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Abstract
Quantum information processing (QIP), which deals with information
transmission and processing under the regime of quantum mechanics, offers
new and fundamentally groundbreaking resources to the domain of crypto-
graphy and computing: the inherent randomness of quantum mechanics as
well as superposition states, which have no classical counterpart.
In this thesis, photonic quantum states are used for experimental real-
isations of two different concepts exploiting these resources. The concept
of quantum key distribution (QKD) is revolutionary because it is the only
cryptographic scheme offering unconditional security, which means that un-
der demanding but realistic conditions, the information of an eavesdropper
can be bounded to be arbitrarily low. Over the last two decades, many
different QKD protocols have been investigated both theoretically and ex-
perimentally. Two major problems prevail: Firstly, matching the conditions
for unconditional security under limited experimental resources is challen-
ging, secondly, long distance communication beyond 200 km is very demand-
ing because for longer distances, an increasingly attenuated quantum state
starts to fail the competition with noise, which remains constant.
One experiment accomplished in this thesis is concerned with the first
problem. The realisation of the actual quantum state used for transmission
is critical. Single photon states from nitrogen and for the first time also
silicon vacancy defect centres are used for a QKD transmission under the
BB84 (Bennett and Brassard 1984) protocol with polarised photons. The
deviation of the used single photon states from the ideal state is thoroughly
investigated and the information an eavesdropper obtains due to this devi-
ation is analysed. The QKD setup is very practical and can be used as a
testbed for single photon emitters from different defect centres.
Transmitting quantum states via satellites is a potential solution to the
limited achievable distances in QKD. A novel protocol particularly suited
for this is implemented for the first time in this thesis, the frequency-time
(FT) protocol. The protocol is thoroughly investigated by varying the ex-
perimental parameters over a wide range and by evaluating the impact on
the performance and the security.
Finally, big steps towards a fully automated fibre-based BB84 QKD ex-
periment in the time-bin implementation with autonomous sender and re-
ceiver units are accomplished.
Another important concept using quantum mechanical properties as a re-
source is a quantum random number generator (QRNG). Random numbers
are used for various applications in computing and cryptography. Especially
QKD itself relies on the usage of good random numbers. A QRNG supply-
ing bits with high and quantifiable randomness at a record-breaking rate is
reportetd and the statistical properties of the random output is thoroughly
tested.
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Zusammenfassung
Die Quanteninformationsverarbeitung, also die U¨bertragung und Prozes-
sierung von Quantenzusta¨nden, hat das Potential, die Informationstechnik
vo¨llig zu vera¨ndern.
In dieser Doktorarbeit werden zwei Konzepte der Quanteninformations-
verarbeitung mithilfe von photonischen Quantenzusta¨nden realisiert. Das
erste Konzept, der Quantenschlu¨sselaustausch, ist revolutiona¨r, weil es das
einzige Kryptografiekonzept ist, welches perfekte Sicherheit gewa¨hrleistet.
Das heißt in diesem Kontext, dass die Information eines potentiellen Lau-
schers unter bestimmten Annahmen auf beliebig kleine Werte begrenzt wer-
den kann. Zahlreiche Quantenkryptografieprotokolle wurden schon unter-
sucht. Zwei grundsa¨tzliche Probleme bleiben bestehen. Zum einen ist es
sehr schwer, unter begrenzten Ressourcen die Bedingungen herzustellen, die
in den Annahmen fu¨r perfekte Sicherheit impliziert sind. Zum anderen sind
die Reichweiten auf momentan etwa 200 km begrenzt, da irgendwann das
abnehmende Signal des Quantenzustands schwa¨cher wird als das konstante
Rauschen.
Ein Experiment, welches im Rahmen dieser Doktorarbeit durchgefu¨hrt
wurde, bescha¨ftigt sich mit dem ersten Problem. Insbesondere die kon-
krete Realisierung des u¨bertragenen Quantenzustands ist sehr kritisch fu¨r
die Sicherheit des Verfahrens. Es werden Einzelphotonen von Stickstoff-
Fehlstellen-Zentren und zum ersten Mal auch von Silizium-Fehlstellen-Zentren
fu¨r einen Quantenschlu¨sselaustausch mit Hilfe des BB84-Protokolls mit po-
larisierten Photonen benutzt. Die Abweichung der benutzten Zusta¨nde von
idealen Einzelphotonenzusta¨nden sowie deren Bedeutung fu¨r die Sicherheit
werden analysiert. Der experimentelle Aufbau kann als Testu¨bertragungsstrecke
fu¨r Einzelphotonen von verschiedensten Defektzentren benutzt werden.
Die U¨bertragung von Quantenzusta¨nden via Satellit ko¨nnte das Problem
der begrenzten Reichweite lo¨sen. Ein neues Protokoll, das Frequenz-Zeit-
Protokoll, eignet sich dafu¨r besonders gut. Es wird wa¨hrend dieser Arbeit
zum ersten Mal u¨berhaupt implementiert. Umfangreiche Untersuchungen
inklusive der Variation wesentlicher experimenteller Parameter geben Auf-
schluss u¨ber die Leistungsfa¨higkeit und Sicherheit des Protokolls.
Außerdem werden elementare Bestandteile eines vollautomatischen Ex-
periments zum Quantenschlu¨sselaustausch u¨ber Glasfasern in der sogenann-
ten Time-bin-Implementierung mit autonomem Sender und Empfa¨nger rea-
lisiert.
Ein anderes wichtiges Konzept der Quanteninformationsverarbeitung ist
die Nutzung des Quantenzufalls zur Herstellung zufa¨lliger Bitfolgen. Zufa¨llige
Bitfolgen haben zahlreiche Anwendungsgebiete in der Kryptografie und der
Informatik. Die Realisierung eines Quantenzufallszahlengenerators mit ma-
thematisch beschreibbarer und getesteter Zufa¨lligkeit und bisher unerreich-
ter Bitrate wird ebenfalls in dieser Doktorarbeit beschrieben.
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1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics started out in the beginning of the 20th century as a theory
able to explain intriguing phenomena which could not be explained by classical
physics. Back then, no one even dreamed of applications of this theory explaining
the behaviour of typically very small systems.
Especially superposition states and entangled states existing in the quantum world
brought about the interest of a small community of scientists but did not seem to
lead to anything ”useful” in the ”real world”. Quantum information processing
(QIP) changed that in a radical manner. Quantum key distribution (QKD) and
quantum computing promise solutions to real problems not at hand in the classical
world.
QKD, a means to secretly communicate between two distant parties secured by the
laws of quantum physics has its roots already in the seventies (although published
only in the 80s) of the past century [1]. Once the idea was mature [2], a rapid
development on the theoretical and experimental level took place. Nowadays the
experimental status is far beyond the first proof-of-principle experiments and first
commercialized QKD setups exist. Still, some fundamental limits remain and
restrict it from a widespread application, making the ongoing research worthwhile.
First brought about by Feynman [3] and others, e.g. Deutsch [4] in the 80s, a
higher interest in quantum computing was only sparkled by the publication of the
Shor algorithm [5]. This is an algorithm using qubits (a quantum algorithm) able
to factorize large primes much faster than any known classical algorithm. While
activities were reinforced over the last 20 years, a fully functional quantum com-
puter still seems out of reach.
The elementary building block of both concepts is the qubit, the quantum mech-
anical analogue to the classical bit. Starting point is a two level quantum system
where each level, represented by the states |0⟩ and |1⟩, respectively, is associated
with a bit. These states are vectors in a two-dimensional Hilbert space. Contrary
to a classical system, this so called qubit can be in a superposition of the two levels
or states:
|Ψ⟩ = α |0⟩+ β |1⟩ (1)
with
|α|2 + |β|2 = 1 . (2)
α and β represent probability amplitudes in form of complex numbers and |α|2
1
and |β|2 are the probabilities of the qubit to be in state |0⟩ and |1⟩, respectively.
Qubit states can be visualized by the Bloch sphere, cf. Figure 1.
|0
|1
|Ψ〉
Figure 1: The Bloch sphere. The poles represent the |0⟩ and the |1⟩ state, respectively.
All qubit states |Ψ⟩ lie on the surface of the sphere.
The surface of the sphere represents all possible qubit states. A classical bit
is represented by one of the two poles. States on the equator are qubits with
equal probabilities of being in state |0⟩ or |1⟩, thus they can be written as
|Ψ⟩ = 1/√2 |0⟩+ 1/√2eiφ |1⟩. That is the most widely encountered form of a
qubit in quantum information.
A realisation of such a qubit can come in different forms and depends on the
application. For quantum computing, stationary qubits are mainly of interest as
can be realised for example with the internal states of trapped ions [6]. For QKD,
qubits should be transmitted from sender to receiver with as little interaction with
the environment as possible. A natural realisation of such a so-called flying qubits
is the photon, for example using two orthogonal polarisations to encode a qubit
state. That is why efficient single photon generation is of great interest in QIP.
The qubit offers characteristics unknown in the classical world which are used
in QKD and quantum computing. In QKD, the impossibility to get better than
probabilistic results when not measuring the qubit in the computational basis
guarantees that an eavesdropper ignorant of the proper measurement will intro-
duce errors and thus will be perceived. For quantum computing, the probabilistic
coexistence of the two classical bits in a single system at the same time enables a
sort of parallel computing unknown in the classical world.
This thesis is dedicated to different QKD experiments and related components.
QKD has come a long way since its first ideas and implementations. Nowadays it
seems to approach its technological limits when it comes to transmission distances
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and rates. The major problem is the sensible nature of the quantum system. It is
also prone to loss and available detection schemes are noisy.
This thesis concentrates on different aspects of potentially stretching the existing
limits. There are different strategies to this: there is an engineer’s approach of
making existing protocols and components better by using more advanced techno-
logy or by simple incremental improvement. At the same time, it is also worthwhile
to concentrate on more fundamental research to develop new efficient sources of
single photons or to explore new protocols. Both strategies are pursued here.
Before discussing the achievements of this thesis, some introductory chapters pre-
cede. In Chapter 2, QKD and its basic ideas as well as the state-of-the-art at
the moment are introduced.
In Chapter 3, basic properties of quantum states of light relevant to this thesis
are described.
The BB84 protocol is thoroughly explained in Chapter 4. This serves as a basis
to understand the QKD experiments presented subsequently.
An efficient single photon source could be an important step towards higher trans-
mission rates and distances. This has been experimentally investigated in this
thesis with a QKD implementation using polarised single photons from nitrogen
vacancy defect centres and for the first time from silicon vacancy centres in dia-
monds, cf. Chapter 5. The construction of the confocal setup used for the single
photon source (SPS) [7] also concentrates on engineering aspects like compactness
and practicability.
Another part of this dissertation is concentrated on the rather conceptual approach
of implementing a new and practical protocol. The frequency-time (FT) protocol,
experimentally realised for the first time, cf. Chapter 6, uses frequency and time
as non-orthogonal bases to encode qubits. Additionally to having advantages for
the implementation and to the robustness of these degrees of freedom in optical
fibres, the potential of the FT protocol for satellite QKD and for transmitting
several bits at a time makes it very interesting.
In the last part of this dissertation the focus is more on an engineer’s approach to
existing technologies. In Chapter 7, the strategy of implementing a state-of-the-
art time-bin encoding scheme is depicted.
Chapter 8 finally reports the joint realisation with the company PicoQuant
GmbH of a quantum random number generator (QRNG) with the highest ran-
dom bit rate at the time using existing high-end timing resolution techniques.
This chapter is also an example that quantum technology already found its way
to real application.
3

2 Quantum key distribution
This chapter will introduce the basic ideas of quantum key distribution (QKD).
In Section 2.1 existing classical cryptographic schemes will be introduced briefly.
Then the basic idea of QKD will be established by means of the BB84 protocol
in Section 2.2. After sketching the complete process of QKD beyond the trans-
mission of qubits in Section 2.3, different qubit representations and protocols are
discussed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 deals with QKD with continuous variables.
The frequency-time (FT) protocol which has been implemented in this thesis is
treated in Section 2.6. QKD with entangled photons is introduced in Section 2.7.
Major security threats such as eavesdropping in Section 2.8 or quantum hacking
in Section 2.9 are presented then before giving an overview of the state-of-the-art
in QKD research at the end of this chapter in Section 2.10.
2.1 From classical to quantum cryptography
There are basically two methods of modern cryptography, namely symmetric-key
cryptography and asymmetric- or public-key cryptography [8]. The basic idea of
symmetric key cryptography is that the sender and the receiver of a message use the
same key to encrypt and decrypt the message. There are two different realisations
of this, the stream cipher and the block cipher [8]. The simplest algorithm is
the stream cipher, which encodes the message by forming the bitwise exclusive
or (XOR) (the bitwise XOR is 1 if the two input bits differ and 0 otherwise) of
the message and a random key of same size [8]. Due to its simplicity, the stream
cipher is a fast algorithm [8]. One example of the stream cipher which is proven
to be absolutely secure [9] is the one-time pad. In the one-time pad, the key is
as long as the message, absolutely random and it is used only once. Since this is
unpractical with conventional technology (see below), algorithms which work with
shorter, cryptographically secure pseudo-random keys are usually used [8]. One
widespread implementation of such an algorithm is RC4 [8].
A block cipher is a more sophisticated algorithm which encrypts and decrypts
whole blocks of bits of a message in a manner determined by the symmetric key.
Usually, several iterations of substitutions and permutations are applied on each
block [8]. Typically, all blocks are randomized in a different way before the al-
gorithm is applied to each of them, so that the same key can be used for several
blocks of plaintext without compromising security [8]. Known examples of block
ciphers are the Data Encryption Standard (DES), using block sizes of 64 bits and
key sizes of 56 bits [8], and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), using block
sizes of 128 bits and key sizes of up to 256 bits [8]. DES was shown to be breakable
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in a reasonable amount of time simply by trying all possible keys, due to its short
key length [8]. AES is still considered to be secure [8].
The main concern in symmetric-key exchange is to distribute the key secretly to
the involved parties. For this, a trusted courier can be used. Also, the actual key
can be exchanged using asymmetric key exchange (see below), as for example in the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [8]. QKD for key distribution in combination
with the one-time pad offers the highest possible security standard if implemented
correctly, as will become clear in the next sections.
Asymmetric-key exchange circumvents the problem of key distribution by using
two different keys, one public and one private, which are mathematically linked. If
used for encryption, the public key is used to encrypt the message and the private
one to decrypt it afterwards [8]. Security is brought about by the complexity of
the mathematical link between the two keys. It is easy to create a public key and
the corresponding private key, but computationally hard to calculate the private
key for a given public key. The used algorithms security is e.g. based on the
difficulty of factorization of large integers [8]. Asymmetric key exchange is widely
used in Internet communication, for example in Transport Layer Security (TLS)
in combination with symmetric keys [8]. A known and widely used algorithm is
RSA (after its designers Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) [10, 8]. Asymmetric key
exchange can also be used for the distribution of a symmetric key, as mentioned
above. This can be of advantage since symmetric encryption is easier and faster
[8]. The principle of asymmetric key exchange can not only be used for encryption
but also as a digital signature. The main idea is here that a message or a hash of
a message can be decrypted by everyone who is in possession of the public key but
could have only be encrypted by the holder of the private key. This works because
the cryptographic process is absolutely symmetric for both keys, both can be used
to either encrypt or decrypt a message [8].
The security of the Internet is nowadays mainly based on asymmetric-key ex-
change. As already mentioned, the security relies on the fact that it is computa-
tionally very hard to calculate the private key from the public key. But this does
not mean that it is impossible, unknown attacks able to break this scheme might
already exist. And there is an algorithm known as Shor’s algorithm, which in con-
junction with a quantum computer would make the scheme based on factorization
of large integers insecure [11].
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2.2 The BB84 protocol
The one-time pad can offer absolute security, the problem is to secretly distribute
the key. QKD can solve this problem by encoding the bits of the key into quantum
states, the security is then guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. The
general scheme combining both ideas is depicted in Figure 2.
Secret 
message
ŶĐƌǇƉƟŽŶ͗
XOR
Quantum
keyAlice
Quantum
key Žď
ĞĐƌǇƉƟŽŶ͗
XOR
Secret 
message
YƵĂŶƚƵŵŬĞǇĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƟŽŶ
Encrypted secret message
Eve
Figure 2: Scheme of the one-time pad in combination with quantum key distribution
(QKD). The one-time pad is used for secure transmission of a secret message between
Alice and Bob over a classical channel. The key, which is a random bit string of the same
length as the message and used only once, is distributed securely guaranteed by the laws
of quantum mechanics over the quantum channel. A possible eavesdropper (Eve) could
attack both channels, but unsuccessfully.
Starting point is the qubit |Ψ〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉, introduced in Chapter 1. When
transmitted from a sender, usually called Alice, to a receiver (Bob), it can be
used to communicate secretly. An eavesdropper, typically called Eve, who tries
to measure the state of the qubit will inevitably force the qubit to collapse onto
either |0〉 or |1〉 with the given probabilities. Also, Eve is not able to make an
exact copy of the qubit because of the no-cloning theorem [12], which is explained
in Appendix A.
Hence, if Alice sends such a general qubit state in form of a photon to Bob via the
so-called quantum channel, Eve cannot intercept the state without changing it and
cannot copy it either. The complete scheme of the first and most important QKD
protocol, the BB84 protocol [2] using polarised single photon states, goes as follows.
Two orthogonal states are chosen to represent each a 0 and a 1 in two different
bases, for example one in the horizontal-vertical (|H〉, |V 〉) and one in the diagonal
polarisation (|+45〉, |−45〉) basis (cf. Figure 3). Those two bases should have
a maximal overlap, i.e. |〈+45|H〉|2 = |〈−45|H〉|2 = |〈+45|V 〉|2 = |〈−45|V 〉|2 = 1
2
.
Alice chooses one of the two bases and then one of the two basis states at random
and sends it to Bob. The transmission can be accomplished via optical fibres
or through free space. Bob has two measurement instruments, one to measure
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the H-V and one for the diagonal basis, and choses one of the two randomly.
Each instrument typically consists of a filter device to separate both polarisations,
e.g. a polarising beam splitter (PBS), and a single photon detector. If Bob chooses
correctly, a deterministic bit measurement is accomplished. If not, the actual state
is in the superposition state with |α|2 = |β|2 = 1
2
with respect to Bob’s basis and
the outcome is random. That is why after transmission Alice and Bob agree about
photons which were processed in corresponding bases and discard the rest during
a process called sifting. The scheme is schematically shown in Figure 3.
Bob
Bob‘s
basis:
Bob‘s
results:
Sent states
from Alice:
Figure 3: Flying qubits sent by Alice on the way to Bob. Bob measures in the H-V
basis and hence all photons are projected on either horizontal or vertical polarisation.
Normally, Bob would vary the basis randomly. In the inset, possible results are shown
when Alice sends randomly one of four different polarisations states and Bob applies
both bases.
If Eve tries to intercept the photon she has to decide for a measurement basis
as well. Afterwards, if she resends the state she measures to Bob she will inev-
itably introduce errors. If she uses the same two bases as Alice and Bob, about
half of the time she chooses the incompatible basis. Then, Eve has no informa-
tion about the bit and the photon she sends to Bob will be projected onto the
wrong state about half of the time. If she chooses the right basis, she will get
full information and introduce no errors. If Eve intercepts every photon like that,
she will thus get half of the information and introduce 25% errors. That is why
Alice and Bob publicly compare a statistically relevant part of the transmitted
key bits afterwards, which is not used for the key itself but only to estimate the
quantum bit error rate (QBER). The QBER is defined as the number of wrongly
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transmitted bits over the overall number of transmitted bits and is given in per-
cent. The eavesdropping can be detected by estimation of it and a compromised
key would not be used for secret communication. Eve could only attack a ratio
of d of the transmitted photons. She will then gain information of d/2 of the
whole key after sifting and will introduce a QBER of d/4. The presented attack is
called intercept-resend attack and is just one of many possible attacks, cf. Section
2.8. However, it demonstrates well the principle of security of QKD. The BB84
protocol is described in more detail in Chapter 4.
2.3 The complete quantum key distribution process
The whole process of QKD is more complex than the basic principle explained
above. It consists of the following steps [13]:
(1) quantum transmission, when qubits are exchanged between Alice and Bob,
(2) sifting,
(3) error estimation,
(4) error correction and
(5) privacy amplification.
The process of quantum transmission has already been explained. The bit
string after the quantum transmission is called the raw key. It is important to
add that beside the equipment to prepare and measure the degree of freedom of
the photon which is used for transmission, Alice and Bob need a good source of
randomness for this process. Alice has to choose the bits and the basis randomly
and Bob his measurement basis. Inherently random quantum mechanical processes
are an ideal source of randomness. QRNGs, i.e. generators of random numbers
or bit strings exploiting quantum randomness are thus particularly well suited for
this and an obvious choice for QKD. The working principle of QRNGs is explained
in Chapter 8.
During sifting Bob publicly announces which photons he detected (transmission
and detection efficiency are typically ≪ 1) and in which basis he measured. Alice
then tells him which measurements to discard because his basis choice was not
corresponding to hers. Alice then also discards these bits as well as those not
detected by Bob. In the absence of errors, Alice and Bob both possess the same
string of bits now. This string is called the sifted key. During sifting no actual bit
information is revealed to a possible eavesdropper. It should be noted that Alice
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and Bob need to label their sent and measured bits identically to perform the
sifting. For this purpose, typically a synchronisation scheme is applied between
them. One such scheme, which has been realised as part of this dissertation is
extensively discussed in Section 7.1.2.
The security of QKD relies on the fact that an eavesdropper inevitably introduces
errors on the sifted key. That is why the error estimation is an essential part
of the protocol. During this process, Alice and Bob publicly compare a randomly
chosen subset of the sifted key to estimate their QBER. The number of compared
bits should be large enough to estimate correctly. At the same time, it should
be relatively small with respect to the raw key since these public bits cannot be
used for a secret key anymore and have to be discarded. Once the QBER is
known, Eve’s information on the key can be estimated. How this is done will be
explained in Section 2.8 and in Section 4.4. Even though the error can also result
from experimental imperfections and not from Eve, all error will be attributed to
her presence, as will be discussed in Section 2.8. Depending on her amount of
information, the sifted key either has to be discarded or will be further processed.
The first step of this so-called post-processing is the error correction.
The error correction aims at transforming an error afflicted sifted key into an
error free key through public communication but without leaking any information
about the concrete value of any single bit to an eavesdropper. This is typically
done by comparing parities (parities are the result of XORs of two or more bits) of
blocks of bits [14]. The block size is chosen such that there is maximally one error
per block with high probability given the estimated QBER. If the parities match,
the block is assumed to be error free. Otherwise, the block size is successively
reduced until the faulty bit is identified. It can then be flipped or discarded.
Several rounds of this process with random block compositions have to be made.
The published information about the bits is only of probabilistic nature to Eve
and no concrete value of a single bit is communicated. Still, Eve gains knowledge
about the key but if the algorithm is efficient she will not learn any more than
Bob does, who thus keeps his information advantage. All information Eve might
have has to be considered in the following process of privacy amplification.
In privacy amplification, Alice and Bob agree on a specific processing of the key
in order to lower Eve’s knowledge about it down to an arbitrarily small amount.
This can be done for example by taking parities of selected bits as constituting
bits for a shorter key [13] or by processing the key with a well chosen hash function
[15]. This way, Eve’s information, which is generally only of probabilistic nature,
will be reduced. At the same time, the key is shrunken. It has to be reduced
by the supposed amount of information Eve possesses plus a well chosen safety
margin [15]. The resulting key is naturally called secure key.
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Transmission
Sifting
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Privacy
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Eve‘s info
Theory:
Upper bound on Eve‘s
information for given 
QBER
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key
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factor
Figure 4: The algorithm of QKD. During quantum transmission, a raw key is generated.
In the process of sifting Alice and Bob agree on qubits which were processed in the same
basis, the others are discarded. From this results the sifted key, which is about half
as long as the raw key. Then Alice and Bob compare a subset of their bits to get an
approximation of the QBER. During error correction, additional information might be
leaked to Eve. The key then has to be reduced by this information and the maximal
information Eve already possesses given the estimated QBER. At the same time it is
modified such that Eve has no more information on it. This process is called privacy
amplification and results in the secure key.
The complete algorithm of QKD transmission is shown in Figure 4. The post-
processing process and Bob’s and Eve’s resulting information on Alice’s key is
illustrated in Figure 5.
The whole classical communication process starting from the sifting has to be
authenticated to guarantee that Alice and Bob talk to each other and not to
Eve who could influence the communication to her advantage (man-in-the-middle
attack). This authentication can be implemented by a shared secret, e.g. using a
small part of an already transmitted secure key. That means that Alice and Bob
have to share an initial secret before their first transmission.
A widely used post-processing protocol is CASCADE [14]. A version of this pro-
tocol has been implemented in C++ in the framework of this dissertation in the
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Key length I = 1
I = 1
I = 1
ΔIBE
ΔIBE
ΔIBE- δsec
Sifted key after error
correction
after privacy
amplification
Figure 5: The effect of post-processing on the information of Bob (grey) and Eve
(shaded) on Alice’s key, shown for comparison in white. After sifting, Bob lacks some
information due to the QBER. Also Eve might have learned something about the key
during transmission, the difference between her and Bob’s knowledge is labeled ∆IBE .
After error correction, Alice’s and Bob’s keys are identical. Eve has gained information
as well, but the information gap between her and Bob ideally remains unchanged. After
privacy amplification, Alice’s and Bob’s key shrinks, but Eve will be left without any in-
formation about the key. In the shrinking process, additionally to Eve’s prior knowledge
further bits δsec have to be sacrificed to create a safety margin.
master thesis of Robert Riemann [175], cf. Section 5.3.
2.4 Other qubit representations
Polarization is not the only photon feature used for encoding. Also, BB84 is not
the only QKD protocol. Other implementations of BB84 as well as other QKD
protocols will be introduced in the following four sections.
One reason to use other degrees of freedom than polarisation is that it is not very
robust in optical fibres which are typically used for transmission. Of course, qubit
states can be realised differently. For example, the phase between two possible
paths a photon can take can also lead to superposition states. This was first
proposed Charles Bennett [16] for a protocol using only two non-orthogonal states.
Figure 6 shows a possible setup for a BB84 protocol with phase qubits [13]. With
this, a state as described in Equation 1 of Chapter 1 can be produced where the
two basis states |0⟩ and |1⟩ represent the two different arms of the interferometer.
The coefficients of the equation then contain the coupling ratio of the first coupler,
which is a fibre-based equivalent to a beam splitter, as well as the phase difference
between the two paths of the interferometer. Thus, the phase difference between
path A and B can be measured, just as in classical interferometry. If the phase
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difference is 0, the photons end up in output 0, whereas if the phase difference is
π the photon ends up in output 1. Alice can set those two phases in her phase
modulator (PM ΦA) to realise the first basis. A second basis can be realised if Bob
sets his phase modulator (PM ΦB) to π/2 and Alice chooses π/2 or 3/2π. If the
bases of Alice and Bob do not correspond, the output port is random.
SP
S
PM
 �
A
PM
 �
B
C 1
C 2 SPDs
0
1
Alice
Bob
Figure 6: The setup for a BB84 QKD experiment where the information is coded in
the phase. The single photon source (SPS) emits photons, which can take two arms of
an interferometer. Alice controls the phase ΦA in one arm through her phase modulator
(PM), Bob controls the phase ΦB in the other arm through his phase modulator. At the
two output ports of the interferometer are two single photon detectors (SPDs), which
are associated with bit 0 or bit 1.
A practical problem in this scheme is the phase stabilisation between two arms.
That is why a similar but more phase stable scheme has been thought of, the time-
bin encoding with two unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometers [16]. In general,
a time-bin qubit refers to a photon which has passed through an unbalanced in-
terferometer and is in a superposition of being in two different time-bins [17], see
Figure 7. The basis states of Equation 1 then represent the two possible instances
in time the photon could be in, the coefficients contain the coupling ratio of the
beam splitters or couplers of the interferometer as well as the phase difference ac-
quired when passing through the different arms. If the coupling ratios can actively
be controlled, for example by an optical switch, this time-bin state can be used to
realise one basis for the BB84 protocol. But typically, the two bases for BB84 are
realised with different phases between the two time-bins, similar as above. These
phases can be read out with a second, identical interferometer on Bob’s side. This
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scheme is introduced in detail in Section 4.2.
|0〉|1〉|hν〉 C1 C2
φ
Figure 7: The generation of a time-bin qubit in a fibre-based setup is shown. By
splitting up a single photon in an unbalanced interferometer one creates a superposition
of two possible instances in time where the photon could be located. The exact form of
the created state depends on the transmission and reflection of the two couplers C1 and
C2 and the phase φ acquired in the interferometer.
There is another class of qubits which belongs to the so-called distributed phase
reference protocols, namely the coherent one-way (COW) [18] and the differential
phase shift keying (DPSK) [19] protocol, cf. Figure 8. For COW, the information is
stored in the position of a nonempty signal pulse within a time bin of two successive
pulses, of which one is a vacuum pulse and the other contains a signal with an
intensity of µ < 1. In DPSK the information is stored in the phase relation between
two successive pulses of the same intensity µ. For both, the security relies on the
coherence between all pulses, i.e. in this case the fixed phase relation between
them. Basically, if an eavesdropper tries to measure the signal coming from Alice,
he will destroy the coherence between the signals. This will be detected, in the
case of DPSK directly by erroneous detections after Bob’s interferometer. In the
case of COW an additional interferometer serves as a second basis to survey the
coherence from time to time.
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Figure 8: Two distributed phase reference QKD protocols. In the upper figure, the
DPSK protocol [19] is depicted. Through the phase modulator (PM), the bit information
is coded in the phase relation of different weak coherent pulses emitted by a pulsed
laser. The coherence between the pulses, symbolized by the arrows, ensures interference
of the pulses in the unbalanced interferometer and guarantees the security as well. An
eavesdropper would break the coherence. In the lower figure, the COW protocol [18]
is depicted. Here the information is encoded in the position of the nonempty weak
coherent pulse within a sequence of two successive pulses of which the other one is a
vacuum pulse. The pulses are formed by an intensity modulator (IM) behind a laser.
Coherence is monitored from time to time with the help of an unbalanced interferometer
coupled to the setup with a coupling ratio (1− tB) ≪ 1. A sequence of two non-empty
pulses has to be sent occasionally for reasons of security.
2.5 Continuous variables quantum key distribution
In addition to discrete QKD with qubits, there is continuous variable QKD [20],
a scheme where measures generate results on a continuous scale. Typically, in
continuous variable QKD the quantum states used are not single photon states
and thus can be measured with standard PIN diodes, so that real amplitudes in-
stead of discrete clicks as with single photon detectors are measured. In principle,
continuous degrees of freedom instead of discrete ones can be used as well with
single photons. But the binary nature of single photon detection, where threshold
detectors either just click or not, is the reason that single photon schemes are typ-
ically described in a discrete variable picture. Most continuous variable schemes
work with quadratures, so in- and out-of-phase components of coherent [21] or
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squeezed states [22, 23], cf. Figure 9. The security of those protocols relies on the
uncertainty principle. The uncertainty principle describes the fact that simultan-
eous high precision measurements of some pairs of physical quantities, for example
both quadratures, are incompatible in quantum mechanics. Coherent states are
minimal uncertainty states with the uncertainty equally distributed in both quad-
ratures, whereas squeezed states have less uncertainty in one quadrature and more
in the other [24]. Also, schemes with small variations in the polarisation of mac-
roscopic coherent states exist [25]. There are many different realisations, schemes
which encode and measure the information in just one degree of freedom [25] or in
both degrees simultaneously [26], schemes with just two possible states and binary
coding [25] or schemes which make use of the continuous degree of freedom [21].
p
q
Figure 9: The optical phase or p-q space. Coherent states are characterized by an
uncertainty represented by a circular disc. A squeezed state has less uncertainty in one,
more in the other dimension.
They all have in common that if Eve tries to make a measurement of the sent states,
the noise increases, in analogy to the QBER in single photon QKD schemes. First
protocols where limited to transmission losses of less than 3 dB between Alice and
Bob. To achieve transmission distances similar to single photon schemes, postse-
lection of suitable measurements [27] or a suitable post-processing [21] (cf. Section
2.3) has to be applied. As mentioned, in principle also single or entangled (cf. be-
low) photons can be used for continuous variables and some protocols have been
devised which make use of the possibility of sending more than one bit at a time
with single photons [28, 29, 30]. A protocol which can be classified in this domain
and also has the potential to be used for a larger alphabet per signal is the FT
protocol, introduced in the following.
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2.6 The frequency-time protocol
This protocol encodes information in the frequency or arrival time of single photons.
It is basically a continuous variables protocol whose security relies on the impossib-
ility of measuring both frequency and time simultaneously due to the uncertainty
relation. Time of arrival and frequency of a photon have the advantage that both
are robust when transmitted in free space or optical fibres. Also, techniques to
generate and measure theses quantities exist and are widely used also in classical
telecommunication protocols. This protocol is implemented in this dissertation in
analogy to the BB84 protocol, with binary coding and two states each in frequency
and time of arrival. The protocol and the implemented experiment are discussed
in more detail in Chapter 6.
2.7 Entangled photons
Entangled quantum states and their use for QKD shall also be briefly introduced
here. An entangled state is a quantum state of two or more quantum systems
which can only be expressed as whole and not as a simple product state of the
individual quantum systems. The involved quantum systems can be located far
away from each other. One example is the following state, one of the famous Bell
states, an entangled state which consists of a pair of photons,Ψ− = 1√
2
(|0⟩ |1⟩ − |1⟩ |0⟩) . (3)
|0⟩ and |1⟩ could for example represent two orthogonal polarisations of the indi-
vidual photons of the photon pair. Such a state can be used for QKD, as proposed
by [31]. Experimental realisations were achieved by several groups simultaneously
[32, 33, 34]. It can be sent to Alice and to Bob who measure it in one of two
random bases, analog to the BB84 protocol. The trick is that this state will give
random but correlated results for both photons in any basis in which the entan-
glement can be described, as long as both Alice’s and Bob’s bases are the same.
The protocol can be described in analogy to the BB84 protocol and this analogy
is in fact paramount to prove the security of BB84, as will be described in 4.4.1.
Entanglement can also be used for continuous variable protocols [23].
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2.8 Eavesdropping
As mentioned, eavesdropping causes errors in the sifted key and thus will be de-
tected by Alice and Bob. In order to describe the security quantitatively, it is
important to know which could be Eve’s most effective eavesdropping strategy,
how much information it yields to her and how much QBER it causes at Bob’s
side. The goal is to prove the security of QKD in a rigorous and mathematical
way. This is no easy task, such a proof depends on the specific QKD protocol and
its implementation as well as on the assumptions about the power Eve possesses.
There are three different classes of attacks which assume different capabilities of
Eve. Depending on the class of attacks one supposes, security is more or less easy
to prove.
Individual attacks are the simplest kind of attacks. In these attacks, Eve is al-
lowed to have a probe interacting with each transmitted qubit individually. The
measurement of her probe can then be delayed until the sifting is conducted. The
individual attack has been analysed thoroughly for BB84 and the security against
it has been proven, for example in [35]. From a technological point of view, for
this attack Eve might need some kind of quantum circuit acting on two qubits
for the interaction of probe and qubit and a device to coherently store her probes
(quantum memory) until the sifting process [35]. The intuitive intercept-resend
attack illustrated in Section 2.2 is a very simple version of an individual attack.
The collective attack is more general. It has been analysed for BB84 and the se-
curity against it has been proven [36]. In this attack, Eve also lets interact each
probe with each qubit individually. She also stores them in a quantum memory
afterwards, but this time she waits until error correction and privacy amplification
are over and then makes the optimal measurement giving her the maximum pos-
sible information about the final key. This measurement can be a measurement
on many qubits at a time, which might be advantageous since also in the post-
processing process several bits are combined to form a new key. Thus for this Eve
would additionally need quantum circuits acting on an arbitrary number of qubits
and thus a veritable quantum computer [4].
The most general attacks allowed by the laws of physics are coherent attacks. In
these attacks, Eve’s probe can be a n-dimensional quantum object interacting with
the n quantum bits interchanged between Alice and Bob coherently. The probe
can be stored in a quantum memory until post-processing is finished and can then
be processed by Eve in any manner allowed by physics. Security against this most
general attack has been proven for BB84 with single photons [37], cf. Section 4.4.1
and also with weak coherent pulse (WCP) [38].
To put these theoretical classifications into perspective, already a practical im-
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plementation of some individual attacks seems very difficult given the technology
available today [35]. Collective or even coherent attacks seem to be out of reach
with today’s technology. Nevertheless, it is the correct approach to assume an
eavesdropper as powerful as possible if the claim of superior security of QKD
should stand firm. That is also why in practical QKD, where QBERs due to ex-
perimental imperfections are typically in the order of several percent, this error
has to be treated as if being a sign of Eve’s presence. An almighty Eve might be
able to compensate for imperfect equipment of Alice and Bob and exploit the error
margin for eavesdropping.
An important concept in QKD is the notion of unconditional security. It means
that security is guaranteed and an upper bound of Eve’s information for a given
QBER can be calculated for any kind of attack allowed by physics, as long as some
supplementary requirements on the implementation are fulfilled [39]:
1. Eve cannot access Alice’s and Bob’s devices to check their settings.
2. Alice and Bob must trust their random number generators.
3. The classical channel is authenticated with unconditionally secure [8] au-
thentication protocols, e.g. the one proposed by Carter and Wegman [40].
4. Eve is limited by the laws of physics.
5. The exchanged quantum states must match the theoretical description.
BB84 has been proven to be unconditionally secure for ideal SPSs [37] and WCPs
[38]. There has also been a prove of unconditional security for distributed phase
reference protocols [41]. To the author’s knowledge, there are only security proofs
against collective attacks for some classes of continuous variable protocols up to
date [42, 43].
2.9 Quantum hacking
Despite the proven theoretical security of BB84 and other protocols, there are
ways to hack real QKD schemes, meaning that eavesdropping causes only little
or no significant error. But this hacking is only possible because the technical
implementation is flawed and so at least one requirement of the unconditional
security notion is not fulfilled. Two well known attacks on existing commercial
QKD systems are described in [44, 45]. The field of quantum hacking is very
important. By revealing vulnerabilities of real QKD implementations it advances
their security.
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2.10 State-of-the-art
QKD is a mature field of research. But to become a real world application up to its
potential, unsolved issues remain. The major problem is the limited transmission
distance and key rate. The weak quantum signal gets absorbed in optical fibres
or through air. In fibres, transmission losses are minimally 0.16 dB/km at an
optical wavelength of 1550 nm, cf. for example the supplemental material of [46].
Losses through air minimally amount to around 0.1 dB/km at a wavelength of
around 1560 nm and for clear sky [47]. Inefficient and noisy detectors aggravate the
problem. Furthermore, optical fibres used for regular Internet transmission cannot
be used since this traffic causes excess noise and the frequently used amplifiers
destroy the quantum signals.
Several experimental implementations mark the state-of-the-art in QKD in terms
of rate, transmission distance and technical maturity. The latest COW imple-
mentation achieved a record breaking distance of 307 km over optical fibres with
a key rate of approximately 3 bits/s [46]. A time-bin BB84 experiment achieves
the highest reported key rates of up to 1.09Mbit/s over 50 km [48]. A BB84 pro-
tocol with polarised photons over 200 km of optical fibre has been achieved at the
dispense of using active compensation techniques [49] against the non-constant po-
larisation transformation in optical fibres. Continuous variables QKD, for which
increasing noise at higher distances constitutes a bigger problem for the error cor-
rection schemes, has been realised up to a distance of 80 km with a secure key rate
of 200 bits/s supposing collective attacks [50].
As mentioned before, there have also been several efforts to increase the capacity of
a single photon to transmit more than one bit at a time with the goal of achieving
higher key rates [28, 29, 30].
There have been experiments improving the compatibility between classical and
quantum communication on a single fibre using wavelength-division multiplexing
(WDM) techniques [51, 52].
There are even several commercial fibre-based QKD setups. Two, the ones from ID
Quantique [53] and from MagiQ [54], work with the time-bin version of the BB84
protocol. There is one scheme based on continuous variables from SeQureNet [55].
Solutions to the limited transmission distance come from two different approaches.
First of all, there is the idea of the quantum repeater [56], proposing to divide large
distances into smaller segments. Entanglement transmitted over these segments
can then successively be passed on by entanglement swapping [57] until the end
points are reached. This interesting scheme still seems out of reach with today’s
technology. The idea of satellite QKD [58, 59], proposing that distant locations
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can be connected via low earth orbit (LEO) satellites in a triangle configuration,
seems more realistic at the present day [60]. This scheme benefits from the thinning
atmosphere in the upward direction which offers relatively good transmission char-
acteristics. That is why free space QKD, besides of being useful in metropolitan
line-of-sight connections, is of great interest. The longest free space transmission
distance achieved with polarisation based BB84 is 144 km [61]. There has also
been an experiment achieving transmission between a fixed and a moving object,
actually a plane [62], which is also interesting in this context.
21

3 Quantum states of light
In the previous chapter photons have been suggested as ideal transmitters of
quantum information. This chapter now introduces some basics of photonic quantum
states. At the beginning, in Section 3.1, the quantum theory of light is introduced
as well as some basic formalism to describe it. Then the two most important
quantum light states used in optical quantum information are introduced, namely
Fock states in Section 3.2 and coherent states in Section 3.3. These states can not
be fully appreciated without introducing some principal ideas of calculating and
measuring statistical properties of light beams in Section 3.4.
3.1 From classical light to photons
Quantum mechanics came about because several experiments could not be de-
scribed by existing theories. One example for this is the photoelectric effect,
which was first observed by Heinrich Hertz in 1887 [63] but not yet understood
at that time. It was Einstein in 1905 who gave an explanation to the effect by
describing light as consisting of discrete particles which each possess an amount
of energy given by its frequency multiplied with a constant [64], thus postulating
the existence of photons. Hence, only photons above a certain frequency carry
enough energy to release an electron from the metal surface. Another example is
blackbody radiation and the prediction of classical physics that it would contain
an infinite energy, which is known as the ultraviolet catastrophe. Only Planck’s
law [65] solved this problem. It required that the oscillators in the wall which in
thermal equilibrium equally absorb and emit radiation can only do so in terms
of indivisible quanta of energy which depend on the oscillator’s frequency. This,
together with the introduction of light quanta or photons by Einstein ultimately
led to the introduction of quantum theory, which is able to describe this and other
quantum phenomena.
When formally introducing photons one must start with the classical Maxwell
equations. For a free electromagnetic field in free space with E describing the
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electric and B the magnetic field they are
∇ · E = 0 , (4)
∇ ·B = 0 , (5)
∇× E = −∂B
∂t
, (6)
∇×B = 1
c2
∂E
∂t
, (7)
with c =
1√
ε0µ0
, (8)
where c is the speed of light in free space, ε0 is the electric vacuum permittivity
and µ0 the magnetic vacuum permittivity. When applying the curl to 6 and 7, one
gets the wave equations for the electric field and magnetic field,
∇2E− 1
c2
∂2E
∂t2
= 0 , (9)
∇2B− 1
c2
∂2B
∂t2
= 0 . (10)
An electric field in a cavity, linearly polarised in x-direction and satisfying Equation
9, when summed over over all possible cavity modes will take the form [66]
E(r, t) = Ex(z, t) =

j
Ajqj(t)sin(kj · z) , (11)
where
Aj =

2ω2j mj
V ε0
2
, (12)
with mj being a constant with the dimension of a mass and qj being an amplitude
with the dimension of a length. Both are introduced to visualize the analogy of a
single optical mode with that of the harmonic oscillator in the Hamilton mechanics
formulation (see below), as in [66]. ωj = j · π · c/L is the frequency of the cavity
mode j, where j = 1, 2, 3, ..., kj = j ·π/L, and V is the mode volume in the cavity.
In its general form it is given by V =

V ′ drε(r) |E(r)|2

/

max

ε(r) |E(r)|2,
where ε is the permittivity and the integral is over all space (V ′) [67]. Following
from Equation 11, the magnetic field has the form
B(r, t) = By(z, t) =

j
µ0Aj

q˙j(t) ε0
kj

cos(kj · z) . (13)
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Writing down the classical Hamiltonian of the field in the present form calculated
for the volume of the cavity, one gets
H = 1
2

V

ε0E
2
x +
1
µ0
B2y

dV . (14)
Substituting the expressions 11 and 13 for Ex and By, respectively, Equation 14
becomes
H = 1
2

j

mjωjqj +mj q˙
2

(15)
=
1
2

j

mjωjqj +
p2j
mj

, (16)
with the momentum pj = mj q˙j . This shows the equivalence to the Hamiltonian
for different modes of the harmonic oscillator. The quantization of functions in
the Hamilton mechanics formulation is accomplished by replacing the observables
with quantum mechanical operators. In this way, a single optical mode, which is
a associated with a single mode of an harmonic oscillator is quantized in complete
analogy to it by associating the variables qj and pj with the quantum mechanical
operators qˆj and pˆj. A fundamental difference between classical and quantum
mechanics is the fact that many operators do not commute. This is expressed by
the commutator relations, which are for qˆj and pˆj
[qˆi, pˆj] = qˆipˆj − pˆj qˆi = ih¯δij , (17)
[qˆi, qˆj] = 0 , (18)
[pˆi, pˆj] = 0 . (19)
It is useful to replace the operators qˆj and pˆj with the annihilation and creation
operators aˆj and aˆ
†
j, whose meaning will become apparent soon,
qˆj =

h¯
2mωj
(aˆ†j + aˆj) , (20)
pˆj = i

mh¯ωj
2
(aˆ†j − aˆj) . (21)
With these the quantum mechanical Hamilton operator becomes
Hˆ = h¯

j
ωj

aˆ†j aˆj +
1
2

. (22)
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The annihilation and creation operators obey the commutator relations
[aˆi, aˆ
†
j] = δij , (23)
[aˆi, aˆj] = 0 , (24)
[aˆ†i , aˆ
†
j] = 0 . (25)
With these operators, the electric and magnetic fields take the form
Ex(z, t) =

j
ξj

aˆje
−iωjt + aˆ†je
iωjt

sin(kj · z) , (26)
By(z, t) = −iµ0ε0c

j
ξj

aˆje
−iωjt − aˆ†jeiωjt

cos(kj · z) , (27)
with ξj =

h¯ωj
ε0V

, (28)
which has the dimensions of an electric field. This result can be generalized to
a field in free space in which case the volume V represents a volume for which
periodic boundary conditions are established [66],
E(r, t) =

k
ϵkξkaˆke
−i(ωkt−k·r) +H.c. , (29)
B(r, t) =

k
k× ϵk
ωk
ξkaˆke
−i(ωkt−k·r) +H.c. , (30)
where ϵk is an unit polarisation and H.c. stands for Hermitian conjugate.
3.2 Fock states
To introduce Fock states, only a single mode of the optical field will be considered
for simplicity and without loss of insight, the index j will thus be omitted in what
follows. It is useful to introduce the eigenvectors |n⟩ to the Hamilton operator Hˆ
together with the corresponding eigenvalues En,
Hˆ |n⟩ = h¯ω

aˆ†aˆ+
1
2

|n⟩ = En |n⟩ . (31)
aˆ†aˆ can be expressed by the number operator nˆ = aˆ†aˆ, which has the eigenvalue
equation [66]
nˆ |n⟩ = n |n⟩ (32)
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and thus the corresponding energy eigenvalue of |n⟩,
En =

n+
1
2

h¯ω . (33)
It can also be shown that
aˆ |n⟩ = √n |n− 1⟩ , (34)
aˆ† |n⟩ = √n+ 1 |n+ 1⟩ . (35)
It is now very intuitive that the state |n⟩ represents a light mode consisting of
exactly n photons of frequency ω, each carrying an energy of h¯ω. These states are
called photon-number or Fock states.
Fock states have the following characteristics. First of all, they form a complete
set of states, i.e
∞
n
|n⟩ ⟨n| = 1 . (36)
They form an orthonormal basis,
⟨n|m⟩ = δnm . (37)
An arbitrary state can thus be represented by Fock states,
|ψ⟩ =

n
cn |n⟩ , (38)
with
cn = ⟨n|ψ⟩ . (39)
Arbitrary Fock states can be created by repeated application of the creation op-
erator on the vacuum state,
|n⟩ =

aˆ†
n
√
n!
|0⟩ . (40)
The mean photon number or expected value of a state |n⟩ is naturally
⟨n⟩ = ⟨n|nˆ|n⟩ = n . (41)
The variance is
(∆n)2 =

n|nˆ2|n− ⟨n|nˆ|n⟩2 = 0 . (42)
Of particular interest in quantum optics is of course the single photon state |1⟩,
produced by a single photon source (SPS).
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3.3 Coherent states
For the introduction of coherent states only single mode optical fields will be
considered as well.
Coherent states are eigenstates of the annihilation operator,
aˆ |α⟩ = α |α⟩ , (43)
with α being a complex amplitude. Calculating the mean photon number with the
number operator nˆ, one gets
⟨n⟩ = α aˆ†aˆα = |α|2 . (44)
Using Equations 40, 43, the orthogonality of the Fock states and requiring |α⟩ to
be normalized, the representation of coherent states in the Fock state basis looks
as
|α⟩ = e− |α|
2
2
∞
n
αn√
n!
|n⟩ . (45)
The probability pn to find n photons in the coherent state |α⟩ is
pn = |⟨n|α⟩|2 = e−⟨n⟩ ⟨n⟩
n
n!
. (46)
This is a Poissonian distribution. Figure 10 shows the photon number distribution
for coherent states and for comparison for a Fock state.
The variance of a coherent state is
(∆n)2 = ⟨n⟩ = |α|2 , (47)
as can be easily shown by properly rearranging the creation and annihilation op-
erators [24].
Coherent states are important in quantum optics because they are the best approx-
imation to classical light states, for example the states generated by lasers. Weak
coherent pulses (WCPs) are used to approximate single photon states in many
experiments, despite their fundamentally different statistical features, as will be
discussed in the next section.
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Figure 10: The probabilities for coherent and Fock states to contain a certain amount
of photons are shown. Both have a mean photon number of 〈n〉 = 4. Whereas the
photon number of the Fock state is determined, the coherent states’ photon number
obeys a Poissonian distribution.
3.4 Characterizing light sources
3.4.1 Autocorrelation functions
Now the field and intensity correlation functions of a single light beam are intro-
duced, the autocorrelation functions. Starting point are the classical expressions,
then a transition to the quantum mechanical expressions is made. They have an
important meaning in interference experiments. In addition, the quantum mech-
anical intensity autocorrelation function leads to expressions which enable to fully
appreciate the nature of non-classical light sources such as single photon source
(SPS).
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3.4.1.1 Spectral properties of light - the degree of first order coherence
The degree of first order coherence is a normalized version of the first-order auto-
correlation function and is for a plane wave light beam [24]
g(1) (z1, t1; z2, t2) =
⟨E∗ (z1, t1)E (z2, t2)⟩|E (z1, t1)|2 |E (z2, t2)|21/2 , (48)
with E(zi, ti) being the complex field amplitude of the light beam at point zi and
time ti and the ⟨⟩ brackets stand for the average over a time much longer than one
period of oscillation of the light. This function relates the field of a single plane
wave light beam at two different points in space z1 and z2 and at two different
instances in time t1 and t2. The degree of first order coherence plays a role in
interference experiments such as in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer, cf. Figure 11.
4
3
1
2
Figure 11: The scheme of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Light from input 1 or input
2 is split by a beam splitter (BS). The light then is reunited on a second BS where it
interferes, which affects the intensities at output 3 and 4
Looking at the averaged intensity at output 4 for an incoming light beam at output
1, one gets the expression [24]
I¯4(t) =
1
2
ε0c |R|2 |T |2
|E(t1)|2+ |E(t2)|2+ 2ℜ [E⋆(t1)E(t2)] , (49)
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where I¯ is the averaged intensity over one period of field oscillation, T and R are
the transmission and reflection coefficient of the involved beam splitters and t1 and
t2 are the acquired delays of the light traveling through the two different arms. If
the light is stationary, meaning that its statistical characteristics over time do not
change, one can drop the indices 1 and 2 marking specific instances in time and
only τ = t2 − t1 is relevant. With this, expression Equation 49 can be written as
[24] 
I¯4(t)

= 2 |R|2 |T |2 I¯(t) 1 + ℜ g(1)(τ) (50)
= 2 |R|2 |T |2 I¯(t) 1 + g(1)(τ) cos arg g(1)(τ) (51)
= 2 |R|2 |T |2 I¯(t) 1 + g(1)(τ) cos ϕ , (52)
with

I¯(t)

=
1
2
ε0c
|E(t)|2 . (53)
Here g(1)(τ) is a simplified version of Equation 48 for stationary light and the
intensity measured at a single point. ℜ[g(1)(τ)] is the term introducing the inter-
ference effects. The absolute value of the g(1)(τ) function depends on the spec-
tral properties of the light beam and can be used to define its coherence time
τc =
∞
−∞
g(1)(τ)2 dτ . It can also be used to calculate the normalized spectral dis-
tribution function by use of the Wiener-Khintchine theorem [24],
F (ω) =
1
π
ℜ
 ∞
0
g(1)(τ)eiωτdτ
 . (54)
g(1)(0) is always 1. Light is said to be first-order coherent if |g(1)(τ)| = 1 for all τ .
In this context it is interesting to introduce the visibility V , which is a measure of
the contrast in interference experiments when observing interference fringes [66],
for example by slightly varying the path length difference in the interferometer of
Figure 11,
V =
⟨I⟩max − ⟨I⟩min
⟨I⟩max + ⟨I⟩min
, (55)
where ⟨I⟩max and ⟨I⟩min are the maximal and minimal observed intensities when
slightly varying the path length difference around a temporal difference of τ . Look-
ing at Equation 52 one can appreciate that the maximal and minimal intensities
result when the cosine equals +1 and −1 and V can actually be expressed as
V =
g(1)(τ) . (56)
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As pointed out, the degree of first order coherence gives information about the
spectral properties of a light beam. Very often in quantum optics one is interested
in the statistical properties of the intensity of a light source, which can be identified
by measuring the degree of second order coherence. Particularly the characteristics
of a SPS can only be appreciated like that.
3.4.1.2 Intensity fluctuations of light - the degree of second order co-
herence
The degree of second order coherence is the normalized second order autocorrela-
tion function, for plane polarised parallel beams it is [24]
g(2) (z1, t1; z2, t2) =
⟨E∗ (z1, t1)E∗ (z2, t2)E (z2, t2)E (z1, t1)⟩|E (z1, t1)|2 |E (z2, t2)|2 . (57)
If the light is stationary and if the degree of second order coherence is evaluated
at a single point in space, only the relative difference in time τ = t2 − t1 matters.
With this Equation 57 becomes
g(2) (τ) =
⟨E∗ (t)E∗ (t+ τ)E (t+ τ)E (t)⟩
⟨E∗ (t)E (t)⟩2 , (58)
where τ = t2−t1. If the light beam is classical, inequalities describing the properties
of g(2) (τ) at different τ can be established [24],
1 ≤ g(2) (0) ≤ ∞ , (59)
0 ≤ g(2) (τ) ≤ ∞ τ ̸= 0 , (60)
g(2) (τ) ≤ g(2) (0) . (61)
Inequality 61 means that for classical light, g(2) (0) can never be smaller than
g(2) (τ) for τ ̸= 0. This is not true for some fields which are described by quantum
mechanics, as will be seen below. Two different kinds of classical light sources
are interesting in this context. A stable electromagnetic wave of monochromatic
light, meaning that no amplitude or phase fluctuations are present and the τc is
infinitely long, gives a g(2)(τ) = 1 for all τ . A thermal light source can be shown
to have a g(2) (0) = 2 and a g(2) (τ) → 1 for τ ≫ τc.
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3.4.1.3 Quantum mechanical degrees of coherence
In order to evaluate the degrees of coherence for quantum fields, quantum mech-
anical operators are used instead of the classical complex field amplitudes,
g(1) (z1, t1; z2, t2) =

Eˆ− (z1, t1) Eˆ+ (z2, t2)


Eˆ− (z1, t1) Eˆ+ (z1, t1)

Eˆ− (z2, t2) Eˆ+ (z2, t2)
1/2
(62)
for plane parallel beams. If a stationary field is observed at a single point in space,
then
g(1) (τ) =

Eˆ− (t) Eˆ+ (t+ τ)


Eˆ− (t) Eˆ+ (t)
 . (63)
Eˆ− (z, t) and Eˆ+ (z, t), respectively, denote the negative or positive frequency part
of the electric field operator of Equation 26 or more generally of Equation 29
which contain the creation and annihilation operators, respectively. Differently
to the classical expressions, the quantum mechanical operators do not generally
commute. The order in which they appear here, with annihilation operators lying
to the right of creation operators, is the so-called normal ordering. It is important
to use this normal ordering to account for measured intensities [24].
A quantum mechanical treatment does not give any different results for g(1)(τ)
than a classical one. For the second order coherence and a plane parallel light
beam the quantum mechanical version is
g(2) (z1, t1; z2, t2) =

Eˆ− (z1, t1) Eˆ− (z2, t2) Eˆ+ (z2, t2) Eˆ+ (z1, t1)


Eˆ− (z1, t1) Eˆ+ (z1, t1)

Eˆ− (z2, t2) Eˆ+ (z2, t2)
 (64)
and
g(2) (τ) =

Eˆ− (t) Eˆ− (t+ τ) Eˆ+ (t+ τ) Eˆ+ (t)


Eˆ− (t) Eˆ+ (t)
2 , (65)
respectively. If a single mode light beam is considered, g(2)(τ) becomes a time-
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independent function [24],
g(2) (τ) =

aˆ†aˆ†aˆaˆ

⟨aˆ†aˆ⟩2 (66)
= 1 +
(∆n)2 − ⟨n⟩
⟨n⟩2 . (67)
For Fock states this results together with Equation 41 and Equation 42 in
g(2) (τ) = 1− 1
n
. (68)
This is a surprising result, since it clearly violates that g(2) (0) ≥ 1 (see Equation
59) for n ≪ ∞. This result can only be achieved by fields which can exclus-
ively be described by quantum mechanics. It has been confirmed experimentally
many times. Light having the second order temporal degree of coherence < 1 at
τ = 0 has sub-Poissonian statistics. For a coherent state Equation 67 results in
g(2) (τ) = 1 = g(2) (0). This coincides with the classical result of a stable mono-
chromatic wave, which is thus very well approximated by coherent light. Light
beams with g(2) (τ) = 1 are called Poissonian.
If more realistic multimode coherent or Fock states are treated, the results are the
same. Additionally, thermal light treated this way gives results like in the classical
case, with g(2) (0) = 2 and g(2) (τ) = 1 for τ ≫ τc. Light with a g(2) (τ) > 1 is
called super-Poissonian.
There is no time dependence of g(2) (τ) in Equation 68. If the light described by
a Fock state is described more rigorously with respect to its source, for example
when describing fluorescence from a two-level system in a good approximation to
an actual SPS, a time dependence of g(2)(τ) is found. This gives rise to another
phenomenon only observed in the quantum world, which is antibunching [24]. An-
tibunching takes place when g(2)(0) < g(2)(τ). It expresses the fact that photons
from such a light source are less likely to be emitted at the same time than at dif-
ferent times, which is naturally the signature of a single photon source. Thermal
sources are more likely to emit more than one photons at a time, this is called
bunching. The emission of photons from a coherent light source is completely ran-
dom without any time correlation. These characteristics are illustrated in Figure
12 for different light sources.
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Figure 12: To the left: representation of the time-series of photocounts for a) a thermal
light source with bunching, b) a coherent light source with Poissonian distributed photon
emission and c) an anti-bunched light source as for example a single photon source (SPS).
To the right, the corresponding g(2)(τ) are shown.
Single photon sources (SPSs) have two statistical properties only explainable by a
quantum mechanical description: they have a sub-Poissonian statistics and they
show antibunching. Both . Often, these two characteristics of a light source are
observed at the same time, but this does not have to be the case [68].
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3.4.2 The Hanburry Brown and Twiss effect
It was shown how the first order degree of coherence is connected to the visibility
in an interferometer. However it has not yet been explained how the second order
degree of coherence is actually measured. The measurement setup is actually
simple, as shown in Figure 13.
4
3
1I¯1(t)
Coincidences(τ = t4- t3)
Figure 13: The typical setup to measure the Hanbury Brown and Twiss (HBT) effect.
An incoming beam is equally divided by a 50/50 beam splitter (BS) before each output
is measured by a detector. The detector signals are analysed in a coincidence counter.
The result can be used to calculate g(2)(τ).
The light beam to be measured is simply divided into two equal beams by a 50/50
BS. The light beam is then measured with two single photon detectors which out-
put a stream of clicks proportional to the number of impinging photons. The
coincidences between the two detectors at time intervals of synchronous detections
are counted by an electronic coincidence counter. The recorded signal can be con-
verted into a histogram of time differences between correlated detections which is
directly proportional to g(2)(τ) and only has to be normalized. Theoretically only
a single detector without a beam splitter would suffice to make this measurement,
as was shown also experimentally in [69]. The setup with a beam splitter and
two detectors is necessary when trying to measure beams with only few photons
because detectors sensitive to single photons are typically not able to resolve the
detected number of photons and have a significant dead time after detection. This
setup, also called intensity interferometer, was originally invented to measure an-
gular sizes of astronomical objects [70] and the measured correlation of intensities
is called the HBT effect after its discoverers.
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4 The BB84 protocol
The importance of the BB84 protocol for quantum key distribution (QKD) has
already been mentioned. It was the first and is today still the most implemented
protocol, with state-of-the-art and even commercial realisations. It has also been
the first QKD protocol for which unconditional security has been established. In
this chapter the most important aspects are examined, starting with the two most
frequent realisations in Section 4.1, the one using polarised photons and the time-
bin implementation. Then key components such as light sources, electro-optic
modulators and detectors are discussed in detail in Section 4.3. Especially light
sources play a crucial role when it comes to the security of the protocol. Finally
the security is discussed in more depth and the calculation of secure key rates is
established in Section 4.4. This is used in later chapters to describe the three
different QKD experiments reported on in this dissertation.
4.1 The standard protocol - BB84 with polarisation
In Figure 14 a basic scheme for a BB84 experiment with polarised photons is
shown. In this very simple realisation, four different pulsed laser diodes (LD)
emit the horizontally, vertically, +45◦ and −45◦ polarised photons needed. The
beams are combined by beam splitters (BSs) and attenuated by a neutral density
filter (ND) to approximate single photons before being transmitted to Bob. On
Bob’s side, a BS serves as a passive device to randomly choose a basis. This is an
implementation of a passive basis choice. If in contrast an active device is used for
the basis choice, which has to be fed with random numbers, it is called active basis
choice. In both outputs of the beam splitter BS, there is a polarising beam splitter
(PBS) and two avalanche photodiodes (APDs), in one output there is an additional
λ/2 plate in front of the PBS which turns an incoming linear polarisation by 45◦.
In this way, the horizontally and the vertically and diagonally polarised photons,
respectively, can be distinguished. A photon measured in the wrong basis gives a
random result through a random projection on one of the two output states of the
PBS.
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Figure 14: A basic scheme for an experimental realisation of the BB84 protocol with
polarised photons, here coming from pulsed laser diodes (LD). There is one diode for
each polarisation used, horizontal (H), vertical (V), and the two diagonal ones (+45◦,
−45◦). A neutral density filter (ND) attenuates the laser pulses to approximately single
photon level. On Bob’s side, a first beam splitter (BS) realises Bob’s random basis choice.
In one basis, a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) distinguishes between horizontally and
vertically polarised photons. In the other basis the photons are first rotated by 45◦ such
that the two diagonally polarised photons can be faithfully distinguished by a PBS as
well. The detection is realised with four APDs.
If transmission is performed via an optical fibre instead of free-space, the polarisa-
tion will most likely be transformed and the transformation will usually not remain
stable over time (cf. Section 4.3.3 in this chapter). Then, additional waveplates
can be used in front of Bob’s measurement apparatus to compensate for this effect.
An alternative setup with less light sources and less detectors and thus reduced
cost can be realised using active optical components such as electro-optic modu-
lators (EOMs), see Figure 15. An EOM is a device which acts as an electrically
modulatable waveplate when a voltage is applied. It will be described in more
detail in 4.3.2. With this EOM, vertically polarised light from a laser diode or
a real SPS is either left unmodified or turned by 90◦ to become horizontally po-
larised light when the EOM acts as λ/2 plate. The EOM can also act as ±λ/4
plate to transform the vertically polarised light into left- or right-handed circular
polarisation.
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Figure 15: A basic scheme for an experimental realisation of the BB84 protocol with
polarised photons, here with only one pulsed laser diode (LD), two APDs and active
base choice. The diode emits vertically polarised photons. An EOM is used to either
not modify the polarisation, turning it by 90◦ or transforming the linear into left- or right-
handed circular polarisation. A neutral density filter (ND) attenuates the laser pulses
to approximately single photon level. On Bob’s side, a second EOM either leaves the
polarisation unmodified or acts as a λ/4 plate to transform circular light into linear one.
Linear light can then be deterministically discriminated by a polarizing beam splitter
(PBS) before the light is detected in one of its two outputs with an APD. Circular light
gives random detection events.
When represented in the linear polarisation base,
|L⟩ = 1√
2
(|H⟩+ i |V ⟩) , (69)
|R⟩ = 1√
2
(|H⟩ − i |V ⟩) . (70)
It can be seen that the overlap between this two bases is the same as between
the horizontal/vertical and the diagonal basis introduced before. On Bob’s side,
instead of the BS, an EOM can be used to either leave the light unmodified or
to turn circular polarisation into linear one or vice versa. Linear polarisation can
then be faithfully discriminated with a PBS and two APDs whereas circular light
gives random results. This is thus a realisation of an active base choice.
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4.2 The time-bin implementation
The time-bin scheme has already been briefly introduced in 2.4. Now it will be
presented in more detail. It is especially well suited for transmission via optical
fibres where polarisation is not very robust. A scheme is shown in Figure 16.
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Figure 16: The fibre-based time bin scheme. A photon is in a superposition state
of two different time-bins l or s after passing through an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder-
interferometer with a short arm s1 and a long arm l1. In this interferometer, Alice can
modify the phase ΦA in one arm with her phase modulator (PM). When the photon
passes through an identical interferometer at Bob’s side with short arm s2 and long arm
l2, detection with two APDs can take place in three different time slots (see on top on
the right): a first one, corresponding to the photon having taken the short arm in both
interferometers, a last one, corresponding to a photon which went through the long arms
of both interferometers and an intermediate one (red rectangle). Photons being detected
in this intermediate time slot can have passed either through the long arm l1 in the first
and the short arm s2 in the second interferometer or the short arm s1 in the first and the
long arm l2 in the second interferometer. These two possibilities are indistinguishable
and thus interfere at the last coupler of Bob’s interferometer. Bob can influence the
phase ΦB in one arm of this interferometer by a phase modulator and applies his basis
choice by this.
In a first unbalanced interferometer controlled by Alice, a time-bin qubit is created.
The photon will have either passed through the short arm, denoted by s1 or the long
arm, l1, the path length difference being ∆l. Alice can influence the phase ΦA in
the long arm by a phase modulator (PM). This is basically an EOM with an index
of refraction depending on the applied voltage. On Bob’s side the superposition
state passes through a second, identical interferometer. In this interferometer, Bob
can influence the phase ΦB in the long arm by a phase modulator. The photon
can take again the short arm, denoted by s2 or the long arm, l2. Then detection
occurs in one of two APDs at either of the output arms of the interferometer in
three different possible time-slots, as shown in Figure 16. These correspond to
four different photon path combinations: s1s2, l1l2, l1s2 and s1l2. The two latter
possibilities are temporally indistinguishable and thus interfere according to the
phase set by Alice and Bob. Temporally filtering only those events yields the
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following superposition state:
|ψ⟩ = eiΦA |l1s2⟩+ eiΦB |s1l2⟩ (71)
= |l1s2⟩+ ei(ΦB−ΦA) |s1l2⟩ (72)
Alice will choose between four different phases: 0, π, π/2 and 3
2
π. Bob will choose
his basis by setting his phase to either 0 or π/2. A truth table (Table 1) associates
the different phases with clicks in APD 0 or 1 (see Figure 16).
ΦA Bit sent ΦB Click APD no. Bit received
0 0 0 0 0
π 1 0 1 1
π/2 0 0 0 or 1 ?
3
2
π 1 0 0 or 1 ?
0 0 π/2 0 or 1 ?
π 1 π/2 0 or 1 ?
π/2 0 π/2 0 0
3
2
π 1 π/2 1 1
Table 1: Truth table for the time-bin BB84 protocol
There are some practical issues which have to be considered when implementing
this scheme. First of all, the arm length difference ∆l has to be such that the three
different possible arrival times can be temporarily resolved, so it has to be larger
than the pulse length and the minimal temporal resolution of the detectors. With
typical experimental equipment it should be in the order of nanoseconds [13]. This
corresponds to roughly 10 cm of arm length difference.
Secondly, as was seen in Equation 56, the interference contrast or visibility depends
on the coherence time in relation to the temporal difference between the two paths.
In reality the two interferometers will never be exactly identical, but their path
differences δl should only be within a fraction of the coherence time. Typically,
this means that they must be matched within a difference in the order of mm [13].
Also, to keep the phase relation between them stable, they have to be stabilised,
for example by keeping them at a stable temperature in isolated boxes. Active
compensation techniques, e.g. fibre stretchers [48], are typically necessary as well.
Additionally, for interference to take place, the polarisation of states which have
been transmitted over different, interfering paths have to be the same. The trans-
mission path in between Alice and Bob should induce the same polarisation trans-
formation on the two time-bin states. The different arms of the interferometers are
more critical in this respect. Fortunately, the polarisation in temperature stable,
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isolated boxes is rather stable. There are also special techniques to circumvent
this problem, such as the use of Faraday mirrors [71] employed in a Michelson
interferometer.
These practical issues will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 7.
4.3 Essential components for the BB84 protocol
4.3.1 Light sources
In this section the focus is on components for QKD. The discussed components are
typically used in experimental setups for the BB84 protocol but are also relevant
for implementations of other protocols. They are key components in the different
experiments presented in this thesis. This first section deals with possible light
sources for QKD. There are two different possibilities: a real single photon source
(SPS) or an approximation of single photons through weak coherent pulse (WCP)
coming from a laser. Specific aspects of these two possibilities are discussed in the
following.
4.3.1.1 Single photon sources
Only a single photon source has a sub-Poissonian statistic and features anti-
bunching, as has been discussed in Section 3.4. Thus only a true single photon
source emits one photon at a time. This is an important issue for the security
of QKD as will be seen in Section 4.4.3. Different realisations exist so far, with
specific drawbacks and advantages as well as a typical wavelength regions of emis-
sion. Typically, some kind of two-level system is used or approximated whose
fluorescence after excitation exhibits the typical statistical signature of a SPS.
The most common systems are semiconductor quantum dots [72], single molecules
[73], single ions [74] or defect centres such as the Nitrogen-vacancy (NV) centre
in diamonds [75]. Excitation of the system can be either by optical pumping or
through electrical excitation. In this thesis, QKD with two types of defect centres
in diamonds, the NV centre and the silicon vacancy centre (SiV) will be further
discussed in Chapter 5. Some two-level systems, which are of interest not only as
single photon emitters but also as localized quantum bits for storage or processing,
couple to wavelengths which are not suited for long distance photon transmission.
This is why schemes for the conversion of single photon wavelengths are of interest
[76, 77]. A different approach to SPSs are heralded single photons generated from
photon pairs in spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) [78]. In this
scheme, two photons of a pair are separated in two different spatial modes. A high
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conditional probability of the existence of a single photon state in one mode then
results from a detection of one photon in the other mode.
All available SPS have different practical issues which limit their applicability
presently. An ideal single photon source should be efficient, meaning that a single
photon is emitted into a well defined spatial and spectral mode with near unity
probability each time a trigger signal is applied. This aspect concerns the quantum
efficiency, the collection efficiency and the spectral bandwidth of the emission. The
quantum efficiency is the emission probability per excitation and is in principle an
inherent property of the quantum emitter. It can be enhanced by enhancing the
radiative rate using the Purcell effect through coupling of the emitter to resonant
structures. The collection efficiency can be influenced as well by the design of
photonic structures in the environment of the emitter. Improving both quantum
and coupling efficiency of single photon emitters is an active area of research at
the moment and different approaches with different quantum emitters have been
sought, e.g. terrylene molecules coupled to dielectric plannar antennas [79], NV
centres in diamond coupled to fibre-based microcavities [80], defect centres integ-
rated in diamond nanowires [81], the coupling of quantum dots to nanoantennas
[82] or plasmon-enhanced single photon emission of NV centres [83] have been
successfully demonstrated. Of interest for long distance quantum communication
is of course the coupling into a single mode of an optical fibre (see Section 4.3.3).
Concerning the spectral mode, it is desirable to have a narrow bandwidth emission
for most experiments. The SPS should also yield a high and stable emission rate
without blinking or bleaching and be practical, meaning that it can be built in a
robust and compact way and can be operated ideally at room temperature. Some
of the aforementioned realisations are promising, but further fundamental research
and extensive testing is necessary to reach this goal.
4.3.1.2 Attenuated lasers
Due to their practicability, very often attenuated laser pulses are used to approx-
imate single photons. Compact and easy-to-use pulsed laser diodes in combination
with precise attenuators are typically used to produced the weak coherent pulses
(WCPs). Even though very low intensities with a mean photon number µ of typ-
ically ∼0.1 is used, the statistical properties of the emitted coherent light, which
are Poissonian, do not change, see Sections 3.3 and 3.4. This means that there
is always a finite probability that a pulse contains more than one photon. Since
all photons within a pulse are coded in the same way, this could be exploited by
Eve (see photon number splitting (PNS) attacks, 4.4.3). Because of that, µ has to
scale linearly with the transmission coefficient t between Alice and Bob, (Section
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4.4.3), meaning that the key rate scales with t2. This is a problem when using
WCPs if no sophisticated additional protocols are used as for example the decoy
state method [84], see Section 4.4.3.
4.3.2 Electro-optic modulators
Electro-optic modulators (EOMs) are used in many different experiments discussed
in this thesis. Mainly they are used to accomplish four different tasks: polarisation
modulation, intensity modulation, switching, and phase modulation.
The modulators are based on the linear electro-optic effect. This means that (ad-
ditional) birefringence is induced in a crystal through a change in the index of
refraction n along an axis by application of an electric field. The change is linear
to the applied field. The axis shall be called optical axis as in uniaxial birefringent
material from now on. By the change of n, the phase of light polarised along this
axis can be modulated. The effect is caused by a redistribution of bond charges
at an atomic level as well as a possibly slight deformation of the lattice under the
application of an electric field [85]. Typically, a crystal transparent at the desired
wavelength and offering a high electro-optic coefficient r is sandwiched between
two electrodes to apply the electric field. There are two possible configurations,
longitudinal or transverse. Longitudinal modulators apply the electric field parallel
to the light beams propagation direction, transverse modulators apply it ortho-
gonally to the propagation direction. Transverse modulators usually allow lower
voltages to be applied for the same effect and all modulators used in this thesis
are of the transverse type. The phase along the optical axis is modified according
to [85]:
∆φ =
2π
λ
L∆n (73)
with L being thy crystal’s length and
∆n ≈ 1
2
n3r · E (74)
E being the applied electric field. So to use an EOM as a phase modulator, one uses
light polarised linearly along the optical axis and applies an appropriate voltage.
For a controlled modulation of a linear polarisation, light should be entering with
an angle of 45◦ with respect to the optical axis of the modulator. This polarisation
is equally projected on a plane containing the optical axis and onto an orthogonal
plane. In this manner, one projection is shifted with respect to the other, and
arbitrary waveplates like a λ/2 plate with a resulting rotation of the polarisation
of 90◦ or a λ/4 plate resulting in circular polarisation can be realised.
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One way to modulate the intensity is to modulate the polarisation in combination
with a linear polarisation filter at the output of the modulator. All modulators
used in this thesis are however so-called Mach-Zehnder modulators (MZMs). They
actually consist of a small Mach-Zehnder interferometer whose phase between the
two arms is modulated by the electro-optic effect. The modulator output consists
of only one interferometer output and the intensity results from the degree of
constructive and destructive interference, respectively, controllable by the applied
voltage. Typically, a so-called push-pull constellation is used [85], with phase
modulators of opposite phase in each interferometer arm. This constellation needs
lower voltages and pulse deformation caused by chirp can be avoided [86]. The
same device can also be used as a switch when both outputs are used for a so-called
double output Mach-Zehnder modulator (DOMZM).
The crystal materials depend on the wavelength of the application. Typical ma-
terials are potassium dihydrogen phosphate (KDP) for visible light and lithium
niobate (LiNbO3) for the infrared.
For high-frequency modulation, a so-called traveling wave constellation is used,
where the applied voltage travels along with the light. This way, the light will
see the same index of refraction all the way along the crystal. This is realised by
designing the electrodes such that they are part of the driving transmission line
[85].
Another practical issue is that many modulators are intrinsically polarizing since
they guide only a single linear polarisation.
4.3.3 Transmission channels
There are two channels for transmission of quantum signals in QKD: optical fibres
or free-space. Optical fibres are made of silicon dioxide (SiO2) and possess an index
of refraction profile which results in axial guidance of light through total internal
reflection of the light in radial direction. Standard single mode optical fibres for
telecommunication purposes, which are usually used, have low losses at 1.3µm
and 1.5µm (0.35 dB/km [13]; 0.16 dB/km [46]) and preserve the coherence of most
quantum states, even though active compensation might be necessary, for example
when using polarisation states [13]. They naturally offer perfect overlap of the spa-
tial mode when coupling between different devices or beams. Free-space or air also
offers good transmission at some visible and infrared wavelengths (0.19 dB/km at
780 nm and 852 nm, respectively [87], 0.1 dB/km at around 1560 nm [47]). Losses
scale typically exponential with the transmission distance but can progress signi-
ficantly more favourable when transmitting between the earth and low earth orbit
(LEO) satellites. Transmission through free-space also preserves the coherence of
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most quantum states, for polarisation no compensation as for fibres is needed. One
problem is the unavoidable divergence of light beams and beam path fluctuations
due to turbulence. Also, the spatial mode of the light is not well defined as it is
in the case of optical fibres.
4.3.4 Single photon detectors
One difficulty in working with single photons is to detect them. There are no ideal,
noise-free single photon detectors available, ultimately since quantum fluctuations
represent a fundamental limit. There are basically two widely used methods to
detect single photons: either with avalanche photodiodes (APDs) or with super-
conducting single photon detectors (SSPDs). Both techniques have its advantages
and its drawbacks which are discussed in the following. The characteristics of the
less frequently used photomultiplier tube (PMT) are also introduced since it has
properties which are interesting for some applications and one is used for the im-
plementation of the QRNG reported in Chapter 8. APDs, which are used mostly
for the experiments in this thesis, are photodiodes which are operated in the so-
called Geiger-mode, where the voltage applied to the diode exceeds the breakdown
voltage such that a single electron-hole pair created from a photon can lead to a
detectable avalanche of electrons [13]. To stop the avalanche, once it is detected,
there are different methods: in passive quenching, a resistor in series with the
diode quenches the avalanche once it occurs. In active quenching, this is done by
an electronic circuit once the avalanche is detected. In gated mode, the voltage is
brought above the breakdown voltage only during certain gates of variable width.
For this mode, the instance in time when the photon arrives should be known [13].
There are different materials for the diode material of the APDs, basically there
is silicon (Si) for the wavelength range from the visible up to 1µm and there is
indium gallium arsenide (InGaAs) covering the telecom wavelength range between
1.3µm and 1.5µm.
A second class of detectors are SSPDs [88, 89]. They consist of a superconducting
nanowire which is arranged in a pattern of meanders to cover large areas. The
nanowire is kept well below critical temperature and just below but close to the
critical current. Incoming photons create a localized non-superconducting region,
called hotspot, eventually causing the current density to exceed its critical value.
The superconductance is disrupted and a measurable voltage pulse is created [90].
SSPDs are typically made of niobium nitride (NbN) or of tungsten silicide (WSi)
[91].
PMTs are less frequently used in quantum information processing (QIP), but they
do have characteristics which make them competitive to the other types for some
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applications. A PMT exploits the photoelectric effect to create electrons out of
single photons on a photocathode. A detectable avalanche of electrons is cre-
ated by a series of dynodes in a vacuum tube with an increasing acceleration
voltage between each pair of dynodes [92]. Materials are gallium arsenide phos-
phide (GaAsP) for visible wavelengths and InGaAs/indium phosphite (InP) for
the near infrared. There are variants like the hybrid detector, a photocathode
combined with an avalanche diode, [93], which offers very good timing resolution
of about 50 ps and the ability to resolve photon numbers. There is also the mi-
crochannel plate PMT, built of glass capillaries whose walls act as dynode with a
continuously increasing acceleration voltage, [94]. It offers good timing resolution
of 80 ps [95].
There are different figures of merit when it comes to single photon detection. Some
of them are related to problems intrinsic to devices sensitive enough to detect single
photons. The quantum efficiency η gives the probability that a single photon
results in an electronic output signal. For APDs it varies from 10-25% typical for
InGaAs/InP models to over 70% for Si APDs. Recently there has been a report
of η up to 55% at a wavelength of 1.5µm [96]. For SSPDs an η of around 10-25%
[97] for light from the visible to the infrared without the use of external cavities is
reported for NbN models. It should be noted that higher efficiencies are typically
achieved by a resonator structure around the detector which prevents detection
over a wide wavelength range. Recently a SSPD made of WSi showed an η of over
90% [91]. PMTs typically have lower quantum efficiencies in all wavelength ranges
than APDs.
Dark counts are counts which are not due to photons but due to thermal or elec-
tronic noise. They impair the signal to noise ratio and ultimately limit possible
transmission distances (see Section 4.4.1). The dark count rates of Si APDs and
of SSPDs are much better than those of InGaAs APDs. The dark count rates of
PMTs is usually worse than those of APDs.
The so-called afterpulses are a phenomenon typical to APDs when trapped charges
produced after a detection cause an avalanche which mimic a detected photon [13].
Also PMTs typically produce afterpulses. They can be dealt with by introducing
a dead time after detection, giving the charges time to relax unnoticed in the
meantime. This comes at the price of reducing the maximal detection rate. Also
a higher detector temperature helps decreasing afterpulses, but this increases the
thermal noise.
Then there is the timing jitter which is the uncertainty in the time between a
detected photon and the corresponding electronic output signal. Typically APDs
possess jitter in the order of 100 ps whereas SSPDs are an order of magnitude
better. PMTs can possess lower jitter than APDs of 50 to 80 ps [95, 93].
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The maximum count rate of all these devices can vary from MHz to GHz [96] and
depends on dead times and the electronic circuitry used. Typically the maximum
count rate of the detectors imposes the limit to repetition frequencies of modern
QKD experiments.
It is worth mentioning that while most detectors do not have the ability to resolve
the number of photons in a given pulse and just have a digital output signal
indicating that either a detection was registered or not, there are detectors with
the ability to resolve the number of photons [98, 99, 93]
Last but not least, practicability deals with the question if bulky and unpractical
cryogenic cooling with liquid helium is used, which has to be frequently exchanged.
This is the case for some SSPDs implementations, but often closed cycle cooling
is available.
Table 2 summarises the figures of merit for different types of available commercial
single photon detectors as well as a state-of-the-art research prototype (Toshiba).
The data of the commercial products was taken from the companies’ websites
[100, 101, 102, 103, 53, 104].
SSPDs APDs PMTs
Photon Single Excelitas ID Q ToshibaHamamatsu
Scontel Spot Quantum SPCM id210 [96] 7421/7422H10330A
λ [µm] 0.5-1.7 ∼1.5 0.2 - 2.0 0.4 - 1.0 0.9 - 1.7 ∼1.5 0.3-0.72 0.95-1.7
Material NbN WSi? ? Si InGaAs/ InGaAs/ GaAsP InP/
InP InP InGaAs
η 10-25% >90% >75% >70% 10-25% 55% 40% 2%
(700 nm) (580 nm)
DC [Hz] <10 ? <300 25 ∼20 k ? 100 250 k
AP 0 0 0 0.5% ? 10% ? ?
∆t [ps] <45 ps 30-50 ps <40 ps 350 ps 200 ps <100 ps 300 ps [92] 400 ps
Max.
count rate/>100MHz 40MHz 500MHz >1.5MHz ?
dead time 3-30 ns 20 ns typ. 10µs
Cooling closed ? closed Peltier Peltier ∼ Troom Peltier Peltier
type cycle cycle
PNR n y n n n n y [92] ?
Table 2: A table comparing the performance of different single photon detectors. DC
stands for dark counts, AP for afterpulses, ∆t stands for the timing jitter between
incoming photon and output signal. When a maximal count rate is not available, the
dead time can give an indication about maximal rates. PNR stands for the ability to
resolve the number of detected photons. When a field is marked with a“?”, more specific
data was not available.
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4.4 The security of BB84
In this section, the secret key rate, which is the magnitude of interest in QKD, will
be analysed in more detail for the well studied example of the BB84 protocol. At
first, a security proof of a perfectly implemented BB84 protocol will be sketched
and a secure key rate will be deduced. Then, after a short introduction to ex-
perimental sifted key rates and QBERs, practical flawed implementations will be
analysed, with the focus on light sources which do not emit true single photons.
The deterioration of the secret key rate due to a photon number splitting (PNS)
attack of Eve is calculated. Finally, the recovery of satisfactory secure key rates
when using weak coherent pulses (WCPs) through the decoy state method is in-
troduced.
4.4.1 Unconditional security
The notion of unconditional security has already been discussed in Section 2.8. It
has been briefly explained that if Eve’s information on a sifted key can be bounded
and if it is low enough, error correction and privacy amplification can be applied
to generate a secret key which is secure.
Now it shall be sketched how this unconditional security can be proven and how
Eve’s information can be bounded for the BB84 protocol following the security
proof from Shor and Preskill [37].
It starts with entangled EPR pairs (named after Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen)
distributed between Alice and Bob, meaning that one photon each is received.
EPR pairs are states of entangled qubits of the following form:
|β00⟩ = |00⟩+ |11⟩√
2
(75)
The states, which might have been changed due to noise on the channel or eaves-
dropping, are locally measured by Alice and Bob to extract a key. It can be shown
that the fidelity of the states shared between Alice and Bob with respect to the
original EPR states can bound the information an eavesdropper might possibly
have about the key [105]. The fidelity between two states described by the density
matrices ρ and σ is defined by the following expression:
F (ρ, σ) ≡ tr

ρ1/2σρ1/2 (76)
It gives a measure of the similarity of the two states. If they are identical F
= 1, otherwise smaller. The fidelity can be measured by random sampling of
some of the distributed states and by applying a specific measurement to them
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[105]. The information of Eve is then bounded and can be removed by privacy
amplification if it is low enough. Alternatively, and this is in the line of proving the
security for the BB84 protocol, one can apply so-called entanglement distillation
protocols until the fidelity comes arbitrarily close to 1. Entanglement distillation
is a process using n-states of fidelity F < 1 to produce m-states of fidelity F = 1,
where m < n. If a measurement of the state is effected only afterwards, a secure
key can be distributed. This entanglement distillation can be accomplished using
so-called quantum error correction (QEC) codes correcting t errors and working on
quantum states. They typically need complex quantum operations which require
a quantum computer and quantum memories. Random sampling of Alice and Bob
must guarantee that no more than t errors have been transmitted for this to work.
This is the so-called modified Lo-Chau protocol [105]. Such QEC which correct up
to t errors of m states using n states exist with certainty as long as the following
equation, known as the quantum Gilbert-Varshamov bound is satisfied:
m/n ≥ 1− 2H

2t
n

(77)
where H is the binary Shannon entropy, H(x) = −x · log2(x)− (1−x) · log2(1−x).
So for m states with fidelity close to one, one needs at least n states where n is
given by Equation 77 or the other way around if n states are used to obtain m
secure states, the error on the n states should be maximally t. This scheme is
still far from BB84, as entangled photon pairs, quantum computers and quantum
memories are needed. The need for entangled pairs can be relaxed by showing
the equivalence of all the required operations for entangled pairs and qubit states
prepared by Alice and measured by Bob, as long as Alice and Bob use the so-called
Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes [106] as QEC [105]. These codes are based
on classical error correction codes but rely on quantum mechanical operations.
CSS codes correct both bit and phase errors of a quantum state, but in a decoupled
manner. Because in the version with qubits instead of EPR pairs, Bob only cares
about bit values of the final key and not about phase errors [37], the phase error
correction information normally necessary to implement the QEC can be dropped.
This allows Alice and Bob to work with the two classical codes on which CSS
codes are based, so no quantum computers are needed. Now introducing a random
basis choice for Bob’s measurement instead of Bob storing the received states in
a quantum memory and waiting for Alice to announce the correct measurement
basis as required in the initial proposition actually results in the BB84 protocol
[105]. The classical codes which are used actually implement error correction and
privacy amplification in this. This scheme works with certainty for maximally t
errors on n bits producing m secure bits as expressed by Equation 77. This bound
can be relaxed if one only demands the codes working with high probability for
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random errors ≤ t [37]. The bound then becomes
m/n ≥ 1− 2H

t
n

. (78)
The right side of this equation becomes 0 for t/n (the QBER) equal to 11%. It
should be noted that this bound is true only for ideal error correction and also
only for qubits encoded in single photon states.
4.4.2 Theoretical rates
Now equations to theoretically estimate secret key rates for experimental realisa-
tions of the BB84 protocol are introduced. The secret key rate can be calculated
as a product of two factors, the sifted key rate Rsifted and the secret key fraction
r. The secure key rate is then given by S = Rsifted · r.
Before turning to the sifted key rate, which possibly counts events which are not
generated by photons, the sifted photon key rate is defined, which only contains
bits caused by the detection of photons. The sifted photon key rate Rsifted photon
for the BB84 protocol depends on the repetition frequency of the light source
frep, the mean intensity or mean photon number per signal µ, the transmission
between Alice and Bob t, the transmission in Bob’s apparatus tB, the detection
efficiency η and a factor q which is typically 1 but is 1/2 for example in the time-
bin implementation, where only half of the sent signal ends up in the right time
window,
Rsifted photon =
1
2
· q · frep · µ · t · tB · η . (79)
The pre-factor 1
2
accounts for the fact that in only half of the cases Alice and Bob
will have chosen corresponding bases.
The QBER is defined as the number of wrong counts over the number of overall
counts,
QBER =
Nwrong
Nsifted
=
Rwrong
Rsifted
. (80)
The experimental QBER, which is not caused by eavesdropping, consists of two
different contributions to Rwrong: R
Q
opt and R
Q
det. The rate of erroneous bits of
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purely optical origin, RQopt, which comes from an imperfectly prepared or measured
state and has a probability to occur of popt for every sent state,
RQopt =
1
2
q · frep · µ · t · η · popt . (81)
This error is thus part of Rsifted photon, which can be divided into an error free and
a flawed part, Rsifted photon = (1 − popt) · Rsifted photon + popt · Rsifted photon. Then
there is the QBER which accounts for noise, typically from dark counts from the
detector, the corresponding rate is
RQdet =
1
2
· 1
2
frep · ndet · pdet . (82)
The first pre factor 1
2
comes from dark counts which occur while Alice and Bob
chose different bases, the second comes from the probability that dark counts acci-
dentally occur in the right detector, thus not causing errors. This error rate is thus
not proportional to the transmission and thus grows relatively to Rsifted photon with
increasing loss. That is why eventually the transmission distance is limited because
the QBER becomes too big. The complete sifted key rate including erroneous bits
is thus
Rsifted = Rsifted photon +R
Q
det . (83)
The secret key fraction is of course a function of the QBER and in the case of ideal
post-processing it is given by Equation 78, so that the secret key rate becomes
S = Rsifted · (1− 2H(Q)) , (84)
where Q stands for QBER. As most error correction codes are not as effective
in reality, there is some function f(Q) that gives its effectiveness, with f ≥ 1, a
typical value is 1.2. Then Equation 84 becomes
S = Rsifted · (1− f(Q) ·H(Q)−H(Q)) . (85)
4.4.3 The photon number splitting attack
When weak coherent pulse (WCP) from attenuated lasers are used, there is a
finite probability to generate and prepare more than one photon per pulse and
thus per state. This can be exploited by Eve in the so-called photon number
splitting (PNS) attack [107]. It goes as follows: Eve performs a so-called quantum
non-demolition measurement (QND) on the WCP sent by Alice to measure the
number of photons in the pulse without disturbing the qubit itself. Such a quantum
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non-demolition measurement can be quite complicated experimentally, but is not
impossible. When more than one photon is present, she can keep one, for example
put it in a quantum memory and measure it only after the sifting. She can thus
gain full information on the qubit without introducing errors. The situation is
bad when significant losses on the line exist. If the transmission t is as small or
smaller than the probability of having more than one photon in a pulse pn≥2, Eve
can replace the transmission channel between her and Bob with a (theoretically
possible) lossless channel and block all pulses with just one photon. She could
then gain full information on the key without being detected since the key rate
would be as expected. This attack is illustrated also in Figure 17.
QM
Eve: QND
lossless line
Alice Bob
Figure 17: The photon number splitting (PNS) attack. Alices sends WCP with typical
intensities μ to Bob. These contain very often no photon at all, from time to time
one photon and with a probability of ∼ μ2/2 two photons (more photons are even less
probable). Eve performs quantum non-demolition measurements (QND) on each pulse
and in case of two or more photons contained, she puts one in her quantummemory where
she stores it until sifting, only then she measures, then in the correct basis. She sends
the remaining photon(s) to Bob via a lossless line, making her intervention unnoticeable.
This attack can be prevented while using weak coherent pulse (WCP), but at
the price of a strongly reduced rate. To see this, one can make an estimate of
the maximal secure key rate. When a single photon source (SPS) is used, μ is
fixed. But when attenuated lasers are used, it has to be optimised, giving a good
compromise between a maximal sifted key rate and and a probability pn≥2 being
not to high [39]. Rsifted is proportional to μ and t, the information given to
Alice unnoticed is proportional to ∼ μ2/2 if just the two-photon probability (see
Equation 46 in Section 3.3) is considered. So the secret key rate is proportional
to μ · t− μ2/2 which is maximised for μ ≈ t. The secret key rate thus scales with
t2/2 instead of just t as one might expect, which is very unfavorable.
There is another, more efficient way in terms of secret key rates to deal with
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PNS attacks, the decoy state method [108, 84]. Before presenting the idea and
achievable rates, some terms have to be introduced with a nomenclature as in [39].
First of all Rsifted can be split into separate rates caused by different numbers n
of photons actually emitted,
Rsifted =

n
Rn . (86)
The yield Yn =
Rn
R
, with

n
Yn = 1 is the probability of an emitted signal with
n photons being detected. Also the errors can be split into parts associated with
different numbers of emitted photons,
εn =
Rnwrong
R
, (87)
with the QBER
Q =

n
Ynεn . (88)
The same expression can be formulated for the information of Eve IE,
IE =

n
YnI
E
n . (89)
Recapitulating the PNS attack, the worst case scenario is that εn>1 = 0 and I
E
n>1 =
1. Eve will try to keep Y1 as low as possible. All the parameters directly accessible
to Alice and Bob are Rsifted and the QBER. Y1 can be calculated in principle for
the worst case assumption that all pulses emitted with more than one photon will
be detected and with pn>1 which can be calculated from µ. The secret key rate
from Equation 85 for BB84 implemented with WCP then becomes [109]
S = Rsifted · {Y ⋆1 (1−H · (Q/Y ⋆1 ))− f(Q) ·H(Q)} , (90)
where Y ⋆1 is the worst case assumption as described above. If a more optimistic
estimation of a lower bound of Y1 and thus of the error ε1 = Q/Y1 could be
made, higher key rates would be possible. That is the trick of the decoy state
method. Imagine Alice chooses between different intensities µ1, µ2, ..., µm: only
after transmission she will publicly announce which intensity she used when. Bob
will thus have different results for the rates Rµ1sifted, R
µ2
sifted, ..., R
µm
sifted as well as
for the QBER Qµ1 , Qµ2 , ..., Qµm . But the different Yns and εns will not have
changed since Eve can only measure the photon number but knows nothing about
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the intensity Alice applied and thus cannot change her strategy according to it.
Since
Rµisifted =

n
Rµin , (91)
Yn = R
µi
n /R
µi
sifted (92)
and
Qµi =

n
Ynεn (93)
the yields and errors can be exactly calculated for m → ∞. In practice it can be
shown that with only three different intensities used a good approximation can be
made [110]. So not only can Eve be detected when trying to apply the PNS attack
because a deviation from the expected yields and errors will be noticed, also the
secret key rate is much more favourable with the better lower bounds on Y1 and
ε1,
S = Rsifted · {Y1 (1−H · (ε1))− f(Q) ·H(Q)} . (94)
Also, the decoy state method allows Alice to use substantially higher mean intens-
ities than is the case when using WCP without it [110].
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5 BB84 with single photons
When quantum key distribution (QKD) is implemented with an attenuated laser as
signal source, the security can be compromised, cf. Section 4.4.3 and the intensity
of weak coherent pulses (WCPs) has to be significantly reduced to circumvent the
problem, resulting in a low key rate. One effective solution is to use the decoy state
method [108, 84]. However, if a practical and efficient single photon source (SPS)
is at hand, it will be a natural choice for most QKD protocols and also for linear
optical quantum computing (LOQC) [111] and some quantum repeater protocols
[112]. Efficiency means here that it emits a single photon into a well-defined spec-
tral and spatial mode with a probability near unity each time a trigger is applied.
To be practical, the SPS should also have a stable emission rate, be easy-to-use, it
should operate at room temperature and at high repetition frequencies which are
comparable to those of pulsed lasers. A promising candidate for such a SPS are
defect centres in diamonds [75, 113, 114]. They operate at room temperature and
show bright and mostly stable emission.
In order to evaluate the applicability of defect centres in diamonds as reliable
sources for QKD, a test-bed that allows for long-term measurements and integra-
tion of different defect centres in diamonds is implemented. It consists of a short
free-space transmission line combined with a compact SPS based on diamond-
based defect centres for polarisation based BB84. The source relies on a confocal
setup for stable optical excitation and efficient collection of single photons from
nanodiamonds containing defect centres. Furthermore, it is designed in a way that
facilitates the replacement of one kind of nanodiamond single photon source by
another. A QKD experiment is performed with nitrogen vacancy (NV) centres and
for the first time also with silicon vacancy (SiV) centres. This chapter is organized
as follows: First of all, in Section 5.1, defect centres as single photon source are
introduced more thoroughly. Afterwards, the setup is introduced in Section 5.2,
consisting of the three main parts, the confocal setup, the QKD testbed and the
control and data acquisition unit. Before presenting and discussing the results in
Section 5.4, the CASCADE protocol used for post-processing of the raw key is
presented in Section 5.3.
The results presented in this chapter have been published in [171].
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5.1 Defect centres in diamonds as single photon sources
Diamonds consist of carbon (C) atoms in a double face centred cubic crystalline
structure. Diamonds have interesting optical properties. Their wide band gap
makes them transparent over a wide range of wavelengths and they have a high
index of refraction of n ≈ 2.4.
Interesting in this context is their ability to host impurities such as nitrogen (N)
atoms. The impurities have electronic properties which can result in optical activ-
ity. Only some impurities are known for emission of single photons. Here, NV and
SiV centres, named after the dominant impurities and the coexisting vacancy of a
carbon atom in the lattice, are used as single photon source.
5.1.1 The nitrogen vacancy centre
The NV centre modifies the crystalline diamond structure by a nitrogen atom
replacing a carbon atom and a neighbouring vacancy, as can be seen in Figure
18 a).
N
V
C
a) b)
Figure 18: In a) the atomic structure of the nitrogen vacancy (NV) centre. It is
constituted of a substitutional nitrogen atom (N) replacing a carbon atom (C) together
with a nearest neighbour vacancy (V) is shown, taken from [7]. In b), an image taken
with a scanning electron microscope (SEM) of a diamond nanocrystal is shown. Taken
from [115].
Due to additional electrons which can be bound or missing, there exist several
charged states of the NV centre in addition to the neutral state. In this dis-
sertation, so-called nanodiamonds, thus diamonds with a size of 20-100 nm [7],
cf. Figure 18 b), are used due to their practicability and good photon extraction
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properties. All of them had one bound electron, only NV− centres will be discussed
in the following.
Responsible for the single photon emission is an electronic structure which can be
described as a three-level structure with one ground, one excited and a metastable
state (see Figure 19). Single photon emission, indicated by g(2)(0) < 0.5 (see
Equation 68), is observed, see inset of Figure 19 for an exemplary measurement
[7]. At the same time, close in time to the antibunching-dip, bunching can be
observed, see also inset of Figure 19. The bunching structure can be explained
with the existence of the metastable state. The metastable state has a relatively
long lifetime and can only be reached via the excited state. When it is excited,
photon emission is not possible for a while until it decays to the ground state which
can then be excited again, so no photon detection will take place for long time.
But when a photon has been detected and one knows that the system is in the
ground state, another detection can take place because the excited state can be
reached again. This makes the conditional probability of detecting a photon when
another one has just been detected higher than the average probability to detect
a photon.
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Figure 19: The simplified energy level structure of both a SiV and a NV centre and the
different associated transition rates. The 3-level structure allows to explain the observed
emission behaviour of the defect centres, especially when measuring g(2)(τ) (see inset for
measurement of a typical NV− centre, taken from [7]). The observed values of g(2)(0) <
1 are accompanied by a pronounced bunching.
Fluorescence emission is around 637 nm, that is where the phonon-free transition
lies (zero phonon line (ZPL)). The NV− centre shows emission strongly coupled
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to phonons, making its spectrum very broad (100 nm full width at half-maximum
(FWHM) at room temperature), see Figure 20. The Debye-Waller factor (DWF),
indicating the ratio of emission into the ZPL to the overall emission is only about
3% at a temperature of 5K [7].
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
550 600 650 700 750
Wavelength [nm]
P
ho
to
n 
co
un
ts
 [a
.u
.] 637 nm
Figure 20: Spectrum at room temperature of a NV− centre under 532 nm excitation.
The ZPL at 637 nm can be seen. Taken from [7].
NV− centres occur both in bulk and in diamond nanocrystals. In such nanodia-
monds NV− centres have radiative lifetimes τrad of ∼ 20ns.
The quantum yield of the NV− centre was shown to be upper bounded to 0.7 [116].
High count rates of up to 2.4Mcts/s under continuous wave (CW) excitation have
been reported [117].
The emission of the NV− centre can be described by two optical transitions from
two perpendicular dipole moments [118]. This limits the polarisation contrast of
NV− centres. That is a drawback when implementing the polarisation based BB84
protocol, as a linear polariser before state preparation blocks about 40-50% of the
overall emission.
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5.1.2 The silicon vacancy centre
The SiV centre consists of a Si atom and a lattice vacancy in a so-called split-
vacancy configuration (see Figure 21), where the substitutional Si atom relaxes its
position in the direction of the lattice vacancy next to it [7].
Si
C
Figure 21: The atomic structure of the silicon vacancy (SiV) centre consisting of a
substitutional silicon (Si) atom and a vacancy in the usual lattice of carbon atoms (C).
Taken from [113].
The electronic structure can be approximated by a three level system as well and
shows similar behaviour of the second order degree of coherence as the NV− centre,
see Figure 19.
The spectral emission for different centres is distributed around 738 nm with a
typical linewidth smaller than 4.9 nm [7].
The radiative lifetime τrad of 0.2 to 2 ns is much shorter than for the NV
− centre,
allowing a maximal theoretical emission rate larger than 5GHz. However, the
quantum yield in nanodiamonds was estimated to be only 0.01-0.09% [119]. Nev-
ertheless, high count rates up to 6Mcts/s under CW excitation have been reported
[113].
The SiV centre exhibits favourable linear polarisation visibilities up to 91% [7].
Many SiVs centres in nanodiamonds show blinking and bleaching behaviour [7],
limiting their suitability as stable SPS. However, SiVs centres with stable emission
have been observed.
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5.2 The experimental setup
The experimental setup consists of three parts, which are described in the following
sections. The compact and versatile SPS will be introduced in the next section.
The free-space testbed for BB84 QKD with polarised photons, which is usable
over a broad wavelength range is presented subsequently. Finally, the control and
data acquisition unit consisting of a field programmable gate array (FPGA) in
conjunction with a personal computer (PC) is presented.
5.2.1 Compact and versatile design of a single photon source
The design of the SPS relies on a compact, portable and ready to use confocal
microscope setup [7]. A hemispherical zirconium dioxide (ZrO2) solid immmersion
lens (SIL) can be utilized to enhance the collection efficiency of single photons
emitted from defect centres in nanodiamonds spin-coated directly on the flat side
of the SIL. Details of the fabrication of SILs with NV centres are provided in [117]
or [7]. Figure 22 shows a schematic (a) and a photograph (b) of the source which
fits completely on an aluminum plate and has dimensions of only 22.5 cm×19 cm×
9 cm. Thus the SPS is mobile and can easily be integrated in different experimental
setups. The setup is robust against mechanical vibrations and thermal drifts due
to its small size and compact mounting of all optical components. The generated
single photon beam can either be free-space or fibre coupled by removal/addition
of a single mirror which is equipped with a magnetic base. The sample unit
holding the defect centres can either be a SIL with spin-coated defect centres
or another substrate due to a removable sample holder. The setup is equipped
with broadband optics and thus suitable for various defect centres, provided their
emission wavelength is in the range of 600 nm to 800 nm. Only the exchangeable
dichroic mirror has to be adapted together with the suitable excitation source.
The sample holder is mounted on a 3-axes piezo stage. In order to keep track of
the absolute position of the stage, sensors capable of detecting changes down to a
nanometre are used (SmarAct System). In combination with a numerical aperture
(NA) = 0.9 objective it is possible to focus on a well defined position on the sample
with very high accuracy and stability, enabling high, constant single photon rates.
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Fiber for laser 
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Filter: LP620, SP780
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Figure 22: (a) Scheme and (b) photo of the compact confocal microscope setup. The
excitation laser is focused with a high numerical aperture (NA) objective onto the sample.
The sample contains nanocrystals that contain either NV or SiV defect centres. In the
case of NVs centre, a SIL serves as the sample holder, enabling a higher NA for increased
photon collection. The emission is collected by the same objective and then filtered by
a dichroic beam splitter (exchangeable) and longpass (LP) and shortpass (SP) filters to
clean it from residual laser light or fluorescence of the SIL or the substrate. The 90/10
beam splitter (BS) behind the out-coupler of the excitation laser is used to monitor the
excitation power. Taken from [171].
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In QKD it is favourable to use photons at a well defined instant of time, thus pulsed
excitation of the defect centres is used. For the QKD experiment, the maximal
excitation rate is limited to frequencies up to 1MHz by the modulation rate of the
EOMs (see below).
Alice uses a green diode laser (PicoQuant LDH-P-FA-530, 531 nm, pulse width
<100 ps) for excitation at a rate of 1MHz. This yields detected count rates at
Bob’s side for an NV− centre in a nanodiamond which was spin coated on a SIL of
about 8900 cps. That corresponds to an overall photon yield of 0.89% and a source
efficiency of 2.9%. The latter is defined as the ratio of excitation pulses resulting in
a single photon without background in the desired optical mode, here the free-space
beam of the QKD experiment. It is determined, for a given overall photon yield,
by taking the overall transmission tsetup of 0.31 of the setup, including the quantum
efficiency of∼ 65% of the APDs (Perkin Elmer AQR), into account. A g(2)(0) value
under pulsed excitation of 0.09, indicating high purity single photon emission, is
determined (Fig. 23a) using high resolution time-correlation electronics (PicoHarp
300, from PicoQuant). A lifetime of 28.5±1.5 ns is estimated from the exponential
decay of the fluorescence in time.
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Figure 23: Measured intensities as a function of time for NV (a) and SiV (b) emission
under pulsed excitation to calculate g(2)(τ). The excitation rates are 800 kHz and 1MHz,
respectively. The missing peak at τ = 0 indicates single photon emission. From the pulse
shape, a lifetime of the excited state of 28.5±1.5 ns for the NV centre and 3±2 ns for the
SiV centre is calculated. Taken from [171].
The single SiV centres used here are created during chemical vapour deposition
(CVD) growth of randomly oriented nanodiamonds on Iridium (Ir) films [113] and
have been supplied by the research group of Christoph Becher from the University
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of Saarbru¨cken. During the growth process, Si atoms in the gas phase of the CVD
chamber are incorporated into the diamond lattice. Subsequent annealing yields
SiV centres. Excitation of the SiV centre is performed with laser pulses from a red
diode laser (PicoQuant diode laser LDH-D-C-690, 687 nm, pulse width <100 ps)
also at an excitation frequency of 1MHz. For the brightest SiV centre a photon
count rate of 3700 cps and a g(2)(0) value of 0.04 is achieved, see fig. 23b. From
the exponential decay of the fluorescence peak, a lifetime of 3±2 ns is estimated.
The overall photon yield is 0.37% and the plain source efficiency is thus 1.2%.
The achieved count rate per excitation pulse is lower for the SiV centre compared
to the NV centre. Knowing that the collection efficiency of emitted photons from
SiV centres in nanodiamonds grown on Ir-substrate can be very high [119], this
hints at a lower quantum efficiency. In [119], a quantum efficiency between 1-9%
is estimated. However, compared to the NV centre, the excitation frequency could
in principle be chosen to be much higher for the SiV centre due to the shorter
lifetime, which could compensate for the lower quantum efficiency.
5.2.2 Setup of the quantum key distribution testbed
The QKD setup is illustrated in Figure 24. The emitted free-space photons from
the SPS are initially prepared in a linear polarisation state by passing through
a linear polarisation filter after a λ/2 plate which is adjusted to maximise the
transmission through the polariser. After passing through a pinhole for further
spatial mode cleaning, the photons impinge on the first EOM which is controlled
by Alice. The EOM can act as a half-wave (λ/2) or quarter-wave (λ/4) plate,
respectively, depending on the applied voltage. In this way two orthogonal linearly
polarised photon states as well as two orthogonal circular polarisation states can
be generated, compliant to the BB84 protocol with polarised photons as described
in Section 4.1. After a lens system for recollimation, the photons pass through
a second EOM which is controlled by Bob. The transmission distance is in the
order of meters. Bob randomly chooses a measurement basis by setting the EOM
voltage such that it either does not modify the photons or acts as a λ/4 plate. A
circular polarisation is thus transformed into a linear one or vice versa. The linear
polarisation states can then be deterministically analysed in a system consisting of
a polarising beam splitter (PBS), a linear polarisation filter, compensating the non-
perfect contrast of the PBS in reflection, and two APDs. For the random bit and
basis choice of Alice and Bob, quantum random numbers from the online random
number service of Humboldt-Universita¨t zu Berlin (HU Berlin) and PicoQuant
GmbH (http:// qrng.physik.hu-berlin.de/, see also Chapter 8 and [172]) are used.
All used components are broadband. The EOM is constructed in a way that it
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acts as a zero order waveplate. This minimises its wavelength dependency during
the modulation of different polarisation states. Even so, especially when using the
broadband NV centre as light source, possible dependencies between wavelength
and transmitted polarisation state could open the door to side-channel attacks
which would have to be analysed in way similar to the analysis of multiphotons
(cf. 4.4.3). However, a thorough analysis of this problem is beyond the scope of
this work.
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Figure 24: Schematics of the QKD testbed. Single photons are emitted from the
source (SPS) and prepared in a well defined polarisation state by the λ/2 plate and a
polarisation filter (PF). After collimation and spatial mode cleaning by two lenses (L) and
a pinhole (PH), they pass through EOM 1. On Bob’s side, the beam is recollimated by
two lenses and then passes through a second modulator EOM 2). Then, the polarisation
is analysed by a PBS and a polarisation filter in the reflected mode of the PBS. Its
slightly reduced contrast compared to the transmitted mode with that linear polariser.
After passing through a lens in each path for focusing, the photons are detected by one
of two APDs. Taken from [171].
It should be noted that the QKD implementation is directly usable as a Hanbury
Brown and Twiss (HBT) interferometer setup to measure the g(2)(τ) of the SPS
in use. For this, a constant polarisation with equal probability of projection onto
horizontal and vertical polarisation states, i.e. any circular polarisation is set by
means of the EOMs. In this way, the PBS in front of the APDs acts like a regular
BS on incoming photons, implementing a setup as introduced in Section 3.4.2. The
APDs have to be connected to fast time-tagging electronics in this case (PicoHarp
300 from PicoQuant).
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5.2.3 Control and data acquisition
The whole experiment is controlled by a single field programmable gate array
(FPGA) control unit (National instruments NI PCI 7813R) interfaced with a host
PC via Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) Bus [175]. A FPGA is pro-
grammable hardware specifically useful to accomplish time critical tasks in parallel
(cf. Section 7.1.3 for more information on FPGAs). For this purpose, the FPGA is
equipped with many input/outputs (I/Os) to interface it with the device or setup
which is controlled. The output signal logic is transistor-transistor logic (TTL)
(see Section 7.1.2). The clock frequency of the FPGA is 40MHz. The control
algorithms are designed with a subset of the usual LabVIEW Code suitable for
FPGA specific tasks. It is translated into low-level hardware description language
used for actually programming the FPGA by a supplied software tool.
The control process of the FPGA consists of the several steps, see Figure 25.
The process is started by acquiring random data from the PC, received from the
quantum random number generator (QRNG) reported on in Section 8. The EOMs
are set according to these random numbers which determine the used basis for Alice
and Bob, respectively, as well as the sent state for Alice. This is accomplished by a
10 bit value which is output in parallel for each EOM. These values are transformed
to analogue voltages by two homemade digital-to-analogue converters (DACs), see
Section 7.1.3. The DACs need a trigger signal to read in the bits from the FPGA.
The signals from the DACs are amplified to high voltages of up to ±250V by
homemade EOM drivers. It is those drivers which currently limit the repetition
frequency to 1MHz. Once enough time is elapsed that the EOMs are set, the
excitation laser of the SPS is triggered. The data acquisition is started by reading
the outputs of the free-running APDs at a well defined instant in time after the
laser trigger has been applied. The measured data together with the random bits
and bases associated with it are transferred back to the host PC, where they are
analysed to determine the sifted key rate and the QBER. It is also on the host PC
that the post-processing is applied to the data (see next section).
Get random numbers
from host PC Set EOMs Trigger DAC
Trigger LaserRead out APDsSend measured data to host PC
Figure 25: Flow chart of the processes the field programmable gate array (FPGA)
controls during a typical cycle of the experiment. Taken from [175].
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The principal parameters of the experiment can be set via a graphical user interface
(GUI) programmed in LabVIEW and running on the host PC, see Figure 26.
Those parameters comprise for example the bit values between 0 and 1023 (10 bit)
for the EOMs of Alice and Bob (Alice Pool and Bob Pool in Figure 26). These
values have to be determined experimentally beforehand. The repetition frequency
is set by f ratio (see figure) to f = 40MHz/f ratio. f ratio thus determines the
number of basic FPGA clock cycles per clock cycle of the QKD experiment. f laser
and f read (see Figure 26) determine the FPGA clock cycle in which the laser is
triggered and the APDs are read out, respectively. f read is counted as number
of FPGA clock cycles after the laser trigger has been applied, the actual cycle for
the read-out of the APDs is given by f laser+f read. These and other parameters
are communicated to the FPGA via the PCI Bus.
Figure 26: Graphical user interface (GUI) of the LabVIEW field programmable gate
array (FPGA) module. Taken from [175].
5.3 CASCADE: the post-processing algorithm
As discussed in Section 2.3 before, a post-processing algorithm based on CAS-
CADE [14] has been realised as part of this thesis. Details as well as the source
code can be found in the master thesis of Robert Riemann [175] and can also be
publicly downloaded (www.physik.hu-berlin.de/de/nano). Here, a brief summary
of the most important ideas and their implementation shall be given.
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5.3.1 Error correction
For error correction codes, there are three different important characteristics [14].
An error correction code can be (i) robust, (ii) optimal and (iii) efficient.
(i) An error correction code R being ϵ-robust with ϵ ∈ [0, 1] expresses its probab-
ility of successfully conciliating to strings A and B of length n, thus producing
a secret message S while exchanging information E. The process is described
as R(A,B) = (S,E). An ϵ-robust code fulfills the following:
(∃N0(ϵ))(∀n ≥ N0(ϵ))

α,β∈{0,1}n
prob(A = α,B = β) · prob(R(α, β) = [⊥, ·]) ≤ ϵ
where ⊥ indicates a failed run to generate a secret key.
(ii) An optimal code is an ϵ-robust code that does not exchange more information
than necessary given an error probability p of each bit in B with respect to
the original A:
lim
n→∞
IE(S|E)
nh(p)
= 1 + ζ (95)
with IE(S|E) being the information Eve has on S given E. If a code is op-
timal, then ζ = 0.
(iii) The efficiency of an error correction code is concerned with its run time: If
there exists a polynomial t(n) such that T¯ (n) < t(n) for n sufficiently large,
where T¯ (n) is the expected run time of R acting on messages of length n,
the code R is said to be efficient.
An ideal code is a code which is both optimal and efficient. There are unfortunately
no known suited ideal codes for QKD. The resort are so-called almost ideal codes.
Those are ϵ-robust and efficient codes with a ζ > 0.
Such a code is realised in the CASCADE protocol. The realisation presented here
works with parities of blocks of bits. A parity of block of bits is found by the
sum of the bits modulo 2 or the XOR of these bits. In CASCADE, it works in
the following way: first of all, an error estimation is done by taking 2% of the
final key and comparing it publicly. By this, a suitable initial block size k1 for
comparing parities between Alice and Bob can be chosen such that there is on
average maximally one error per block. The reason for that is that a parity check
does not find an even number of errors. Of course, Alice’s parity is the reference to
which Bob’s should agree. If the parity check on the block shows a disagreement,
an error finding code called Binary is started. It subdivides the block successively
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into blocks of half the length than the previous one and compares parities until
the erroneous bit is found and flipped. Then, the block size is doubled, as is done
right away if the parities of the initial block match. To detect an even number
of errors undetected before, the bit order is randomized every time a block size
is doubled. If for the larger block an error is found and corrected, the original
block is checked again so that a previously even number of errors in it can now be
detected. The same is done with the block of doubled size for the same reason.
Every time the parities of two blocks match, their size is doubled until a final
predetermined block size is reached. Then the error correction is terminated. The
scheme of the algorithm is shown in Figure 27.
Error estimation
Determination of k1
Parity checkChoose sorting for k1
Binary correction
yes Found corrupt
blocks?
no
Protocol finishedUsed block size
k1?
Final block size
reached?
Reset to block size k1 Double block size
yes
nono
yes
Figure 27: The error correction code based on CASCADE. Taken from [175]
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5.3.2 Privacy amplification
The privacy amplification is supposed to vanish the information Eve has on the key
from eavesdropping on the quantum channel and from the information distributed
during error correction. This info IE can be quantified (supposing single photon
BB84) as t = f(Q) ·n ·h(Q)−n ·h(Q), (cf. Equation 85) and has to be subtracted
from the sifted key. This is accomplished by using compression functions g chosen
at random from a set of functions G:
g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}r, r = n− t− s (96)
where n is the sifted key length (see Section 2.3 for the concept of sifting) and s is a
security parameter. It can be shown [15] that Eve’s knowledge of the resulting bit
string K is bounded by 2
−s
ln2
even if Eve knows the compression function (after the
quantum transmission) if g belongs to a so-called universal2 class of hash functions
[40].
A possible set of functions fulfilling this requirement is the following:
H = {gx : x→ [(c · x)mod2r] ∈ {0, 1}r|x, c ∈ {0, 1}r, c odd} (97)
This set of functions is practical to implement in soft- and hardware and has
another advantage: the odd random number c can be taken to be Alice’s and
Bob’s basis choice, which is absolutely random and communicated only after the
quantum transmission [15].
5.3.3 Authentication
All of the public communication steps beginning with sifting have to be authentic-
ated. The underlying principle is to build checksums, or tokens, out of the message
to be authenticated and a private random key as a digital signature. If the same
private random key is possessed by the receiver, he can verify the checksum. It is
very important to use an efficient algorithm for authentication which consumes as
few bits as possible of the private key. This is fulfilled by a scheme proposed by
Wegman and Carter [120] in which universal2 hash functions are used. The scheme
is depicted in Figure 28. The function itself used in every step of the scheme for
compression is the same as for privacy amplification above, only adapted for the
length of the message to be compressed and the resulting token. It could be shown
that the scheme only consumes O(log a) private key bits for authenticating a
message of a bits opposed to O(a) for other schemes.
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Figure 28: The authentication scheme. The message to be authenticated is split into
parts of lengths 2s with s= b+log2log2a, where b is the length of the authentication token
and a the length of the message. If necessary, zero-padding is added. The blocks of length
2s are then all compressed to length s using the appropriate function defined by the secret
key k1. Two resulting blocks are then concatenated and again compressed using a new
key k2. This is continued until a block of length s remains. The authentication tag is
then simply the lower order b bits of this block. Taken from [15].
A typical scenario could be that an adversary has intercepted one message and
the corresponding token and now tries to slip his own message to the designated
receiver with a corresponding token guessed from his knowledge. It can be shown
that the probability pguess for the adversary to guess the token of size b correctly
is [120]
pguess <
2
2b
=
1
2b−1
. (98)
The software is implemented using C++ and the cross-platform application frame-
work Qt 4.7.4 provided by the Qt Project (http://qt-project.org). It is thus ap-
plicable on all major desktop platforms. Even though this experiment is controlled
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by a single FPGA and thus there are no separated senders and receivers, the whole
program is realised as two separate units for Alice and Bob which could be run on
different platforms and which could communicate via TCP/IP. More details can
be found in [175].
5.4 Results
The BB84 protocol is experimentally implemented with the two different SPSs, a
NV− and a SiV centre.
The results are summarised in Table 3. With the brightest NV− centre with a
detected count rate of 8.9 kcps, a sifted key rate of 4.0 kbit/s at a QBER of 3.0%
is achieved. The raw key is then further processed using the CASCADE protocol,
resulting in a secure key rate of 2.6 kbit/s. The observed QBER can be attributed
to the limited contrast of the polarisation optics and the EOMs.
Using the brightest stable SiV centre with a detected count rate of 3.7 kcps, a
sifted key rate of 1.5 kbit/s, a QBER of 3.2% and a resulting secure key rate of
1.0 kbit/s is demonstrated. The keys are transmitted at an experimental clock rate
of 1MHz.
Both NV and SiV centres are showing a stable emission rate over several hours.
This indicates the long-term stability of the setup and the defect centres.
NV SiV
Repetition rate 1MHz 1MHz
Count rate 8.9±0.1 kbit/s 3.70±0.04 kbit/s
Sifted key rate 3.99±0.05 kbit/s 1.51±0.02 kbit/s
QBER 3.0±0.2% 3.2±0.2%
Secured key rate 2.6 kbit/s 1 kbit/s
Table 3: Results of the QKD experiments with NVs and SiVs centres, each executed
for 300 seconds.
The single photon sources (SPSs) implemented here do occasionally emit more
than one photon at a time and thus make the QKD vulnerable to photon number
splitting (PNS) attacks (see Section 4.4.3). It is thus interesting to have a look at
the source efficiencies and the g(2)(0) values of the SPSs and their consequences
on the security concerning multiphoton events.
An upper bound on the probability pm to have multiphoton events in pulses emitted
from a sub-Poisson light sources is given by [121],
pm ≤ µ
2g(2)(0)
2
, (99)
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where µ is the mean photon number per pulse which is identical to the source
efficiency. This upper bound can then be used to calculate a lower bound on the
secure key rate R, which takes the insecurity of having multiphoton events into
account. In fact, Equation 90 from Section 4.4.3 describes this with a Y ⋆1 given by
Y ⋆1 = 1−
pm
pclick
(100)
with the detection probability of a signal pclick ≈ µ · ttotal+pdc [121]. ttotal contains,
besides the setup transmission tsetup (cf. Section 5.2.1), the transmission of the
quantum channel. The dark count probability pdc is 2.4 × 10−5. Figure 29 shows
secure key rates as a function of the channel loss.
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Figure 29: Secure key rates as a function of channel loss achieved with the BB84
protocol utilizing a SPS with an NV centre (a) and a SiV centre (b) in blue considering
also possible multiphoton events. For comparison, the key rate when using an attenuated
laser without the decoy state protocol at the optimised mean photon number µ ∼ ttotal,
where ttotal is the overall transmission of the setup, is shown in red and dashed. Also
shown in green and dotted is the secure key rate when using weak coherent pulse (WCP)
together with the decoy state protocol with a mean photon number of 0.5.
The secure key generation rate at 0 dB roughly reproduces the measured secure
key rate after post-processing. For comparison, the secure key rate of a potential
experiment with identical parameters, but with an attenuated laser instead of a
single photon source with a mean photon number of µ ∼ ttotal (cf. Section 4.4.3) is
also plotted. The key rate is calculated as in Equation 90, taking the multiphoton
probability of a Poissonian light source into account. Also, the key rate of an
identical experiment with an attenuated laser source together with the decoy state
protocol (the used mean photon number of 0.5 is calculated as in [110]) is shown,
calculated with Equation 94. At low loss, attenuated laser pulses without the
decoy state protocol have relatively high signal intensities and thus outperform
the SPS. At a channel loss of > 3.3 dB for the NV centre and > 6.4 dB for the SiV
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centre, cf. Figure 29, translating into distances > 8 km and > 16 km using a typical
transmission of light through air in sea level of 0.4 dB/km [122] the SPS provides
higher secure key rates and longer achievable transmission distances. However,
for the parameters achieved here, an attenuated laser together with the decoy
state protocol is still favourable over the SPS regarding maximum key rates and
achievable distances. This is because the obtained efficiencies of the SPS is not
high enough and at the same time the g(2)(0) value not low enough.
Finally, following this analysis, requirements on nearly ideal but still realistic SPSs
are explored and their performance is compared with WCPs using decoy states.
For this, the different parameters characterizing a SPS, like the quantum efficiency,
the photon yield and the value of g(2)(0) are varied towards more favourable val-
ues. This could be achieved by integrating the defect centres in photon extracting
architectures like three dimensional light guiding micro structures [123] and using
narrow-band emitting defect centres which could be easily filtered against back-
ground fluorescence. A prerequisite would be to use emitters with quantum yields
∼ 1. In Figure 30 the resulting rates are shown for different parameter choices.
It can be seen that building a SPS which generates superior key rates than WCP
with decoy states is challenging, but could be possible in the future.
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Figure 30: Secure key rates as a function of the channel losses of QKD experiments with
defect centres with ideal but realistic features. For these sources, quantum efficiencies
of 95% and photon yields of 10% (blue curve) and 95% (black curve) are assumed.
The g2(0) value is 0.005 (blue curve) and 0.0005 (black curve). For comparison, an
attenuated laser without (dashed red curve) and with (dotted green curve) decoy state
protocol is depicted as well. The repetition rate is assumed to be 20MHz for all sources.
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5.5 Summary
In summary, a QKD experiment including post-processing with a compact SPS
using defect centres in diamonds has been implemented. The source is designed to
be easily deployed in various QIP experiments. NV and SiV centres are used and
can readily be interchanged within the experiment. SiV centres are potentially
interesting for QIP applications due to their narrow spectral emission bandwidth
but still suffer from drawbacks concerning their internal quantum efficiency and
photostability, which have to be overcome in the future. Together with a thorough
security analysis of the QKD experiment, taking into account the source efficiency
as well as its g(2)(0) value, the requirement to test quantum light sources in realistic
architectures has been discussed.
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6 The frequency-time protocol
For fibre based quantum key distribution (QKD) linear polarisation is not ideal
as a coding technique, because of its low robustness. Similarly, using the phase
is also not ideal and typically complex alignment or stabilisation schemes have to
be deployed. This motivates the use of different coding techniques as for example
the time of arrival or the frequency of photons. In satellite communication, where
the transmission channel is free-space, polarisation coding seems a good choice for
QKD and has already been used in feasibility tests [124]. In this context it might
however be problematic that classical optical satellite links generally use circular
polarisation for duplexing communication [125, 126]. This would prevent using
the same terminals for sender and receiver for classical and quantum communica-
tion. Also, the relative rotation of the coordinate systems of sender and receiver
would demand complex alignment schemes once again [62]. This makes the use of
frequency and time of arrival an interesting alternative for satellite QKD as well.
These reasons motivate practical studies of QKD with photons in the FT protocol
[127, 128, 129, 130], see also Section 2.6. From a technological point of view the FT
protocol is advantageous since mature time and frequency-resolving measurement
techniques are at hand, although there might be challenging demands concerning
the timing jitter of photon detectors and the resolution of employed spectromet-
ers. But these challenges can be dealt with well, as will be shown in this chapter
reporting the first implementation of the FT protocol ever [173]. It is organized
as follows: at first, in Section 6.1, the FT protocol is introduced. In the follow-
ing Section 6.2, the conceptual peculiarities are highlighted by introducing three
different intercept-resend attacks which do not exist in this form for the BB84
protocol. Then, in Section 6.3, the experimental setup of the implementation is
introduced in depth. In the following Section 6.4, results are presented, including
a security analysis on the aforementioned attacks. The chapter is closed with a
summary and outlook in Section 6.5.
6.1 The protocol
The security of the BB84 protocol relies on encoding qubits in single quantum
states in different bases which should be mutually unbiased. This maximises the
sensitivity to eavesdropping attacks. Actually, each state of one basis can always
be constructed as a superposition of the two states of the complementary basis
with equal squared amplitudes each. The BB84 protocol is typically introduced
in an implementation using polarisation, for example with the states |H⟩, |V ⟩
in the rectilinear and |+45⟩, |−45⟩ in the diagonal basis or similarly with four
different possible phases of a photon which are acquired and read out with two
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unbalanced interferometers, see Section 4.2 and Chapter 7. The FT protocol
encodes states which are seemingly very similar to those of BB84, but defined
in time and frequency.
In the time basis, Alice creates one of two states |0⟩ and |1⟩ by temporally well-
defined single photon pulses at two different possible instances in time, t0j and
t1j, where j stands for the j-th bit sent. Each has a full width at half-maximum
(FWHM) of δt, and δt < ∆t, where ∆t stands for the temporal separation of the
two states, ∆t = t1j - t0j.
The frequency basis is represented, in analogy to the time basis, by a photon
state with FWHM of δf at one of two possible frequencies f0 or f1. Here as well
δf < ∆f = f1 - f0. For his measurement, Bob chooses a basis at random and
analyses either the frequency or the arrival time of the photon to find out which
state has been sent.
To ensure a random outcome when measuring in the wrong basis, the overlap
between any two states of a different basis should be large. So the temporal
width δτ of the frequency pulse should be larger than ∆t and the pulse should
be sent at time t2j = (t1j - t0j)/2. In frequency, the spectral width δν of the
time pulse should also be larger than the frequency separation ∆f between the
two frequency states. In addition, the central frequency of the time pulse should
be at f2 = (f1 - f0)/2. If one supposes a Gaussian pulse shape in time and in
frequency, a pulse of a temporal width of δt has a spectral width of δν = 0.44/δt
and a pulse of spectral width of δf has a temporal width of δτ =0.44/δf. This is
given by the time-frequency uncertainty relation or simply by the pulses’ Fourier
transformation. The formulated requirements on the parameters describing the
time and the frequency basis can be summarised by the relations
δτ = 0.44/δf ∼ ∆t , (101)
δν = 0.44/δt ∼ ∆f ., (102)
δf < ∆f , (103)
δt < ∆t , (104)
as well as
t2j =
t1j − t0j
2
(105)
and
f2 =
f1 − f0
2
. (106)
Figure 31 shows a scheme of the described Gaussian pulses in time and in frequency.
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Figure 31: Scheme of the FT-protocol with Gaussian pulses in time (a) and frequency
(b). The shape of the two possible states is shown as well as the shape of a state in its
complementary basis (dashed). Taken from [173]
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Figure 32: Schematic setup for the FT-protocol: A laser generates light at a given
frequency, which can then be modified to generate frequencies f0 or f1. An intensity
modulator carves short pulses at different instances in time to produce t0j or t1j or longer
pulses to preserve the frequency information for the frequency basis. At the receiver, a
switch is used for the basis choice. In one arm of the switch a fast avalanche photodiode
(APD) measures arrival times for the time basis, whereas in the other arm the frequency
is measured with a suitable filter. f0 and f1 are measured by APDs in each output of
the filter. Taken from [173]
Figure 32 shows a possible setup to implement the FT protocol with an attenuated
laser. A continuous wave (CW) light source emits light at frequency f2 with a
narrow spectral width. This frequency can be changed to f0 or f1 by a device to
shift the frequency, generating two frequency states. An intensity modulator then
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shapes pulses representing the different states. These can either be long with a
spectral width of δf or short and at t0j or t1j, according to Equations 101-106. On
the receiver side, a beam splitter (BS) (passive basis choice) or a switch (active
basis choice) selects the basis. A fast single photon detector on one arm then
measures the time basis. A suitable frequency filter on the other arm and one
single photon detector on each filter output implements a measurement in the
frequency basis.
The protocol then works as follows, in analogy to the BB84 protocol:
1. Alice chooses randomly and with uniform probability if she wants to send a
state in the time or the frequency basis.
2. Alice chooses randomly and with uniform probability which bit she wants to
send, thus if she wants to send a “0”, corresponding to either t0j or f0, or a
“1”, corresponding to either t1j or f1.
3. Bob decides randomly with uniform probability in which basis he is going to
measure.
4. Alice and Bob perform the sifting, thus they agree about the signals which
have been received and which have been measured in the correct basis and
discard the others.
5. Alice and Bob estimate the error by comparing a subset of the sifted key in
order to bound Eve’s information on it.
6. Alice and Bob perform error correction and privacy amplification.
This key can then be used to perform the one-time pad (see Section 2.1) over a
classical channel.
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6.2 Intercept-resend attacks: discussion of three different
attacks
As described in Sections 2.8 and 4.4, the ultimate goal for any QKD protocol is
an unconditional security proof. However, this can be complicated and for newly
introduced QKD protocols it is a good starting point to think about individual
attacks which are specific to it. This is the strategy adapted here. Having emphas-
ized the similarities to the BB84 protocol before, the differences and their possible
consequences on the security of the protocol are analysed in the following.
Two substantial differences to the BB84 protocol exist: first, two states within
one basis are non-orthogonal, the exact overlap between the two depends on the
parameter choice of δt, ∆t, δf and ∆f and on the pulse shape, which might not be
Gaussian. This means that even in theory a measurement of a state sent by Alice in
the correct basis might result in an error. In addition, if an eavesdropper for some
reason sends an incorrect state to Bob albeit in the right basis, this state might
not cause an error at Bob’s side. This will play a role in the numerical calculations
on the security presented in this and the following sections. Second, the actual
Hilbert space describing the protocol is of infinite dimension as opposed to two
dimensions, which is the case for BB84. So any possible state cannot be described
as a superposition between two basis states and the overlap between two states
of two different bases is not necessarily 50% as in BB84. Also the measurement
cannot be described as a projection on one of only two possible states anymore,
but the possibilities of projections are infinite and the appropriate measurement
for a state is not anymore well defined. That has consequences on the security
of the protocol. Without treating most general attacks, the treatment of three
different individual attacks reveals those differences in the following.
The effectiveness of the intercept-resend attacks described in the following sections
is analysed in a similar way here as it has been described in the intercept/resend
eavesdropping section of [131]. The approach is as follows: first of all, one supposes
that Eve attacks each bit individually without any knowledge about the basis
which is used. In average, she makes a certain error measuring the state because
of that, which results in a mutual information IAE with Alice < 1 per sent bit,
with IAE = H(A)−H(A|E) and H being the Shannon entropy (cf. Section 4.4.1).
Eve will send a bit to Bob, which has a certain probability of causing an error at
Bob and lessen his mutual information IAB with Alice. To get a lower bound on
the secure key rate, a well known relation of classical cryptography [132] is used
(see also [13]),
S = IAB − IAE (107)
= 1−H(QBob)− (1−H(QEve)) , (108)
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with S being the ratio of secured key bits which can be generated out of the sifted
key bits. This basically states that a secure key can be generated as long as Bob
has more information about the key Alice sent than Eve does. The second equality
is valid in the case of individually attacked bits. QBob and QEve, respectively, are
the average errors Bob and Eve encounter when measuring their individual bits.
To calculate S, one needs to know the error Eve makes when applying a certain
attack as well as the error this causes on Bob’s side. The calculation is done
here numerically using Matlab by simulating measurements of Eve and Bob and
calculating their error. The exact approach is explained below in this section.
The ultimate goal of the effected calculations is to consider different attacks, find
the maximally tolerable QBER QmaxBob for which Alice and Bob can still generate a
secure key given Equation 108 and compare it to the experimentally encountered
error.
This is accomplished in two steps: first of all, different individual attacks, which
are presented in the following sections, are simulated and the encountered errors
of Eve QEve and Bob QBob are calculated. In a typical constellation, Eve cannot
attack every bit since Bob’s resulting error would be too high and no secret key
would be generated. But Eve can attack a fraction d of the sent bits, resulting
in an information of Eve on the key as well as an error of Bob proportional to
d. That is why in a second step, the maximum fraction dmax which still enables
Alice and Bob to generate a key is calculated. The corresponding error QmaxBob can
then be compared to the experimental error. The results of these comparisons are
presented together with the experimental results in Section 6.4.
For the numerical simulations of the attacks, first of all the time and frequency
domains of interest are discretized by an appropriate number of points representing
each. Signal pulses can then be described by amplitudes sampled at those points,
filters by appropriate operations on the pulses over a range of points defining the
filter width. Default Matlab functions, e.g. fft (fast Fourier transform) can then
be used for the analysis. In the simulations, assumptions are made regarding the
sent signals by Alice and Eve and regarding the time and frequency measurement
techniques used. These assumptions are close to the experimental realisation. As
will be discussed in Section 6.3.2.2, in the experiment the pulse shape in time
and in frequency is determined in the time domain by Alice’s intensity modulator.
All pulses are more precisely described in time by rectangular pulses with half
Gaussian-shaped edges than by Gaussian-shaped pulses. The spectral shape of
the pulses is given by the Fourier transform of this shape in time, resulting in
approximately sinc2 shaped pulses.
The measurement process in both bases is approximated by a rectangular shaped
filter in time and frequency, respectively. Bob has one such filter for each state of
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both bases, which is centred around t0j/1j and f0/1 and has a width of ∆t and ∆f ,
respectively.
Eve’s measurement apparatus and her unit for sending pulses to Bob are specific-
ally adapted to each of the presented attacks and are presented in the respective
section below.
In the calculations, a signal which is measured outside of the filter associated
with the correct state is counted as an error for Bob and Eve, respectively. With
each pulse representing a state sent by Alice having an area normalised to one,
the proportion of a signal ending up in one or the other filter directly gives the
probability of this event and facilitates the calculation of errors. An example is
shown in Figure 33 for illustration purposes. The simulated sent single photon
pulse, a pulse representing the state |t0j⟩, has a pulse area equal to one. It is
subject to a measurement effected by two filters, one centered at t0j and the other
one at t1j, representing a measurement of the associated states. The part of the
pulse area which lies outside of the correct filter is counted as an error, symbolised
by the red areas as opposed to the green area representing a correct measurement.
Since these areas describe the probability of the single photon pulse being measured
at the associated times, the error is directly apparent.
Time
Filter Filter 
tj0| 〉
tj0| 〉 tj1| 〉
Figure 33: An illustration of the error calculations used in the numerical simulations.
A pulse normalised to an area of one representing |t0j⟩ is measured by filters associated
with both time states. The area of the pulse lying outside of the correct filter (red areas)
directly gives the probability of an error for a single photon state.
The following sections present the three different individual attacks considered
here.
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6.2.1 The two bases attack
One such attack consists of Eve measuring a state in two bases consecutively, first
in the time and then in the frequency basis or vice versa. Contrary to the BB84
protocol, in the FT-protocol not all information is erased by a measurement in the
wrong basis. E.g. a measurement of a time pulse in the frequency basis broadens
the pulse in the time domain, but it is still centred around a specific time t0j or t1j
and contains information about the original qubit. The two different time states
will have the same intensity profile in frequency, but their amplitudes differ and
still contain the information about the state. So as long as Eve applies a frequency
filter and then measures the intensity by detection, the two states will have the
same probability for either frequency state and after detection, all information
about the time is lost. But if Eve measures the frequency without measuring the
intensity afterwards, the time information contained in the amplitudes might not
be completely destroyed and a measurement in time afterwards might still extract
some information about the original state.
A possible setup of Eve to exploit this is shown in Figure 34. In this exemplary
setup, Eve measures first the frequency of an unknown state. Behind each output
of the frequency filter, there is a second filter to implement a measurement in
the time basis. Only after this second measurement, Eve detects in one of four
outputs, each associated with a combination of information about frequency and
time. Only when she learns about the actually sent basis in the sifting of Alice and
Bob, she discards the information of the other basis. But first of all, before she
has learned about the correct basis, she has to send a pulse to Bob. For this, she
uses a special light source with which which she tries to convey both her measured
time and frequency information, for example a pulse centred on t0j in time and
spectrally on f1. Concerning the temporal and spectral width of the pulses, she
has to make a trade-off such that they will cause the minimal average error when
Bob makes a measurement.
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Figure 34: A possible setup for an intercept-resend two bases attack from Eve. Eve
cascades the measurement in both bases of an unknown state and only detects after both
measurements. She then sends a state that conveys both time and frequency information
she measured.
This attack is simulated in Matlab by supposing that Eve uses two very broad
rectangular filters both in time and frequency. This is assumed advantageous
for her, because it modifies less the original pulse shape than the use of narrow
filters. The two time filters are defined from t2j (see Equation 105) over the whole
time domain for t < t2j and t > t2j respectively. In the frequency domain, the
filters are analogously defined. Both first a measurement in the time and first a
measurement in the frequency basis are analysed separately to find out which one
is more effective. This is of interest because in the simulation as well as in the
actual experiment, there is no symmetry between the time and the frequency bases,
e.g. the pulses have different pulse shapes. The specific pulse Eve sends, which
conveys both time and frequency information she measured, is assumed to have a
Gaussian shape. The pulse width in time and in frequency (both are related by
δfEve = 0.44/δtEve) is optimised in the simulation by minimising Bob’s averaged
error for a pulse he measures half of the time in the time basis and half of the time
in the frequency basis.
This is of course just exemplary and might not be the ideal realisation of this
attack. The goal is rather to show the difference to the BB84 protocol and to see
if the FT-protocol can still produce a secret key under the assumptions made here.
The comparison of the maximally tolerable QBER QmaxBob for this attack is presented
together with the experimental results in Section 6.4.
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6.2.2 The side filter attack
Another possible attack highlighting the differences between the FT and the BB84
protocol is the attempt to measure only parts of the time or frequency pulses, called
the side filter attack. This attack exploits the fact that at e.g. t/f ≪ t0j/f0 and
t/f ≫ t1j/f1, the probability to measure i) one state of the actual basis or ii) any
state of the complementary basis might be much higher, depending on the exact
parameter choice. As an example to illustrate both cases, Gaussian pulses sent by
Alice are considered with parameters which are the same order of magnitude as in
the experimental realisation. For case i), δt = 50ps and ∆t = 2× δt = 100 ps, ∆f
= 17.6GHz = 2× δν, and δf = 8,8GHz. This parameter choice results in perfect
symmetry between all states in time and in frequency, cf. Figure 35. It can also
be seen in Figure 35a) that at t < t⋆0j and at t > t
⋆
1j, the probability to find t0j
and t1j, respectively, is much higher. So if Eve deploys special filters measuring
only at t < t⋆0j and at t > t
⋆
1j, she can directly determine the correct state with
high probability. The situation is of course analogue in frequency, cf. part b) of
the figure.
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Figure 35: An example of a parameter choice which might be exploitable by Eve: a)
the states |t0j⟩ (blue) and |t1j⟩ (red) are shown as well as any states of the frequency
basis (orange, dashed). At t < t⋆0j and t > t
⋆
1j , the probabilities of the respective states in
the time basis are much larger than of any state in the frequency basis. b) the analogue
is shown in frequency with the points of interest at f < f⋆0 and f > f
⋆
1 .
Case ii) is encountered with the following parameter choice: δt = 50ps, ∆t =
100 ps, ∆f = 4.4GHz = 0.5 × δν, δf = 2.2GHz. This parameter choice results
again in a symmetric arrangement of the states in time and in frequency, cf. Figure
36. It is also apparent in Figure 36a) that this time at t < t⋆0j and at t > t
⋆
1j, the
probability to measure a frequency pulse is higher than for a time pulse. The
analogue in frequency is true at f < f ⋆0 and f > f
⋆
1 as can be seen in Figure 36b).
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So if e.g. in time Eve uses a filter analysing only the domains where a frequency
pulse is more likely and then measures the resulting signal with frequency filters,
she might gain an informational advantage, cf. the two bases attack of last section.
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Figure 36: Another example of a parameter set which might be exploited in the side
filter attack: a) this time, at t < t⋆0j and t > t
⋆
1j in the time domain and b) at f < f
⋆
0
and f > f⋆1 in the frequency domain, respectively, the probabilities for the states in the
complementary basis become much larger.
This attack is simulated by first of all finding Eve’s best measurement strategy.
For this, the points t⋆0j/1j and f
⋆
0/1, respectively, are calculated and Eve’s filters are
adapted. It is assumed that these points are the points where the probability for
one state of the basis and its complementary basis are equal, just as in Figure 35
and 36. The position of these points with respect to the different states of both
bases determines if strategy i) or strategy ii) is applied. It is assumed that Eve
sends the same states as Alice but according to her measurement results.
Since the parameter choice is not necessarily symmetric, for example in the exper-
iment implemented here (see Section 6.4), the strategy is evaluated in both bases
individually. The overall efficiency of the strategy in terms of Eve’s shared inform-
ation IAE with Alice and Bob in perspective to Alice’s and Bob’s information IAB
is calculated by averaging over both results. It is assumed that Eve must attack
both bases with the same probability to keep a uniform probability for Bob to
receive states in both bases.
It should be noted that the presented attacks do not represent all of Eve’s pos-
sibilities. For example, when choosing different pulse shapes than Gaussian, as
in this experimental implementation, the situation might be more complex and
more complex filter shapes might grant Eve more information per error she causes
at Bob’s side. In addition, one can see in Figures 36 and 35 that in the middle
between the two states of one basis there is also a higher probability to measure
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a state of the complementary basis. This has not been taken into account here.
Numerical tests suggest that this does not give a lot of advantage to Eve with the
parameters chosen in the experiment, but in general it should be further examined
in future security analyses of this protocol.
6.2.3 The classical intercept-resend attack
To conclude this section about specific individual attacks on the FT protocol, the
basic intercept resend attack is treated, see Section 2.2 in the context of the BB84
protocol. The only difference here with respect to the BB84 protocol is that there
is an intrinsic error when measuring in the right basis due to the non-orthogonality
of states within a basis. This has to be taken into account when calculating the
mutual information of Alice and Bob and Alice and Eve. It also plays a role when
Eve measures in the correct basis and sends the measured state to Bob. It might
be the correct state and still cause an error or might be the wrong state without
causing an error. This has to be taken into account when calculating the efficiency
of this attack. Due to the fact that the states within a basis are almost orthogonal
with the parameter choice implemented here, the efficiency of the intercept-resend
for the FT protocol attack is very similar to BB84.
6.3 Experimental setup
The goal of the experiment is to show the feasibility of the FT protocol with
existing, mainly off-the-shelf telecom components. The use of mainly telecom
components for the optical setup constrains the possibilities of using frequency
filters with a very high frequency resolution. Here, an optical interleaver for dense
wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) with a resolution of 12.5GHz is used.
This determines the minimal timing resolution to about 35 ps assuming Gaussian
pulses, see Equations 101 and 103, which cannot be achieved directly by using
standard APDs. That is why the setup introduced above in Figure 32 has to be
modified in the following way: the switch is used not only for the basis choice but
also to implement the temporal resolution necessary to distinguish the two states
of the time basis. This is accomplished by switching one time state to output
1 and the other state to output 2, cf. Figure 37. Fortunately, fast optical and
electronic equipment to achieve this is at hand. The frequency shifting of the laser
is accomplished by a direct modulation of the current which drives the laser, the
intensity modulation to shape short time or longer frequency pulses is achieved by
a Mach-Zehnder modulator (MZM), cf. Figure 37. The experiment is performed
over a transmission distance in the order of 10m which does not compromise the
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intended feasibility test.
The truth Table 4 associates clicks of the APDs with possible sent and received
states for this setup.
Alice Bob
Basis Bit State sent Basis Click APD no. Bit received
f 0 |f0⟩ f 1 0
f 1 |f1⟩ f 2 1
f 0 |f0⟩ t 1, 2 or 3 ?
f 1 |f1⟩ t 1, 2 or 3 ?
t 0 |t0j⟩ t 1 or 2 0
t 1 |t1j⟩ t 3 1
t 0 |t0j⟩ f 1 or 2 ?
t 1 |t1j⟩ f 1 or 2 ?
Table 4: Truth table for the setup of the frequency-time (FT) protocol.
Switch
APD 1
APD 2
APD 3
1
2DFB MZM VOA
t
Generation of
ps switching
windows
Direct frequency
modulation
Filter
Attenuation to
single photon
level
Optical
Amplitude
Figure 37: A modified setup for the FT protocol. A current modulated distributed
feedback (DFB) laser emits continuous wave (CW) light which is modulated by a Mach-
Zehnder modulator (MZM) and attenuated by a variable optical attenuator (VOA). On
the receiver side, a switch directs all light to the frequency filter for a measurement in
the frequency basis. For a measurement in the time basis, the state at t0j is switched
to output 1 whereas a state at t1j is switched to output 2. Three avalanche photodiodes
(APDs) are used for detection.
The complete setup is more complex. It is shown in Figure 38. It can be subdivided
into different parts, described in the following sections. At the heart of the setup
is the bit pattern generator (BPG). This device provides the basic electronic
signal controlling the experiment via a digital pattern of logical bits and supplies
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the overall time frame. The frequency-modulated laser is the CW light source
of the experiment. Two intensity modulators (MZMs) (intensity-mod and pulse
carver) are used to shape short pulses for the time basis or longer pulses for the
frequency basis. These are then attenuated to single photon level (Variable optical
attenuator-VOA). On the receiver side there is a switch in form of a double output
Mach-Zehnder modulator (DOMZM) which allows making a measurement in the
time base by switching t0j to one and t1j to the other output or directs all the light
to the interleaver which allows measuring the frequency of the optical signal for
the frequency base. The measured signals are then detected by three APDs.
Finally, data analysis is implemented with a real-time sampling scope and offline
data processing.
As can be seen in Figure 38, the receiver outputs leading to the APDs can be
coupled to a digital channel analyzer (DCA) via optional 3 dB couplers (dashed
blue lines). This DCA is equipped with appropriate photodiodes to detect unat-
tenuated classical signals. It has been used frequently to calibrate and characterize
the system.
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Figure 38: Detailed scheme of the experiment. Black fine lines represent electronic
connections, blue thicker lines optical fibre links. Taken from [173].
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6.3.1 The bit pattern generator
The SHF 12103 A BPG is able to generate sequences of electronic digital signals
in form of pseudo-random or individually programmable bit patterns. It is usually
employed to generate electronic signals which are used to test the performance of
optical setups, typically for telecommunication purposes.
The BPG controls all basic processes of the experiment, all the non-grayed-out
parts of Figure 39 are directly or indirectly driven or triggered by it.
It provides signals at a very high rate, which are used for controlling the pulse
shaping on the sender and switching on the receiver side. Also the basic clock or
repetition rate of the experiment, which has a lower frequency, is provided. For
this purpose, various outputs of the BPG (see Figure 40) are used.
APD
 1
Oscilloscope
DCA
Var. 
delay
Inter-
leaver
Intensity-
modIsolator
~~~ Pulse carver VOA
DOMZM
DFB-
Laser
BP
ĮlterEDFA
I-
Laser
Clock
Bias
V
f = 3.42 MHz
Bias-
Tee
Bias
V
F-Gen
F-Gen
f/4
F-Gen
f/2
BPG
AxC
BxD
Ampli-
ĮĞƌ
T-
Ctrl
APD
3
APD
2
Ampli-
ĮĞƌ
Pol-control
Pol-control
Pol-control
Figure 39: Non-grayed-out all parts which are directly controlled by the bit pattern
generator (BPG).
Figure 40: The various outputs of the SHF 12103 A bit pattern generator (BPG).
Taken from [133]
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The pattern on which the output signals are based is a sequence of logical bits,
thus zeroes and ones, which are individually programmable through a graphical
interface, cf. Figure 41. The ensemble of blue and green lines in the figure, re-
spectively, correspond to sub-patterns which are output at different outputs of the
BPG, the A×C and B×D outputs. Each little line corresponds to an individual
bit which can be set to “high” (0) or “low” (1) by a mouse click. The patterns can
also be loaded from external files. The total length of the pattern can be chosen
to be arbitrarily long up to the maximal memory capacity. The pattern is run
through with a rate determined by an external clock. Once the whole pattern has
been run through, it is repeated.
The output corresponding to a bit of value “0” or “low” is −V , for a “1” or “high”
bit it is +V , where V is the adjustable voltage amplitude.
A separate output can provide a much slower trigger signal, the so-called frame
out. Its frequency can be programmed by choosing an integer divisor of the clock
frequency which can be chosen to be sufficiently large to output a trigger signal
once per pattern period, for example.
Figure 41: The graphical user interface (GUI) to control the pattern output by the
bit pattern generator (BPG), the zoomed in part shows the two sub-patterns (blue and
green) in more detail.
The maximal timing resolution of the BPG is given by its smallest programmable
unit, the single bit. When used at its maximal bit rate of 56GBps, this means
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that the duration of the electronic output signal representing a single bit is 18 ps.
To achieve this bit rate, an appropriate external clock has to be used. Here it is
provided by the SHF 78210 B synthesized signal generator. It provides a 28GHz
signal which is internally doubled in frequency within the BPG.
The pattern used here has a length of 65536 bits. Given the clock frequency,
this results in a pattern repetition frequency of 854 kHZ. Within one of the sub-
patterns, there are two sequels of several bits each (6-20, see Section 6.4) which
are set on “high” representing the temporally long pulses of the frequency basis.
These bits on “high” level set the MZM for shaping of the pulses (pulse carver) on
maximal transmittance, whereas a “low” bit minimises the transmitted intensity.
Within each pattern, there are also two sequels of several bits each (typically two,
see Section 6.4) set on “high”, each representing of the two possible time states. All
four bit-sequences representing signal states are evenly spaced within the pattern
(save the ∆t, typically 72 ps or 4 bit, between the two possible time states). The
signal frequency is hence 3.42MHz. The frame out providing the basic clock of
the experiment is thus set to this frequency. In the other sub-pattern there are
two sequels of severals bits (typically 4, see below) put on “high”. They are
used for switching the state |t1j⟩ to APD 3 by setting the DOMZM to maximal
transmittance at the corresponding output. All other signals are to be transmitted
towards its other output, which is achieved by applying “low” bits for the rest of
the pattern. To facilitate the application of the switch bits at the right instant in
time at the DOMZM, this sub-pattern can be shifted with respect to the other.
Because of the predetermined ever-repeating pattern, the order of different sent
signal states is deterministic. Also, the switching is only applied for the time
basis, all states are measured in their corresponding basis and no sifting is needed.
This is acceptable in an experiment proving the feasibility of the protocol with
available equipment. For the data processing used here, the deterministic results
even present an advantage, cf. Subsection 6.3.4.
The relative long pattern length results in a relatively low repetition frequency
of the QKD experiment of 3.42MHz. This is practical due to two reasons. First
of all, available function generators (F-Gens in Figure 39) are used for further
reducing this frequency by frequency division. They are needed for the generation
of auxiliary signals necessary for the experiment. Those function generators do not
support much higher frequencies. Second, the behaviour of the current modulated
laser is not known for higher modulation frequencies and terminal damage of the
laser could result.
The maximum amplitude of the BPG is too small to drive the MZMs and the
DOMZMs directly. Hence, in front of each modulator, there is a fast electronic
amplifier (SHF 806 E). Those amplifiers are alternating current (AC)-coupled and
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need a zero-mean input signal to work properly. Since in the original pattern of
65536 bits, there are only very few ones representing the actual signals and thus
predominantly only zeroes, the resulting signal does have a mean very close to
−V . This is why large blocks of 512 bits each with “high” level are programmed
throughout the pattern alternating with blocks of 512 bits each on “low”. Within
the latter, there are the actual signal bit sequences.
Three different outputs are used for the purpose of controlling the experiment,
cf. Figure 40: there are the high-speed B ×D and A × C outputs, which output
the two sub-patterns. These outputs are a specialized variant of the SubMiniature
version A (SMA) connectors apt for the high frequencies in use, the so called K-
type. Semi-rigid high-quality coaxial cables are used to connect them to the final
devices. The standard SMA Frame out output is used to provide the basic clock
rate of the experiment of 3.42MHz.
Some specific aspect of the BPG signal generation and application will be addressed
in more detail in some of the following subsections.
6.3.2 Light generation and modulation
The sender can be divided into two parts: one part for the generation of the
frequency modulated attenuated light signal and one part for the modulation of
the light. They are described in the following two sections.
6.3.2.1 The frequency modulated light source
The light modulation scheme is shown in Figure 42. A temperature controlled
(Profile TED 200 temperature controller, T-Ctrl in the figure) DFB laser emits
coherent light in CW mode at a wavelength of 1582 nm. The frequency modulation
is done by applying a pattern of appropriate voltage pulses added via a bias tee
to the constant current supply of the laser (Digistant 6426, I-Laser in the figure).
The injection current modulation from the voltage pulses leads to carrier density
modulation and temperature change effects that induce the desired frequency mod-
ulation (cf. [134], p. 68). The voltage pulses are output from a function generator
(Wavetek 164, F-Gen in the figure) and are adapted in shape and amplitude such
that the desired frequency modulation amplitude is achieved. This is accomplished
by a skewed sinusoidal signal. Figure 43 shows a screenshot of the intensities at
the outputs of the used frequency filter for unattenuated frequency modulated cw
light, measured by the DCA (in this demonstration measurement, the intensities
seem different due to differently attenuating fibres used).
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Figure 42: The non grayed-out parts show all components which compose the frequency
modulated light source.
The two generated frequencies are separated by approximately 10GHz, as is meas-
ured by a heterodyne spectral measurement. In this type of measurement, a laser
with a precisely known frequency and the frequency modulated signal are mixed
on a BS before detection by a photodiode. The resulting beat signal gives direct
information about the difference frequency. It should be noted that for this meas-
urement the frequency is statically changed between the two target frequencies
states by applying the associated voltage amplitudes statically to the laser.
To assure that the pulse shaping of the signal states and the frequency modulation
are in phase, the frequency modulation is synchronised to the rest of the exper-
iment. This is achieved by dividing the basic clock rate by two with a function
generator (F-Gen, HP 3314 A). The function generator used for the laser current
modulation is synchronised to this one, see Figure 42. In this manner every second
pulse is frequency modulated with respect to its predecessor, regardless if it is a
signal in the time or the frequency basis. This differs from the original protocol
(cf. Equation 106) but is necessary due to technical reasons. The exact phase of
the modulation with respect to the clock frequency can be set with the HP 3314
A function generator such that the frequency modulation is applied at the right
instant in time.
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Figure 43: Shown are the intensities of unattenuated CW light behind the two outputs
of the interleaver when the frequency modulation is applied. The different amplitudes are
due to different attenuations of the optical fibres which are connected to the photodiodes.
Behind the laser and an isolator to prevent back reflections, the light is amplified by
an Erbium doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) (Keopsys) which preserves the frequency
of the input signal. The output light beam is filtered by a bandpass filter (BP-
Filter) to suppress noise from the amplification. The amplifier is used for practical
reasons, i.e. before working with quantum signals the system is characterized and
calibrated with sufficiently strong classical light signals (see e.g. Figure 43). To
change the intensity easily, a variable optical attenuator (VOA) is used.
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6.3.2.2 The signal modulation
All non grayed-out parts in Figure 44 are involved in the light intensity modulation
on the sender side. A high-speed MZM for 40Gb/s data transmission (Oclaro SD),
is used as pulse carver which serves to shape short time or longer frequency basis
pulses. Its modulation is driven by an amplified (amplifier SHF 806 E) digital
signal from the B × D output of the BPG, as reported in Section 6.3.1. The
modulation contrast can be fine-tuned and temperature drifts compensated by an
externally generated bias voltage (Bias V). The achievable modulation contrast is
about 20 dB.
APD
 1
Oscilloscope
DCA
Var. 
delay
Inter-
leaver
Intensity-
modIsolator
~~~ Pulse carver VOA
DOMZM
DFB-
Laser
BP
ĮlterEDFA
I-
Laser
Clock
Bias
V
f = 3.42 MHz
Bias-
Tee
Bias
V
F-Gen
F-Gen
f/4
F-Gen
f/2
BPG
AxC
BxD
Ampli-
ĮĞƌ
T-
Ctrl
APD
3
APD
2
Ampli-
ĮĞƌ
Pol-control
Pol-control
Pol-control
Figure 44: The non grayed-out parts show all components for the intensity modulation
of the light on the sender side.
Both the temporal shape of the time and the frequency states is determined by the
electronic signal driving the MZM. Due to the binary driving signal, rectangular
pulses are formed instead of Gaussian pulses. The temporal shape of both the
typical time and the frequency pulses is shown in Figure 45. The time pulse shown
in Figure 45 a) results from to bits with of the bit pattern and has an approximate
pulse width of 36 ps. The frequency pulses are varied in length and thus also
in spectral width throughout the experiment, see Section 6.4. The smallest and
thus spectrally broadest pulse used here is formed by six successive bits within
the pattern, the longest and thus spectrally narrowest pulse consists of 20 bits. In
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the figure, part b), a frequency pulse resulting from 10 bits is shown, which has
an approximate pulse width of 180 ps. It should be noted that the time pulse in
part a) is probably not shown in its full shape due to the limited bandwidth of the
digital channel analyzer (DCA) and its integrated photodetectors. Nevertheless it
can be seen that the temporal signal shape can be approximated by rectangular
shaped pulses with edges given by half a Gaussian with a FWHM of about 18 ps.
The spectral shape of the frequency states is given by the Fourier transformation of
their temporal shape, resulting in approximately sinc2 shaped pulses in frequency.
The numerical simulations presented in Section 6.2 are adapted to this.
Due to the binary driving signal the transmission can only be switched between
low and high. Another MZM (Fujitsu FRM7921ER, intensity mod in Figure 44),
is needed to assure that the longer frequency pulses contain the same number of
photons as the short time pulses. This modulator is driven by a binary signal from
a function generator (F-Gen, HP E3610A). This generator divides the BPG trigger
frequency by four. The signal amplitude and the duty cycle are adapted such that
the intensity of two successive frequency pulses is attenuated with respect to two
successive time pulses at a ratio resulting in the same intensity for both. It is
simply given by the ratio of the length of the frequency pulse to the length of the
time pulses. Fine tuning is achieved by a bias voltage (Bias V), which can be set
by the function generator.
a) b)
Figure 45: The temporal shape of a non-attenuated light pulse in the a) time basis and
b) frequency basis as detected on the digital channel analyzer (DCA). The time pulse
is generated by two successive bits on high level, the frequency pulses by 10 successive
“high” bits.
The ensemble of electronic signals on the sender side, for both MZMs and the
frequency modulation of the laser, are schematically shown in Figure 46 for one
pattern cycle of the experiment.
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Figure 46: The different signals on the sender side which are generated during a
period Tpattern of the basic digital pattern. From top to bottom: the attenuation signal
to adjust the pulse energy of the time and the frequency pulses; the signal which is
used to modulate the laser frequency; the signal which is applied to the pulse-shaping
modulator on Alice’s side.
In front of both MZMs there is a manual polarisation controller (Pol-control in
Figure 44) to maximise their polarisation dependent transmission
The expected modulation contrast of both MZMs is 20 dB.
6.3.3 Bobs measurement and detection scheme
The receiver can be divided into several parts as well, which will be reported on in
the following sections: first of all, there is the DOMZM which serves to choose the
basis as well as to implement the measurement in the time basis. Second, there is
the implementation of the frequency basis measurement by using an interleaver.
Behind these devices there are three APDs to determine the actual output the
light state has taken an thus to complete the measurement.
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6.3.3.1 Rapid switching to implement the time basis
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Figure 47: The non greyed-out components show all parts which implement the switch
used for choosing the measurement basis and for the time basis.
The switching scheme on the receiver side is shown in Figure 47. The double out-
put Mach-Zehnder modulator (DOMZM) is driven by an amplified signal (amplifier
SHF 806 E) from the A×C output of the BPG as described in Section 6.3.1. Ad-
ditional adjustment of the switching contrast and compensation for temperature
drifts of the DOMZM comes from an external bias voltage. The maximally achiev-
able switching contrast is 20 dB. The DOMZM is supposed to achieve two things:
first of all, when Bob is measuring in the frequency basis, all light should be guided
to the output connected to the interleaver. Second, when Bob is measuring in the
time basis, a signal pulse centred at t0j should be switched towards the interleaver
as well (and thus towards APDs 1 or 2), whereas a signal pulse centred at t1j
should be switched toward APD 3, cf. Table 4. As explained in Subsection 6.3.1, a
sequence of zeroes is programmed for a measurement in the frequency basis, mak-
ing the DOMZM transparent towards the associated output. For a measurement
in the time basis a small sequence of “ones” is programmed in the pattern, which
is responsible for a fast intensity switching between the DOMZM’s two outputs.
To find the right instant in time for this switching of the |t0j〉 state, the subpattern
for the A×C output is shifted with respect to the B×D subpattern until optimal
switching is accomplished. Fine tuning is achieved by a variable optical fibre delay
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(Var. delay in Figure 47) in front of the DOMZM which can delay optical signals
with a sub-ps resolution. A polarisation controller (Pol-control in the figure) in
front of the DOMZM is used to maximise the transmission of this polarisation
dependent device.
Figure 48: The intensities of switched continuous wave (CW) laser light at both out-
puts of the double output Mach-Zehnder modulator (DOMZM), detected by the digital
channel analyzer (DCA).
A screenshot of classical, unattenuated CW light signal switched between both
outputs of the DOMZM recorded by the DCA is shown in Figure 48. A 10 bit
sequence brings about the shown switched signal.
In Figure 49, the complete schematic signal pattern used for controlling the ex-
periment during one pattern period is shown.
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Figure 49: All different signals which are generated during a period Tpattern of the
basic digital pattern controlling the experiment. From top to bottom: the attenuation
signal to adjust the pulse energy of the time and the frequency pulses; the signal which
is used to modulate the laser frequency; the signal which is applied to the pulse-shaping
modulator on Alice’s side; the signal which is applied to the switch (DOMZM) on Bob’s
side. Taken from [173]
6.3.3.2 An interleaver to implement the frequency basis
Frequency filtering is supposed to separate the states |f0⟩ and |f1⟩ so they can
be distinguished by single photon detection. The filter applied here is a so-called
optical interleaver (Optoplex 12.5GHz interleaver). This device is typically used in
dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) telecom applications to combine
or separate signals with different frequencies. Its integration in the setup is shown
in Figure 50.
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Figure 50: The non grayed-out parts show the interleaver and optical fibres used to
implement the measurement in the frequency basis.
The interleaver works through multi-beam interference. It has the filtering char-
acteristics with respect to the input wavelength as shown in Figure 51. As can be
seen, the device is able to process signals over a broad spectral range. The free
spectral range (FSR) of each output is 25GHz. With the flat transmission profile
of each output (see figure), the device is able to separate signals with a spectral dif-
ference of 7GHz < fSep < 18GHz. The frequency separation between the centres
of two neighbouring transmission windows of different outputs is 12.5GHz. Ideal
separation of two signals is achieved with this frequency separation.
The expected filtering contrast is greater than 20 dB.
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Figure 51: Filtering characteristics of the Optoplex 12.5GHz interleaver as a function
of wavelength. Measurement data by courtesy of the Heinrich Hertz Institute (HHI).
6.3.3.3 The signal detection
The complete detection scheme is shown in Figure 52. The detection is accom-
plished by three indium gallium arsenide (InGaAs) APDs (ID-Quantique ID210).
These are employed in gated mode (see Section 4.3.4) and thus need an external
trigger signal. The gate is a bias voltage of adjustable length and amplitude ap-
plied to the photodiode, which is only able to detect photons during this instant.
Since the arrival times of the photons are known, this can be used to reduce noise
not generated by signal photons. The trigger is taken from the frame out of the
BPG, see Section 6.3.1. Not all three APDs can be triggered by it directly since
the signal power is too weak to be split up further. It is used to trigger just one
APD directly. The other two are synchronised to the gate-out output signal of the
first APD, see figure. This output is synchronous to every applied gate.
The detection outputs of all three APDs are connected to a real-time sampling
scope (Le Croy Wavepro 960).
106
APD
 1
Oscilloscope
DCA
Var. 
delay
Inter-
leaver
Intensity-
modIsolator
~~~ Pulse carver VOA
DOMZM
DFB-
Laser
BP
ĮlterEDFA
I-
Laser
Clock
Bias
V
f = 3.42 MHz
Bias-
Tee
Bias
V
F-Gen
F-Gen
f/4
F-Gen
f/2
BPG
AxC
BxD
Ampli-
ĮĞƌ
T-
Ctrl
APD
3
APD
2
Ampli-
ĮĞƌ
Pol-control
Pol-control
Pol-control
Figure 52: The non-grayed-out parts show the single photon detection and recording.
To find the right instant in time to apply the trigger is elaborate in this case.
Normally, one could temporally scan the experimental clock cycle by adjusting
the external trigger until a significant detection signal is found on the APDs. In
contrast in this implementation, light is transmitted not only during transmission
of the actual signal, but also by the impact of the blocks of 512 bits used to
generate a zero-mean output of the BPG pattern, see Section 6.3.1. The correct
trigger instant can be coarsely estimated by knowing the instant in time signal
pulses are generated on the sender side as well as the length of the transmission
channel. Adjusting the trigger instant is facilitated by the possibility to shift the
frame out with respect to the pattern of the BPG. Fine tuning is achieved by
shifting the gate with respect to its trigger by a small range via the user interface
of the APDs.
The quantum efficiency can be individually set for each APD in the range between
5 and 25%. It seems paradoxical to not choose the highest possible one, but
actually a lower quantum efficiency comes together with a lower dark count rate,
such that the actual signal-to-noise ratio might be improved. Here it has been set
to 17.5%.
The gate width can be set between 0.5 ns and 25 ns. If the signal arrival time is
very well defined as it is here, it is useful to choose a gate as small as possible to
reduce noise. The applied gate width is chosen between 2 and 3 ns. For such small
gates, the exact gate width of each APD has an effect on the bias voltage amplitude
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and thus on the quantum efficiency. This effect has been used to set the relation of
count rates between the APDs as theoretically expected, counterbalancing different
individual attenuations of the different receiver outputs. APDs 1 and 2 should have
similar count rates, whereas the count rate of between the APD 3, which is used
only to detect one time state, should be reduced by one third.
The dead time is set to 0.2µs. A higher dead time reduces the probability of
afterpulses but also reduces the maximally possible detection rate. The chosen
value has been found to be sufficiently large in this case.
The signals of all three APDs are recorded by the real-time sampling scope. The
sampling rate is 20 MS/s, the recorded period lasts 50ms. Longer recording periods
are not possible due to the maximum capacity of the internal scope memory. The
recorded signal is read out by a PC which uses a Matlab script for data analysis,
presented in the following section. The limited statistics which is collected during
the short sampling period prohibits a reduction of the mean intensity below 0.5
photons per pulse.
6.3.4 The data analysis
The scheme of the data analysis is shown in Figure 53. At first, to reduce noise, the
recorded digital signal from the scope passes through a low-pass filter. The oscil-
loscope is free-running, so afterwards the pulse rate has to be estimated. Once the
pulse rate is known, the data is resampled such that an even number of samples per
pulse results. During the clock recovery step, the theoretically optimal sampling
instant is found. By interpolation, every signal pulse is then sampled at this in-
stant. In the next step, the downsampling, only this one sample per pulse is
kept. Then a threshold helps deciding which sample is kept as signal. The ob-
tained signal sequence is then compared to the expected sequence and the errors
are counted. This step is facilitated by the deterministic pattern used here. Also
measuring exclusively in the correct basis (see Section 6.3.1) further reduces noise
due to random outcomes within the relatively short recording of data.
Parts of the Matlab code for data analysis is proprietary and has been used by
courtesy of the HHI. It can not be published in this work.
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Figure 53: Receiver structure with digital signal processing. ADC stands for analog
to digital converter.
6.4 Experimental results
During the experiment, different parameter settings are explored. A complete
QKD experiment is performed with fixed δt, ∆t and ∆f and a δf which is varied
by varying δτ through different programmed pulse lengths in the BPG. See Table
5 for the different chosen settings. δt, ∆t and δτ are directly known through the
programmed pattern, δf and δν are calculated by the Fourier transformation of
the given pulse width and shape. ∆f has been measured by a heterodyne spectral
measurement (see Section 42). All chosen parameters respect the Inequalities 101
-104
δt ∆t δf ∆f δν δτ
36 ps 72 ps 8.1GHz 10GHz 12.2GHz 108 ps
36 ps 72 ps 6.1GHz 10GHz 12.2GHz 144 ps
36 ps 72 ps 4.9GHz 10GHz 12.2GHz 180 ps
36 ps 72 ps 4.1GHz 10GHz 12.2GHz 216 ps
36 ps 72 ps 3.5GHz 10GHz 12.2GHz 252 ps
36 ps 72 ps 3.1GHz 10GHz 12.2GHz 288 ps
36 ps 72 ps 2.7GHz 10GHz 12.2GHz 324 ps
36 ps 72 ps 2.4GHz 10GHz 12.2GHz 360 ps
Table 5: Different chosen parameters during the experiment. Taken from [173].
In Table 6, the experimental QBERs in each basis, Qexpt/f , are shown as well as the
average experimental QBER in both bases Qexpboth. Also shown is the theoretical
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QBER in each basis Qtht/f . Contrary to the BB84 protocol, it is not 0% due to the
overlap of both states of one basis. The numerical calculation of this theoretical
error is done as described in Section 6.2 but without eavesdropping.
δf Qtht Q
exp
t Q
th
f Q
exp
f Q
exp
both
8.1GHz 0.02% 9% 9.4% 15% 12%
6.1GHz 0.02% 9% 5.3% 9% 9%
4.9GHz 0.02% 7% 5.6% 7% 7%
4.1GHz 0.02% 6% 5.7% 6% 6%
3.5GHz 0.02% 7% 4.9% 7% 7%
3.1GHz 0.02% 9% 3.8% 5% 7%
2.7GHz 0.02% 8% 3.0% 5% 7%
2.4GHz 0.02% 8% 2.9% 5% 7%
Table 6: Set of δfs used in the experiment and the resulting theoretical (Qtht/f ) and ex-
perimental (Qexpt/f ) quantum bit error rates (QBERs) in each basis. Q
exp
both is the averaged
experimental QBER in both bases. Taken from [173].
It can be seen that Qthf is not always monotonically decreasing with decreasing δf .
This can be explained by the approximately sinc2 shape of the pulses which possess
side lobes and by Bob’s measurement equipment. The side lobes can sometimes
have higher portions in the wrong filter despite a smaller δf than for an increased
value of δf .
The sifted key rate for all shown parameters was ∼12 kbit/s for a mean photon
intensity of 0.5 photons per pulse (see Subsection 6.3.4) and a transmission distance
in the order of 10m.
The experimental QBERs differ from the theoretical ones, in some case signific-
antly. Both can be explained by a reduced measurement contrast. For the time
basis, the inherent intensity modulation and switching contrast of about 20 dB of
the used modulator and DOMZM cannot be fully exploited due to several reas-
ons: first of all, the modulator, the switch and the amplifiers used work at or
even slightly beyond their electronic bandwidth limit, hence their optimal mode
of operation cannot be reached. Also, the fact that both states in the time basis
are frequency modulated is not ideal when it comes to the optimal adjustment of
the modulator and switch which consist of interferometers sensitive to frequency
changes. This applies to the pulse shaping of the frequency pulses as well. How-
ever, in frequency a non-optimal intensity extinction between two signal pulses
does not contribute to the QBER but could open the door to a side-channel at-
tack on the frequency information. The limited switching time of the DOMZM
also contributes to the error in the time basis. An increased ∆t should improve
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the error rate. This will be analysed below. If in a future implementation, a smal-
ler δf could be implemented through a filter with a higher frequency resolution,
e.g. a fiber Bragg grating (FBG), these error sources could be further minimised by
relaxing the constraints on the temporal resolution. Using a fast single photon de-
tector with a high timing resolution for the time basis instead of the DOMZM, for
example a superconducting single photon detector (SSPD), could further improve
the results and simplify the setup.
For the frequency basis, the reduced contrast compared to the maximal interleaver
contrast of minimally 20 dB might be explainable by a noisy frequency modulation.
In addition, a non-optimal synchronisation with respect to the sent signals could
contribute to the QBER. Compared to the possibilities of analyzing the temporal
shape of the pulses, the analysis of the spectrum of the pulses has been rather
limited with tools at hand. The exact impact of the scheme of the frequency mod-
ulation on the spectrum is not known. It can be seen in Table 6 that an increase
of δτ beyond 180 ps and thus a decrease of δf below 4.9GHz does not have a sig-
nificant impact on Qexpf . This could mean that a further effective reduction of δf
beyond this value is somehow prevented due to the noise in the frequency modula-
tion. This might be improved by applying a smaller δf requiring a different filter.
A trade-off between optimal performance and using standard telecom equipment
should be found.
During the whole transmission, hardly any adjustment is needed. The frequency
modulation and filtering is very stable. Only severe temperature changes acting on
the equipment could derogate this. The polarisation is quite stable in the prevalent
lab conditions with optical fibres which are fixed by scotch tape. It has to be adjus-
ted about every 30min. to every hour. The bias voltage of the modulators has to
be readjusted in about the same cycles to compensate for temperature drifts. Both
could be automated by a feedback loop. On the sender side, unattenuated clas-
sical signals could be used for such a feedback loop, also polarisation-maintaining
fibres could be used here to avoid polarisation transformations. On the receiver
side, if a fast single photon detector would be used instead of the DOMZM, no
feedback at all would have to be applied , neither to control the polarisation nor
the bias voltage. This would be very advantageous compared to many other QKD
implementations which use feedback loops on the receiver side, where the statistic
of the quantum signal used as feedback signal might be very low.
Under all supposed individual attacks (see Section 6.2) a secure key can be gener-
ated. For all chosen parameters, according to the simulations, the most effective
attack turns out to be the attack in both bases. It should be noted that for δf
= 8.1GHz the error rate is above the 11% introduced in Section 4.4.1 and [37],
which is a lower bound for the maximum QBER of the BB84 protocol.
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The stability of the scheme facilitates the testing of different parameter sets in the
time basis. Different Δts and δts have been examined with respect to their impact
on the QBER. The results are shown in Figure 54. For these measurements, the
attenuation has always been adjusted such that count rates are similar for different
δts. The switching sequence of the BPG pattern has a length of 6 bits for every
measurement.
Figure 54: Measured QBER in the time basis Qexpt vs. pulse separation Δt for different
temporal pulse widths δt (18 ps in blue with diamonds, 36 ps in red with squares and
54 ps in green with triangles). Taken from [173].
It can be seen that a larger Δt decreases the QBER as expected. Also, a larger δt
lowers the QBER.
Last but not least it should be noted that when transmitting over larger distances,
a compensation for chromatic dispersion might be necessary, for example by using
dispersion shifted fibres. The effect of chromatic dispersion will be less if a smaller
δf and a larger δt would be used.
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6.5 Summary and outlook
In summary, a proof-of-principle implementation of the FT protocol with existing
commercially available components has been shown for the first time. In fact, every
component except the single photon detectors is off-the-shelf telecom equipment.
A wide range of different parameters as well as their impact on the performance
of the QKD transmission has been tested. This has been facilitated by the over-
all stability of the setup which needed little adjustment during longer periods of
transmission time.
For the range of parameters tested, not only the experimental performance, but
also the security under intercept-resend eavesdropping attacks specific to the FT
protocol has been analysed by numerical simulations including a thorough invest-
igation of the peculiarities of the FT protocol.
As a further development of this implementation, several modifications could be
tested: with a different filter system, more advantageous parameters could be
tested, which would allow for slower and less error-prone intensity modulation and
switching. A fast single photon detector replacing the switch would simplify the
setup considerably and dispense with the need for any polarisation and feedback
dependency on the receiver side, which would be very advantageous compared to
many other QKD schemes.
Besides the aforementioned modifications, it is planned to use the setup for free-
space transmission to show the specific feasibility of the FT protocol for satellite
transmission. Also, a larger alphabet, increasing the secure key rate per sent state
is targeted. This could also increase the security of the protocol [135]. It should be
noted that the FT protocol is well suited for this, since especially on the receiver
side no major modifications would be needed.
Last but not least it is planned to further advance the security analysis of this
protocol. For a full security proof, a collaboration with theoretical physicists
experienced in this field should be sought.
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7 Towards plug and play time-bin quantum key
distribution
When implementing a QKD scheme with optical fibres, the BB84 time-bin imple-
mentation, see Section 4.2, is more practical than BB84 with polarised photons
since polarisation is not robust in optical fibres. As part of this thesis, important
steps towards a realisation of such an implementation have been accomplished.
This implementation has been outlined to perform autonomously with two com-
pletely separate sender and receiver units representing Alice and Bob, which are
only connected with an optical fibre representing the quantum channel and a stand-
ard Internet connection. In order to have a practical setup which is close to a
real-world application, mainly standard telecom equipment is to be used for the
realisation and the targeted repetition frequency is in the MHz range, for which
available and cost-effective components can be used.
This chapter is organized as follows: at the beginning in Section 7.1, the proposed
setup is introduced. Each succeeding section then addresses one main building
block of this setup, stating the requirements which have to be met and reporting
the current status including the results of performance tests. At the end in Section
7.2, the achievements are summarised and an outlook is given on the necessary
steps to complete this work.
Two master theses and a bachelor thesis [176, 177, 178] have majorly contributed
to this work. Also, preliminary works from two bachelor theses have been helpful
[179, 180] for the realisation.
7.1 Setup
The whole setup consists of the basic optical setup introduced in 4.2 and additional
equipment for synchronisation of Alice and Bob and overall process control, see
Figure 55.
The setup shown in Figure 55 can be grouped into several parts on both Alice’s
and Bob’s side. The optical setup is shown on top. On the sender side, a laser
emits signal pulses at 1.5µm into the fibre-based setup (red lines in Figure 55). An
unbalanced interferometer with an electro-optic modulator (EOM) allows Alice to
chose the sent state by controlling the phase. Before entering the actual trans-
mission channel, the pulses are attenuated (Att.) to approximately single photon
level. A second laser emits unattenuated pulses at 1.3µm (blue line in Figure
55) at a predetermined time before the quantum signal. These pulses are used
to synchronise Bob to Alice. They are added to the transmission channel with a
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wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) add-drop multiplexer. The two signals
are again split on the receiver side by another WDM add-drop multiplexer. The
synchronisation signal is detected by a fast photodiode (PD). The quantum signal
passes through another unbalanced interferometer in which Bob control the phase
by an EOM to set his basis choice. Additionally, in Bob’s interferometer there is a
device to adapt its length difference and the relative phase between both arms to
Alice’s interferometer in order to maximise the interferometric visibility. Signals
are then detected on one of two avalanche photodiodes (APDs), each associated
with a predetermined bit value. The APDs are enabled to detect a signal by
application of an electronic trigger signal (APD trigger signal in Figure 62).
Below the optical setup in Figure 55, the field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs)
and electronics part is shown. It is used to control the optical setup in order to ex-
ecute the QKD. FPGAs are integrated circuits (ICs) which are (re-)programmable
to accomplish custom tasks in parallel which are typically time-critical. They are
described in more detail in Section 7.1.3. At the interface between each FPGA
and the optical setup, signal adaption is necessary. This is e.g. accomplished by a
digital-to-analogue converter (DAC), if bits are used to set one out of a range of
possible values, as for example for the phase modulation by the EOMs. In addition,
specialized homemade electronic printed circuit boards (PCBs) (Signal adaption
and duplication in Figure 62) are used if digital signals have to translated to a
different digital logic or duplicated. On both sender and receiver sides, the FPGA
is equipped with a Universal Serial Bus (USB) module to facilitate communication
with a personal computer (PC).
The PCs on sender and receiver side are at the next lower level in Figure 55. They
are used for key data storage and the overall management of the experiment and
offer a graphical user interface (GUI) to the user. In order to fulfill this task as well
as the post-processing of the sifted key in a later stage of the experiment, they are
connected to each other with an Internet connection (TCP/IP) and to the FPGAs
via USB. They are also each connected to a quantum random number generator
(QRNG) and acquire random numbers (Random no. acqu.) used for the bit and
basis choice of the QKD. In an alternative implementation, the QRNGs could also
be connected to the FPGAs directly.
In the following subsections, components of the presented setup will be summar-
ised which are actually implemented together. The subsequent presentation is thus
divided as follows: first of all, in Section 7.1.1, the interferometers as fundamental
building blocks of the experiment are described. Next, in Section 7.1.2, the optical
signal generation and its detection are presented together with the scheme to syn-
chronise both. At the end in Section 7.1.3, the FPGAs controlling the experiment
in conjunction with a PC are described. The homemade DACs are presented in
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the same section. They are at the interface between the FPGAs and the EOMs
used for phase modulation.
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Figure 55: A scheme of the planned complete time-bin implementation. It can be
grouped into several parts for each sender and receiver. The optical setup used for
the actual transmission of the quantum signals is shown on top. For direct control of
the experiment, field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) and additional electronics are
used, shown below the optical setup. The additional electronics is necessary to interface
the FPGAs with the optical setup. Via an Universal Serial Bus (USB) module, each
FPGA is connected to a personal computer (PC) which is shown graphically on the next
lower level. It controls superordinate processes of the experiment. Each PC is connected
to a quantum random number generator (QRNG) (shown at the bottom) to acquire
random numbers (Random no. acqu.) for the bit and basis choice of Alice and Bob. The
scheme is described in depth in Section 7.1 and throughout the whole chapter.
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7.1.1 Two unbalanced interferometers for phase modulation and read-
out
EOM
EO
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Laser 1,3µm
Laser 1,5µm
WDM WDM
PD
APDs
Att.
Alice Bob
0
1
Optical setup
Phase- and 
length-adaption
Figure 56: Shown are the interferometers (red) which constitute the fundamental
building block of the BB84 time-bin quantum key distribution (QKD) implementation.
Each interferometer includes an electro-optic modulator (EOM) for phase modulation.
Additionally, the interferometer on Bob’s side contains a device to adapt the length
difference between both arms to Alice’s interferometer. Also, the relative phase between
the interfering paths can be stabilised with this device.
A fundamental building block of the optical setup of Figure 55 are the interfero-
meters, see also red parts of Figure 56.
7.1.1.1 Requirements on the interferometers
As explained in Section 4.2, three commonly known practical issues play a role
in implementing these interferometers. First of all, it is fundamental to build two
interferometers with an identical path-length difference ∆l between the short and
the long arms. The path length difference mismatch δl = |∆l1 −∆l2| between the
two interferometers (indices 1 and 2) should be small with respect to the coherence
length lc (lc = c · τc, with τc being the coherence time). At this point it should also
be noted that in order to temporally distinguish interfering from non-interfering
events in the time-bin implementation (see Section 4.2), ∆l has to be large enough
to be temporally resolvable by the involved measurement equipment. Second, the
polarisation overlap between the two interfering paths at the last beam splitter
(BS) should be as high as possible. The achievement of a high spatial overlap
between both is satisfied without further intervention because the setup is fibre-
based. Finally, the overall phase relations between the two paths should be kept
constant over the whole transmission so a well-defined phase shift can be applied
by Alice and Bob. These three factors play a fundamental role in achieving a high
visibility V (see Equation 55 in Section 3.4.1 for the definition of visibility). The
visibility itself has an important influence on the quantum bit error rate (QBER).
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It is directly related to the optical error probability popt (cf. Equation 81 in Section
4.4.2) [13],
popt =
1− V
2
. (109)
It is thus vital to know the influence of each of the aforementioned factors on
the visibility. This shall be investigated in the following. Additionally, a fourth
potentially influential factor is investigated here: the impact on unbalanced losses
of the interfering paths on the visibility.
The resulting visibility can be described as a product of individual visibilities which
are functions of these factors,
V = Vδl · Vpol · V∆ϕ · Vloss , (110)
where Vδl describes the visibility as a function of the path length mismatch δl
and Vpol is the visibility as function of the polarisation overlap. V∆ϕ describes the
visibility as function of the phase stability and Vloss describes it as function of
individual losses in each of the interfering paths. Each can take values from 0 to
1.
At first, the intensity of an interfering light beam passing through two unbalanced
interferometers as in Figure 55 has to be expressed mathematically. In principle, if
continuous wave (CW) light is considered, the time average of the intensity at one
of the two outputs of the second interferometer can be quite complicated, since
there are contributions from all the different possible paths the light has taken.
These contributions might all interfere with each other if lc is long compared to
the path difference ∆l of the interferometers. In the experiment, pulsed light
from a laser with a coherence length shorter than the path difference ∆l is used.
Also, in the time-bin scheme (see Section 4.2) only detections around the arrival
time of a light pulse which has taken the long path in the first and the short
path in the second interferometer or vice versa are considered. With this, the
expression simplifies and for the output of the second interferometer of Figure 55
which is associated with the bit value “0”, an expression very similar to Equation
52 of Section 3.4.1.1 can be found, only the higher number of transmissions and
reflections in the couplers has to be taken into account,
I¯4(t)

= 2 |R|4 |T |4 I¯(t) 1 + g(1)(τ) cos ϕ . (111)
This expression has been derived from Equation 52 which describes classical light.
It could however also be expressed with quantized field operators, resulting in the
same expression, where

I¯(t)

would be the quantum mechanical expectation value
of the intensity and
g(1)(τ) would be formed with quantum mechanical operators,
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see Section 3.4.1.3. It thus remains valid if single photons are used as is the case
in this QKD experiment.
To begin with, the impact of the spectral bandwidth and the mismatch δl on
the visibility is discussed. For this, the assumption is made that the laser emits
Fourier-limited Gaussian shaped pulses. Their spectral bandwidth is thus given
by a Gaussian distribution with full width at half-maximum (FWHM) δf given by
δf = 0.44/δt, where δt is the FWHM temporal width of the pulses. With this,
using the Wiener-Khintchine theorem in the form of the Fourier transformation of
Equation 54 as well as Equation 56, the visibility of such a pulse interfering with
itself has a Gaussian shape as well, resulting in
Vδl = exp

−1
2

π · 0.44
c · √2ln2
2
δl
δt
2
. (112)
So for a given temporal pulse width of δt in the order of 100 ps as will be used
here, the mismatch δl should be smaller than 2.6mm to have an optical error
contribution below 1%, cf. Equation 110. It should be noted that in reality the
situation is worse since the real pulses are typically not Fourier-limited. Thus,
ideally, interferometer offering ultra-fine adjustment of δl with a range covering δl
≈ 0 should be implemented.
Next, the effect of the polarisation overlap on V is treated. Since arbitrary po-
larisation transformations are possible in the fibres, the final polarisations can be
elliptical. The overlap is defined as O = |⟨P1|P2⟩|2, with P1 and P2 being the
polarisation states of the light passing through the two interfering optical paths.
Supposing perfect visibility for the overlapping fraction and zero visibility for the
non overlapping fraction,
Vpol = O . (113)
The influence of missing phase stability on the visibility will be discussed now.
An applied erroneous phase of ∆ϕ, added to the ideal phase difference ϕ = φB −
φA between Alice and Bob (cf. Equation 72) can be estimated in the following
way: Taylor-series for ⟨I⟩max and ⟨I⟩min as functions of ϕ using Equation 111 are
developed up to second order at 0 and π, respectively. The resulting expressions
are put into Equation 55, and thus for small ∆ϕ
V∆ϕ ≈ 2− (∆ϕ)
2
2
. (114)
So with this and Equation 110, if a contribution to the optical QBER smaller
than 1% is targeted, ∆ϕ should be smaller than 0.2 rad or 11◦ over the whole
transmission period.
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Finally, the influence of different losses in the interfering paths on V shall be estim-
ated. Losses can occur e.g. through bad splices (see next section) at fibre-to-fibre
connections. Also, components such as EOMs can have nonuniform losses. Start-
ing point of the estimation is Equation 49, only the higher number of transmissions
and reflections taking place have to be accounted for. Also, to account for pos-
sible losses, the fields from the interfering paths are each multiplied with a (real)
transmission factor f1 and f2, respectively, which yields
I¯4(t) = |R|4 |T |4

I¯(t)
 
f 21 + f
2
2 + 2f1f2ℜ

g(1)(τ)

. (115)
Of interest is the relation between the transmission of the two paths and its effect
on the visibility. Assuming ℜ g(1)(τ) is only an argument of the phase ϕ, one
gets
I¯4(t) = |R|4 |T |4

I¯(t)

f 21

1 +

f2
f1
2
+ 2 · f2
f1
· cos(ϕ)

. (116)
Evaluating this expression at ϕ = 0 and π for ⟨I⟩max and ⟨I⟩min, respectively, and
substituting the acquired expressions into Equation 55, one gets
Vlosses =
2
f1
f2
+ f2
f1
. (117)
If again a QBER below 1% is desired, the relative transmission of one path with
respect to the other, f 2i /f
2
j , with i, j = 1, 2 and i ̸= j, should not be lower than
0.67. This expresses a relative robustness with respect to losses, nevertheless,
fibre-splices should be performed as careful as possible to keep the transmission
high and similar in both arms.
The presented issues have to be addressed when implementing the interferomet-
ers. The following section presents techniques used in this thesis to realise two
interferometers with high visibility in the time-bin implementation.
7.1.1.2 Experimental implementation of the interferometers
Experimentally, each of these issues will contribute to the total optical QBER of
the experiment and thus has to be addressed carefully when building the interfero-
meters. Different strategies are possible for each. Now the experimental strategies
seized in this thesis are presented.
In general, the interferometers are built of fibre optic components, such as couplers
or EOMs. Each component is delivered with a certain length of optical fibre,
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which usually cannot be further specified when buying the product. To connect
the individual components, there are two different alternatives. First of all, there
are different types of standard connectors, such as E-2000, FC and SC, to name a
few, which have typical insertion losses of up to 0.3 dB. Secondly, bare fibres can be
spliced together in a process called fusion splicing, where an electric arc produces
heat which melts the tips of the two fibres before joining them together. Typical
losses are below 0.1 dB. Since the fibres of the components of the interferometers
have to be custom cut anyway to have matched interferometers, the second method
has been chosen.
Fibres are cut by the so-called cleaving, which results in a very clean and flat
surface. It is done by a cleaver which first introduces a crack into the fibre by a
blade, for example of diamond, and then breaking it by applying a tension. With
modern cleavers, a cutting precision in the order of millimetres can be achieved,
which is not sufficient here to reach the targeted δl. Additionally, two techniques
have been used: first of all, one interferometer is equipped with a simple fibre-
coupled variable optical delay (OZ Optics ODL-700, see Figure 57) which can be
controlled over a range of 4mm by turning one part of the two-part element which
is threaded. As the light passes through the device twice on its round trip through
the interferometer (see Figure 58 below), up to 8mm of path difference can be
adapted. As a second technique, a voltage controlled fibre-wrapped piezo ring is
used, which will be reported on below in this section.
Figure 57: The fibre-coupled mechanical variable delay line which is able to adjust
the optical path lengths of the interferometers by turning the threaded brass-coloured
element, taken from [136].
Next, the method used to ensure the polarisation overlap is presented. It has
been first thought of by Mario Martinelli [71]. The idea is to use Michelson-
instead of Mach-Zehnder interferometers, which have each arm terminated by a
Faraday mirror (FM) (see Figure 58). A Faraday mirror is a combination of a
mirror and a λ/4 Faraday rotator. The overall effect of the Faraday mirror is the
inversion of the polarisation vector, an incoming polarisation state at the input
of an interferometer is transformed into its orthogonal state at the output of the
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interferometer regardless of the polarisation transformation induced by the fibre
before and after reflection at the Faraday mirror. Like this, the polarisation overlap
is maximal.
1,5µm APD 1
Att.
Alice Bob
EOM
DL
FM
FM
EOM
APD 2
1 2
3
Circulator
DL
FM
FM
Figure 58: Simplified scheme of the BB84 time-bin implementation with Michelson-
instead of Mach-Zehnder interferometers. Both arms of each interferometer are termin-
ated with Faraday mirrors (FM). One arm of each interferometer is extended by a delay
line (DL) of optical fibre. Since for Michelson interferometers, input and output ports
are identical, the use of a circulator becomes necessary on Bob’s side. It is a device
based on Faraday rotators which guides light from port 1 strictly to port 2 and from
port 2 strictly to port 3, as indicated by arrows in the figure.
There is another advantage using Faraday mirrors: the EOMs used for phase mod-
ulation have a polarisation dependent modulation depth, the modulation affects
almost only the TM mode, while the TE mode passes unmodulated. The Faraday
mirrors ensure that the mode which has been TE before reflection becomes TM
mode on the way back and thus gets modulated as well.
Next, the approach for the phase stabilisation of the interferometers is addressed.
It is approached by two different strategies: first of all, the phase is passively
stabilised by a temperature stabilisation scheme. In addition, there is an active
stabilisation by a voltage driven piezo ring wrapped in several meters of fibre.
Both strategies have been pursued during a master thesis [176] in the framework
of this dissertation.
The passive stabilisation is concerned with creating a temperature stable environ-
ment for the optical fibre. The change in optical path length under temperature
changes can be estimated to be 10−5K−1 (empirical value, by courtesy of the
GAP-Optique of the University of Geneva). This means a fibre optical path in
the order of metres as in the interferometers will exhibit phase changes of mul-
tiples of 2π for temperature variations in the order of K. To minimise temperature
changes, the interferometers are heated to well above room temperature with heat-
ing foils (Telemeter Electronics) in conjunction with a temperature sensor and a
homemade proportional-integral-derivative controller (PID controller) as feedback
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loop. The PID controller relies on existing technology within the research group
and will not be presented in detail here. The housing of all fibre optical elements
forming the interferometers is built of copper (Cu) packed in thermo-boxes made
from polystyrene. The copper content as well as the targeted heating temperature
are optimised to maximise thermal inertia of the housing. The homemade PID
controller is able to control the temperature of the heating foil with a resolution
in the range of mK. The exact stability of the feedback-controlled temperature
under the given conditions is not known, but a minimal temperature stability of
0.1K should be expected. This translates into a minimal phase stability in the
order of π. It is also important to fix the optical fibre with adhesive tape into the
housing, otherwise a type of fibre optic microphone [137] very sensitive to acoustic
vibrations is built.
Now the active phase stabilisation with the piezo ring is presented. The ring
is actually used for two different tasks: length adaption of the fibre and phase
stabilisation.
It works by implementing a piezo ring with optical fibre which is tightly wrapped
around the ring in one interfering path, see Figure 59. By expanding or contracting
the ring through application of a voltage, rapid changes of the fibre length an thus
of the optical path length can be induced [138]. The ring has a circumference of
74mm. Its maximal contraction under application of one kV is 5µm. With 64
windings of optical fibre on the ring, the index of refraction of the fibre of about
1.45 and given that the light travels through the ring twice, the achieved optical
path length variation is of about 3mm. To regulate the phase at a precision of
better than 0.2 rad (see V∆ϕ in Equation 114), an adjustment precision of the
piezo in the order of nanometres is required. Comparing this precision to the
maximal path length variation, it is apparent that at least 22 bit resolution of the
DAC involved in the feedback loop and an overall very noise free amplification
and electronic circuitry are needed. These requirements are also very demanding
for the feedback loop itself. Due to finite resources, a first implementation with
an 8 bit DAC and a PC-controlled feedback loop has been sought. This is to be
replaced by an appropriate DAC and a FPGA controlled feedback loop in the
future (see Figure 55). Also, a classical photodiode and strong classical light is
used for the feedback here. In a final implementation, the quantum signal and the
APDs could be used for this if the count rate is high enough so that the statistical
uncertainty acquired over a feedback loop cycle allows to regulate at the targeted
precision.
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~ V
Figure 59: A piezo ring is shown whose diameter can be changed by applying a voltage.
In blue the optical fibre which is tightly wrapped around the ring in order to modulate
the optical path length of the transmitted light.
As voltage supply capable of delivering the required kV, a Hamamatsu power
supply for phototubes (Type C9619-51) is used. One encountered experimental
subtlety concerns the process of winding the fibre round the piezo ring. Since the
ring contracts under applied voltage, the fibre has to be wrapped around the ring
when the maximal voltage is applied. This is not trivial not only due to the high
voltage but also because the fibre should be wrapped with a constant but not to
high mechanical tension on it (risk of breakage). It is accomplished by a small
homemade machine turning the ring with an electric motor while the fibre is kept
under constant but weak tension manually. At the same time, the voltage is applied
through the rotation axis by a cable mounted such that it turns together with the
ring without tangling up. To achieve this, a high-voltage Bayonet NeillConcelman
(BNC) connection is used as bearing, with the plug serving as fixed axle whereas
the jack is rotating with the piezo ring. At the end of the process, the fibre is
fixed on the piezo with instant glue. Only after the drying process the voltage is
eventually lowered to zero. Several ramps of low to high voltage are applied to
even out the mechanical tension throughout the wrapped fibre.
The piezo is installed in one arm of Bob’s interferometer. The ∼15m of fibre are
compensated for in the other arm by the same amount of fibre wrapped around a
ring of the same material and thus the same thermal characteristics.
The scheme of the feedback loop is shown in Figure 60. On the left-hand input side,
the desired value is available to the feedback control software in form of a bit value.
At the same time, the given voltage on the piezo ring results in a certain phase
between the two arms of the interferometer and thus a certain detected intensity.
This intensity is transformed to a bit value by an analog-to-digital converter (ADC),
which is fed back to the PC and compared to the desired value. The feedback mech-
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anism then adapts the bit fed to the DAC controlling the piezo ring. It should
be noted that the resolution of the ADC is less critical since it is only used for
the phase stabilisation and not for the length adaption. It thus only needs to be
able to resolve the intensity increment equivalent to a phase change in the order
of 0.2 rad.
PC DAC Piezo Int
ADC Det
Bit I(φ)
Figure 60: Schematics of the feedback loop used for the phase stabilisation scheme with
the piezo ring. The controller is implemented in software on a PC. A digital-to-analogue
converter (DAC) controls the piezo ring wrapped in fibre which serves to stabilise the
phase in an interferometer (Int). The intensity I(ϕ) resulting from the relative phase is
detected (Det), the detection signal is converted to a bit value by an analog-to-digital
converter (ADC).
The regulative element of the feedback mechanism is a simple integrative element
which is implemented in software (FreeBASIC) [176]. The integration interval as
well as the time constant of the controller are found experimentally.
Due to a broken variable optical delay (OZ Optics), the length adaption could
not be tested. Because of this, there is no conclusive result for the maximally
achievable visibility of the interferometers. The effect of the phase stabilisation
with an optimally adjusted feedback loop and 8 bit digital resolution of the used
DAC is shown in Figure 61. A signal from the photodiode shows the fluctuations
of the intensity after two unbalanced interferometers, which depends on the phase
due to interference. It should be noted that no complete constructive or destructive
interference can be observed because a CW laser instead of a pulsed laser is used
here.
From time t = 0 s until t ≈ 18 s (identified by the red arrow in Figure 61), the feed-
back is turned off. Large intensity fluctuations from relative minimum to maximum
can be observed. When the feedback mechanism is switched on, these fluctuations
are significantly reduced. If the required phase stability had been achieved, the
fluctuations would have been hardly noticeable in Figure 61. However, the res-
olution of the 8 bit DAC is not sufficient to reduce them to a tolerable level for
long term QKD transmission. The feasibility of the usage of the piezo ring for
stabilising the phase can nevertheless be shown. It should be noted as well that
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the temperature stabilisation has been switched off during the measurement.
Figure 61: The detected signal behind the interferometer before and after the feedback
loop is turned on. Taken from [176]
7.1.2 Signal generation, detection and synchronisation between Alice
and Bob
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Figure 62: Shown are all components (non-greyed out) which are used for the optical
signal generation and detection as well as the synchronisation between Alice and Bob.
On top the optical components are shown, below the electronic control unit consisting
of FPGAs and additional electronics. The scheme is described throughout Section 7.1.2.
The components necessary to generate and detect the quantum signals and to
synchronise sender and receiver are shown in Figure 62. It involves parts of the
optical setup and the FPGA and electronics modules. The quantum signal (its
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signal path is symbolised by red lines) is generated by a 1.55µm pulsed distrib-
uted feedback (DFB) diode laser (ID Quantique ID300) in combination with an
appropriate attenuator (Att.). Each pulse has a duration of 300 ps, the pulse re-
petition frequency depends on the frequency of an applied electronic trigger signal
generated by Alice and is variable over a wide range. The attenuation is variable
and can be set according to the transmission losses (see Section 4.4.3). The in-
tensity will be anyhow less than one photon per pulse in average. On Bob’s side,
the quantum signal is detected by one of two indium gallium arsenide (InGaAs)
APDs (ID Quantique ID210 and ID201). They only work in the so-called gated
mode, which means that they are only able to detect photons upon application of
a gate of increased bias voltage (cf. Section 4.3.4) of variable length. This gate is
generated synchronous to an electronic trigger signal which is provided either by
an internal oscillator of the APDs or externally. Here it is provided by Bob (APD
trigger signal in Figure 62). In order to detect the sent quantum signal with high
probability, this trigger should be applied at a fixed instant in time before the
quantum signal impinges on the detectors and synchronous to the pulse repetition
frequency of Alice. This requires a precise synchronisation between sender and
receiver, see next section. A detected signal from one of the APDs is indicated by
an electronic pulse at its output. These pulses are read in by the FPGA on Bob’s
side, see Figure 62.
On the sender side, additionally to the quantum signal, an optical signal used for
the synchronisation is generated by a pulsed laser. Both the signal and the syn-
chronisation laser need an input electronic trigger signal, provided by the FPGA
and homemade electronics (signal adaption and duplication). The laser is the same
type than the one used for the quantum signal (ID Quantique ID300), but emitting
at a different wavelength of 1.3µm (a blue line in Figure 62 highlights its signal
path), facilitating the spectral separation of both. For this purpose, two WDM
add-drop multiplexers are used. The first one on Alice’s side adds the unattenu-
ated synchronisation signal to the transmission channel. The second one, at the
entrance of Bob’s optical setup, separates the quantum and the synchronisation
signal again. The synchronisation signal is detected with a fast photodiode (PD,
New Focus 1592), which generates an electronic pulse proportional to the detec-
ted intensity. This electronic pulse than has to be further processed electronically
in order to synchronise Bob to Alice. For this purpose, homemade electronics
is used (Signal adaption and duplication in the figure), see Section 7.1.2.3. The
synchronisation pulse is generated well ahead of the quantum signal in time, so
there is enough time for the electronic trigger signal to reach the APDs before the
quantum state arrives. This temporal separation also helps to reduce noise from
spurious light of the synchronisation pulse due to imperfect filtering of the WDM
device on the receiver side.
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7.1.2.1 Requirements on the synchronisation
There are two ostensible reasons why Alice and Bob need to be synchronised.
First of all, they have to agree on the index of each bit they sent and measured,
respectively. Especially, since in QKD many transmitted signals become subject
to losses during transmission, Bob cannot number and list every measured signal
and directly compare his list to the numbered list of Alice’s sent signals. Instead,
when Alice and Bob are synchronised, Bob can count every experimental cycle and
number each measured signal accordingly. It is then easy for both to identify the
signals which can be used to form a quantum key. Second, as has been mentioned
in the last section, the used InGaAs APDs require an electronic trigger signal
synchronous to the pulse repetition frequency of Alice.
Additionally, the time-bin implementation uses temporal filtering to sort out the
the quantum signals which have been subject to interference. There are three
different time-slots a signal can arrive at Bob’s side due to the different path com-
binations it can take in the interferometers (see Section 4.2). A sufficient temporal
resolution is thus paramount to filter out the interesting events originating from a
light pulse which has taken either the short arm on Alice’s side and the long arm
on Bob’s side or vice-versa.
The overall timing resolution depends on several factors: it is first and foremost
limited by the pulse width of the signal pulse and the timing jitter of the employed
APDs. Additionally, the timing jitter of the synchronisation comes into play. The
convolution of these three factors yield the overall temporal resolution. It should
be as high as possible for different reasons: it is possible to adapt the path length
difference ∆l of the interferometers to the temporal resolution, but eventually
this is unfavourable because a greater ∆l makes the phase stabilisation of the
interferometers more difficult. Also, for large ∆l, the repetition rate becomes
constrained. Finally, the better the temporal resolution of the setup, the shorter
the detection gate on the APDs can be chosen, which reduces detection noise.
Due to this reasons, a timing resolution of minimally one nanosecond has been
considered advisable and is demanding yet achievable with available components.
At first, the minimal timing resolution due to the used equipment for the generation
and detection of the quantum signal is calculated, starting with the contribution
of the signal laser. The pulse-width of the signal laser cannot be chosen too small
because this results in a large spectral bandwidth which puts severe constraints on
the interferometer unbalance mismatch δl, see Equation 112. Also, due to chro-
matic dispersion in the fibre, the small pulse width could not be sustained over
larger transmission distances. The pulse width of the signal laser used here is about
300 ps. The additional jitter of the output light pulse of the laser with respect to
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the input electronic trigger signal is 43 ps, as has been measured by the manu-
facturer. The timing jitter of the employed APDs is typically around 200-600 ps.
A convolution of these values gives a minimal timing resolution of the equipment
between 364 ps and 672 ps. The additional contribution of the synchronisation to
this jitter should thus maximally have the same order of magnitude. Starting with
the involved optical components, the requirements on the additional electronics
(signal adaption and duplication in Figure 62) can be evaluated. The synchron-
isation laser has a low jitter contribution of 43 ps for the time between the input
electronic trigger and the output pulse, just as the signal laser. The jitter of the
photodiode on Bob’s side presumably has the same order of magnitude than the
laser. The resulting overall jitter thus mainly depends on the additional jitter
of the electronics. If for the electronic circuitry involved in the synchronisation,
standard transistor-transistor logic (TTL) (see next section) was used, a minimum
jitter of several nanoseconds would be inevitable [139]. Thus, the components and
the digital logic used for procession and transmission of electronic signals have
to be chosen well and high-end electronic circuits have to be designed. A report
on this is included in the next three sections. The following section introduces
the light signal generation on the sender side. In the subsequent section, the light
detection scheme on the receiver side is presented. The report on signal generation
and detection is completed by the results of a performance test of the ensemble of
sender and receiver.
It should be noted that an additional requirement on the synchronisation scheme
is a stable detection rate throughout the whole transmission period of a quantum
key distribution, regardless of variations of fibre length due to temperature changes
or mechanical changes. This is accomplished by the presented scheme since both
the quantum and the synchronisation signal are constantly transmitted through
the same fibre.
7.1.2.2 Generating light signals
The generation of the quantum and the synchronisation signal is started with a
digital signal originating from Alice’s FPGA, see Figure 63, which triggers both
lasers. Instead of taking separate signals from the FPGA for each laser, it has been
decided to take a single signal and duplicate it with a separate electronic module
(Signal adaption and duplication in the figure). The reason for this method is that
the FPGA itself emits TTL signals (see below in this section) with a relatively high
jitter. By appropriate electronic circuitry, the crucial relative jitter between both
trigger signals after duplication can be kept much lower. This is realised by a
specifically designed electronic circuit. This circuit also has the possibility to set
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an adaptable delay between the two output trigger signals. Like this, the temporal
distance between quantum and synchronisation signals is variable within a certain
range. The circuit has been realised as a final project of a bachelor thesis [178] in
the framework of this dissertation. The logic of the circuit as well as the design of
the printed board is described in detail in the following. It serves as an example
for other homemade electronic circuits described below.
Laser 1,3μm
Laser 1,5μm
WDMƩ͘
Alice
KƉƟĐĂůƐĞƚƵƉ
&W'нůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐƐ
Signal 
ĂĚĂƉƟŽŶΘ
ĚƵƉůŝĐĂƟŽŶ
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ůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐƐ
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Figure 63: This scheme of the optical signal generation focuses on the paths of the
involved electronic and optical signals on the sender side. A transistor-transistor logic
(TTL) pulse from the field programmable gate array (FPGA) is converted by a spe-
cialised printed circuit board (PCB) (Signal adaption and duplication) to two emitter
coupled logic (ECL) pulses of which one is delayed with respect to the other. They
trigger the lasers emitting optical pulses serving as synchronisation (blue) and quantum
signals (red), respectively.
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Beforehand, a short introduction into digital logic families is made: three import-
ant logic families shall be presented here, TTL, ECL and complementary metal-
oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) [140]. TTL is a standard electronic logic. It is
robust, easy to implement with electronic boards, but not very fast, with typical
switching times in the order of 10 ns and considerable electronic jitter in the or-
der of ns [139]. ECL is a very fast digital logic family operating with negative
voltages, with possible switching times below 1 ns and very low jitter. With its
inputs and outputs which are typically differential, it is very well suited for noise
resistant differential signal transmission with two complementary signals (see for
example [141]). Disadvantageous are the more complex circuitry for differential
high frequency signals, the obligatory negative power supply and the high power
dissipation. There is also a variant using smaller amplitudes to achieve faster
switching, called reduced swing ECL and a version using a positive power sup-
ply, positive emitter-coupled logic (PECL). Finally, CMOS is nowadays the most
widely used digital logic. It is relatively simple, compact, consumes low power
except in high frequency applications and is relatively fast, although not as fast as
ECL. Due to its very low jitter, ECL has been chosen for the involved electronic
circuitry here.
In Figure 63, the course of both quantum and synchronisation signals on the sender
side is explicitly shown, involving the electronic trigger signals. A single trigger
signal is emitted by the FPGA. This trigger signal is a digital TTL pulse with a
pulse width of 25 ns. The designed PCB (Signal adaption and duplication) converts
this pulse into two pulses in ECL format. One is output directly to trigger the
emission of a light pulse of pulse width 300 ps at 1.3µm used for synchronisation
(blue pulse). The other electronic pulse is subject to a variable delay and thus the
emission of the light pulse of 300 ps at a wavelength of 1.5µm is triggered at a later
instant in time. This light pulse becomes the actual quantum signal after being
split up in Alice’s unbalanced interferometer (red pulses) and being attenuated to
approximately single photon level.
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Figure 64: The trigger circuit is shown. The signal paths are highlighted by blue lines.
Integrated circuits (ICs) or circuitry of interest, which are described in the text, are
either highlighted by yellow rectangles and labeled or magnified. Electrical wiring is
green, all components as ICs or e.g. resistances are red. The inset on the bottom left is
a magnified image of the wiring for the Thevenin equivalent parallel termination. The
inset on the bottom is a zoomed in cascade of capacitors to buffer the power supply of
an IC. The ICs for power supply are not shown.
The circuit of the designed electronic board (printed circuit board (PCB)) for sig-
nal adaption and duplication is shown in Figure 64. The circuit and the printed
board which describes the physical realisation of the circuit (see Figure 65) have
been designed with the software Einfach Anzuwendender Grafischer Layout Editor
(EAGLE). In Figure 64, the path of the trigger signal on the board is highlighted
by a thick blue line. The signal from the FPGA is transmitted to the PCB with a
specialised shielded conductor cable for parallel multi signal transmission of up to
68 signals. It is connected with a very-high-density cable interconnect (VHDCI)
connector (see Figure 65). The TTL signal is converted to a differential ECL sig-
nal by a translator chip (MC100ELT24, ON Semiconductor), highlighted in Figure
64 (Translator TTL to ECL), with a very low inherent jitter of typically 2.5 ps.
The signal output of this integrated circuit (IC) is differential, thus two comple-
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mentary output signals are actually generated. One is directly used to trigger the
synchronisation laser via a SubMiniature version A (SMA) coaxial output (un-
delayed output of ECL signal in Figure 64, see also Figure 65). The other output
drives one of the differential inputs of a cascade of three specialised delay chips
(SY100EP195V from Micrel, highlighted in Figure 64) interconnected with differ-
ential transmission lines. With this the delay of the output signal is adjustable
between 6.6-37.3 ns [142]. It can be set manually with a 12 bit static ECL signal
through a 12 bit dual in-line package (DIP) switch, see Figure 64. Behind the last
delay chip, there is a driver module (MC100EL12 from ON Semicondutcor, Signal
driver in the figure). This chip has a single input and two differential outputs
and is able to drive ECL signals via long low impedance transmission lines. In
addition, it protects the sensitive and expensive delay chips from strong currents
caused by short circuits. One output of the driver IC is used to trigger the signal
laser, the other one can be used for testing purposes. Both are output via SMA
outputs, as can be seen in Figure 65 (SMA output of delayed signal and vertical
SMA output for testing purposes, respectively).
For proper functioning, it is very important that every IC chip has a supply voltage
which is buffered against voltage variations with several capacitors ranging from
1nF to 1µF. One of such typical capacitor cascades is shown in one inset of Figure
64.
The layout of the PCB is shown in Figure 65. Signal transmission lines are high-
lighted in light red. The PCB has Eurocard dimensions of 100mm×160mm, suited
to fit in standardised 19-inch racks. All electronic chips are surface-mount devices
(SMDs). For the design of the board some basic rules have been respected to
guarantee a high signal quality of the trigger signal: first of all, all the chips have
been placed as close as possible to each other, keeping signal transmission lines as
short and straight as possible. The signal transmission lines should not be crossed
by other insignificant lines such as for the voltage supplies. If a straight line is not
possible, it should be curved as smoothly as possible, see inset on top of Figure 65
for an example. All lines should have well defined impedances of 50Ohm to avoid
reflections. This is achieved by choosing a width determined by the material and
the thickness of the dielectric layer of the board and the thickness of the line itself.
Tools to calculate the appropriate width are available online, for example [143].
The board is constructed with four layers, beside the top layer with the principal
ICs (ICs highlighted in yellow along the signal transmission line in Figure 65) and
the bottom layer where the voltage controllers are situated, there are two inner
layers: one ground layer and one which represents the negative voltage supply
needed for the ECL. This assures a low-induction low-noise power supply. TTL
is less sensitive to noise from its positive power supply and therefore it does not
have a separate layer.
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It is also advised to put the smallest of the cascade of buffer capacitors, which has
a value of 1 nF, as close to the supply voltage pins of the ICs as possible, see inset
on the bottom of Figure 65 for an example.
The electrical termination of the transmission lines between the ECL chips is
guided by two principles: first of all, power has to be supplied to keep the transist-
ors of the ECL devices at their operating point. Second, the effective impedance
should be 50Ohm. This can be achieved by the Thevenin equivalent parallel ter-
mination (see inset of Figure 64) [144]. It consists of a connection of the conduction
strip to the -5V power supply via a 125Ohm resistance. A second resistance of
83Ohm connects the strip to ground.
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Figure 65: Shown is the layout of the trigger board in a top view. All lines and surface-
mount device (SMD) parts which are on the top side of the board are dark red, those
which are on the bottom are dark blue. The signal transmission line is light red (dashed
if it is situated on the bottom of the board). All main components which are described in
this section are highlighted in yellow. The inset on the top is a magnification of a curved
transmission line. The inset on the bottom zooms in on a cascade of four capacitors
with the smallest one being as close as possible to the power supply pin of the integrated
circuit (IC).
A large heatsink with cooling ribs installed close to ICs for the power supply on the
board, cf. Figure 65. It is necessary to dissipate the amount of heat generated by
those ICs. Also, each logic chip should be subject to constant airflow for cooling.
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To have an idea of the achievable jitter with the presented electronic equipment
on the sender side, a TTL trigger signal is used as input of the PCB while the
two outputs to are connected to a measurement device. Both with a fast digital
sample oscilloscope (Tektronix DPO7104) and a time-to-digital converter (TDC),
a coincidence counting instrument with very high timing resolution (PicoHarp 300
from PicoQuant), the maximal jitter between the two ECL outputs of the board
is determined to be smaller than 28 ps [178]. This result shows that the sender
equipment is suitable to achieve the targeted timing resolution.
7.1.2.3 Detecting light signals
Figure 66 shows explicitly all optical and electronic signals involved in the detection
and synchronisation on the receiver side. The optical synchronisation signal (blue)
and the quantum signal (red) are separated by a WDM add-drop multiplexer. The
synchronisation signal is detected by a photodiode (PD). The resulting electronic
signal is used to synchronise Bob’s FPGA to Alice and to trigger the APDs. The
analogue signal from the photodiode is proportional to the intensity of the syn-
chronisation pulse, typically a pulse with a peak amplitude in the order of 100mV
and a width in the order of 100 ps is generated. This signal cannot be used directly
as input for the APDs and the FPGA since it is to small and short. It has to be
transformed to a broader digital logic signal. Again, homemade electronics is used
for this task (Signal adaption and duplication in the Figure). A broad TTL signal
is used to synchronise the FPGA, since it needs a positive voltage input signal and
since the exact timing is not critical. However, as has been explained in Section
7.1.2.1, the exact timing of the APD trigger signal is crucial, hence ECL is used
for this. The trigger input of the APDs is variable and the threshold voltage to
detect the trigger can be set manually. If a quantum signal is detected by one of
the APDs after a trigger has been applied, a TTL signal is generated which is read
in directly by the FPGA.
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Figure 66: This scheme focuses on the optical and electronic signals on the receiver
side. The synchronisation signal pulse (blue) arrives prior to the quantum signal (red).
It is detected by a photodiode (PD), which transforms it to an analogue electronic pulse
proportional to the optical one. It is converted into a transistor-transistor logic (TTL)
signal which synchronises Bob’s field programmable gate array (FPGA) and an emitter
coupled logic (ECL) signal which triggers the avalanche photodiodes (APDs). The APDs
emit TTL pulses upon detection which are read in by the FPGA.
Converting the analogue electronic pulse of the photodiode into a digital logic
signal is demanding because of its low amplitude and small width. As shown
in Figure 67, a very fast comparator IC (ADCMP581 from Analog Devices) is
used to transform it into a reduced swing ECL signal. The comparator has two
signal inputs: the actual signal Vsig and a reference voltage Vref . If Vsig > Vref ,
the output is switched to a high level, otherwise it is on low level. Since the
amplitude of the analogue synchronisation signal Vsig depends on the losses of
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the optical transmission channel between Alice and Bob, it is useful to have an
adjustable reference voltage Vref . It can be set by a DAC (AD9740 from Analog
Devices) whose output is controlled by a 10 bit signal which can be set manually
or by the FPGA. An external PCB can be used for this, see Appendix B.2. The
reduced swing signal is then broadened by two two capacitors connected to ground
which act as low pass filter. A second, fast comparator (ADCMP566 from Analog
Devices) transforms the signal to regular ECL.
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Figure 67: A simplified scheme of the first part of the the signal adaption electronics
which converts the analogue output of the photodiode to a digital emitter coupled logic
(ECL) signal. The input (on top on the left side) is transformed to a reduced swing
ECL signal by a fast comparator (ADCMP581). The reference voltage Vref defines
the switching point of this comparator. It is set by a digital-to-analogue converter
(DAC) (AD9740) which is controlled by a 10 bit input word. The DAC additionally
needs a periodic clock signal to read the control bits. This clock is provided by a
voltage-controlled oscillator (VCO) and a Schmitt-Trigger which create a clock signal
at approximately 7MHz (not shown). The output of the comparator is differential as is
typical in ECL. Q is the reduced swing ECL signal, Q¯ the complementary signal. Both
outputs are first broadened by two capacitors connected to ground before a second fast
comparator (ADCMP 566) transforms them to a regular ECL signal.
The temporal shape of the signal is then still very narrow and has to be broadened
so that it can be used as a trigger signal. This is achieved by using a scheme
consisting of delay ICs and a flip-flop IC, shown in a simplified version in 68. In
this scheme, the output of the second fast comparator is split up. One part is
connected to the S (Set) input of a flip-flop IC (MC100EL31), while the other
part is delayed with respect to it by a delay IC with an adjustable delay of up to
4.3 ns, controlled by a 9 bit input. This input can either be set manually or by
Bob’s FPGA through an external PCB, see Appendix B.2. The delayed signal is
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connected to the R (Reset) input of the flip-flop chip.
The scheme of the pulse-width modulation with the flip-flop IC is shown in Figure
69. A signal on the S input sets the output (Q) of the flip-flop to high. A delayed
signal on the R input then sets it to low again after the time ∆t delay. Like this,
the output pulse width ∆t PWM is set by ∆t delay.
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Figure 68: A simplified scheme of the second part of the the signal adaption electronics
which converts the short digital emitter coupled logic (ECL) pulse into a longer pulse.
The short ECL signal of the output of the second comparator (ADCMP566) on the
left is split up. One transmission signal pair is connected to the S input of a flip-flop
integrated circuit (IC) (MC100EL31). The other one is subject to an adjustable delay
set by a delay IC (SY100EP195V). The delay time is controlled by a 9 bit input word.
The output of this IC is connected to the R input of the flip-flop chip. The D input of
the flip-flop is set to a logic low level at all times.
Two things have to be respected in order for this scheme to work: first of all, the S
and the R input of the flip-flop IC should never be on high level at the same time,
otherwise an undefined output state results. This can be achieved by setting a
minimum delay ∆t delay larger than the pulse-width of the input pulses. Second,
the D input of the flip-flop IC has to be kept on a logic low level at all times.
Appendix B.1 shows the complete circuit and board layout of the PCB. Behind the
flip-flop in Figure 68 there is actually a dual differential output driver to multiply
the available outputs and to protect the preceding ICs from short circuits. The
output can be directly used to trigger the APDs.
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Figure 69: The signal scheme of the inputs and the output of the flip-flop integrated
circuit (IC) over time is shown. A signal input exceeding a threshold voltage (dashed
horizontal line) at the S input sets the output Q to high. A low to high transition of the
R input at a time ∆t delay later sets Q to low again. The output of Q is thus a pulse
of pulse-width ∆t PWM controlled by ∆t delay.
To synchronise Bob’s FPGA, an ECL signal not used for triggering the APDs
is converted to TTL. At the same time, the pulse width is further broadened to
about 20 ns in order to be readable by the FPGA. For this purpose, another PCB
is used. It uses the same principle of pulse width modulation as has been reported.
For the conversion of ECL to TTL, a translator IC is used. The circuit logic and
the layout of the corresponding PCB is shown in Appendix B.3.
The operation of the receiver unit con only be tested in conjunction with the light
generation scheme of the sender. The testing is reported on in the next section.
7.1.2.4 Testing the synchronisation
The whole synchronisation setup has been tested over a short transmission of ∼5m
in the quantum channel, cf. Figure 70. Only a single National Instruments FPGA
(NI PCI 7813R, see Section 5.2.3) controlling both Alice and Bob has been used
for this purpose with a PC as user interface. The optical setup has been kept very
basic, without the interferometers and only with a single APD. This suffices to
test the functionality of the light generation and detection scheme and the timing
resolution of the synchronisation.
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Figure 70: A scheme to test the light generation and detection of the setup as well as
the synchronisation between sender and receiver. A measurement cycle is started with
a laser trigger signal emitted by the field programmable gate array (FPGA). It ends on
Bob’s side with a single photon detection on the avalanche photodiode (APD), which
has been triggered by a synchronisation signal emitted by Alice. This detection event
is then indicated by a signal read in by the FPGA. If this cycle is completed and if the
temporal resolution of the synchronisation is within the requirements, the scheme can
be used for the quantum key distribution (QKD) experiment. The temporal resolution
is measured with a fast digital sample oscilloscope probing the laser trigger signals on
Alice’s side and the APD trigger signal on Bob’s side.
Starting point of the test is a 25 ns long TTL pulse as trigger signal. It is generated
at 100 kHz from the FPGA. Both the optical synchronisation signal (blue in Figure
70) and after a time delay of about 32 ns the quantum signal (red in the figure) are
transmitted. When the appropriate voltage discrimination level and the maximum
delay for the pulse width modulation are set, the detected synchronisation signal
from the photodiode (PD) is converted to an ECL pulse with 5 ns pulse-width. This
signal successfully triggers the APD. Adapting the timing of the trigger signal by
choosing appropriate lengths for the electric cables and the optical fibres as well as
fine-tuning with an electronic delay directly adjustable at the APD enables single
photon detection at a rate of approximately 7 kcts/s. This is the expected rate for
pulses with mean photon number of 1 emitted at 100 kHz, a detection efficiency
of 10% and the typical loss of the WDM devices and the transmission channel.
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When th signal laser is turned off, the dark count rate is below 1Hz, which shows
that no additional noise is generated by the synchronisation pulses. The detection
signal of the APD is successfully read by the FPGA. The signal for synchronising
the FPGA is a TTL pulse of 20 ns pulse-width and is also read in by the FPGA.
A PC connected to the FPGA via PCI runs a GUI. This GUI features counters
which display the count rate of the APD detections as well as the synchronisation
signal counts.
The jitter between the trigger signal on the sender side and the trigger signal for
the APD on the receiver side is measured by a fast digital sample oscilloscope
(Tektronix DPO 7104) by probes connected to each signal path (see Figure 70).
It is measured to be 41 ps on average, thus clearly fulfilling the requirements on
the temporal resolution. Figure 71 shows a screenshot of the oscilloscope during
the measurement.
Figure 71: A screenshot of the oscilloscope during a performance test of the synchron-
isation. The yellow trace is the emitter coupled logic (ECL) laser trigger on the sender
side, the blue trace the ECL trigger signal for the avalanche photodiodes (APDs) on the
receiver side, which has been transmitted optically. Encircled in red at the bottom is
the standard deviation of 38.15 ps of the time delay between the rising edges of both
signals.
Increasing the attenuation in the quantum channel and thus simulating larger
transmission distances quickly brings the synchronisation scheme to its limit. The
output signal of the photodiode and its narrow pulse width then render the trans-
formation to a digital signal extremely difficult. This represents a limit for this
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scheme. Using a laser with a larger pulse width for the synchronisation would be
an improvement.
The reference level of the discrimination voltage of the comparator which converts
the analogue pulses from the photodiode (see Figure 67) is set manually via a
DIP switch on a separate PCB (see Appendix B.2) for the test reported here.
The PCB also offers the possibility to control it by the FPGA. This would enable
an automatic adjustment to adapt to the actual transmission losses in a final
implementation.
7.1.3 The control unit: field programmable gate arrays, software and
digital-to-analogue converters
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Figure 72: Shown are all components which are used to control the execution of the
quantum key distribution (QKD) experiment (non-greyed out). This comprises field
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) both on sender and receiver side, each connected
to a PC via USB for the execution of superordinate tasks and two digital-to-analogue
converters (DACs) used to interface the FPGAs to the electro-optic modulators (EOMs).
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Finally, the control and data acquisition unit of the experiment is reported on.
At the heart of it lie two FPGAs, one each for sender and receiver, see Figure
72. It interfaces the optical setup. As has been presented, additional homemade
electronics is needed for this. Part of this electronics are the DACs needed for the
phase modulation by the EOMs (see figure), which are described in this section.
The FPGAs also interface PCs via USB used for superordinate actions, as for
example overall management processes like the initialisation of the experiment
and key data storage. Also user control by GUIs is enabled, random numbers are
acquired (Random no. acqu. in the figure) and an Internet connection between
Alice and Bob is established. This is necessary not only for initialisation processes
but also for the post-processing of the quantum key.
Since a complete time-bin BB84 setup for testing has not yet been available (see
Section 7.1.1.2), the control unit is implemented and tested with the existing setup
for QKD with single photons, see Chapter 5 and cf. Figure 73. Using this setup,
the control and execution of mostly all interesting tasks can be tested. The QKD
transmission management is executed by two PCs. When the transmission is
started, at first an Internet connection is established between Alice and Bob. Also,
random bits are obtained from a server connected to a QRNG ([172], see Chapter
8) which is located within the local network. A connection to the respective FPGA
is established via USB. Once all connections are established and enough random
numbers are obtained, the actual transmission is started. It is controlled by the
FPGAs of Alice and Bob. First of all, the EOMs are set according to the random
bits via DACs which transform the output bits of the FPGAs to an analogue
voltage amplitude compliant with the predefined settings (entered via the GUI).
The laser exciting the single photon source (SPS) is triggered at a predefined
moment on the sender side and the APDs are read out the by Bob’s FPGA the
moment the photon should arrive. The obtained raw key is transmitted to the PC
via USB. After transmission, sifting, error correction and privacy amplification are
conducted.
There are only few differences with respect to the outlined time-bin setup: the Si
APDs used here are free-running and do not need a trigger. The synchronisation
is established with an electronic signal instead of an optical one. The free-space
setup working with polarised photons does not need a phase stabilisation and
length adaption nor any other feedback mechanism. Finally, only a single QRNG
is used, connected to Alice and Bob via the local network.
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Figure 73: Scheme of the complete quantum key distribution (QKD) setup to test the
control unit consisting of PCs, field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) and digital-to-
analogue converters (DACs). The QKD setup for this test consists of a single photon
source (SPS) emitting single photons in free-space which are polarisation modulated
by an electro-optic modulator (EOM) on Alice’s side. Another EOM on Bob’s side
implements his basis choice. Two avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are used for detection.
Contrary to the setup of Figure 72, the First In, First Out (FIFO) integrated circuits
(ICs) used as intermediary between the USB modules and the FPGAs (control unit) are
shown. Also, only one quantum random number generator (QRNG) is used which is
connected to Alice’s and Bob’s PCs via Internet connection. Taken from [177]
Major parts of the presented work have been realised during a master thesis [177] in
the framework of this dissertation. The work is based on results accomplished in an
earlier master thesis [175], which were presented in Chapter 5. A major difference
between both implementations is the type of FPGA which has been used. In the
first project, a National Instruments FPGA (NI 7813R) programmable with Lab-
VIEW has been tested. The FPGA has been interfaced via Peripheral Component
Interconnect (PCI) with a PC for data storage and to realise a GUI (cf. Section
5.2.3). Additionally, a post-processing algorithm has been established by a separ-
ate software on this PC (cf. Section 5.3). This work has served as a blue print for
the control and data acquisition unit presented now. In this recent implementa-
tion, GUI, experimental process management and post-processing are integrated
within a single software. Also, two autonomous FPGAs for sender and receiver are
used. Due to lower cost and higher flexibility, FPGAs directly programmable with
Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Language (VHDL) are
used instead of modules programmable in LabVIEW. Starting with a single FPGA
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for both Alice and Bob, the concept is then expanded to separate units. Using
large parts of code developed previously helps to save up resources.
7.1.3.1 The field programmable gate arrays
FPGAs are programmable logic similar to a programmable digital logic circuit
[177]. They consist of an array of configurable basic modules, in-/output blocks
for the in- and output of digital signals as well as specialised modules such as
phase-locked loop (PLL) modules, block-random-access memory (RAM) and non-
configurable modules realising specialised mathematical functions. All these mod-
ules are connected by a wiring system. A schematic setup of such a FPGA is
shown in Figure 74. For Xilinx FPGAs, as used here, the basic modules are called
configurable logic block (CLB) and consist of lookup tables (LUTs) realising the
desired functionality and a Flash memory for the storage of this functionality.
Figure 74: Schematical structure of a field programmable gate array (FPGA), taken
from [177]
A FPGA is typically configured by loading relevant files from an external memory
when powering up. The FPGAs used here are programmable with a development
environment called Integrated Software Environment (ISE) design suite. It of-
fers two different possibilities for programming the FPGA: with circuit diagrams
combining different predetermined logic elements in a circuit or via the hardware
description language VHDL which describes the hardware processes on an abstract
level. Translating the programmed functions into the internal logic of the FPGA
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is accomplished by a software module which is supplied by the producer for each
type of FPGA individually.
Both FPGAs are used in the form of an evaluation board which additionally
supplies the electronic environment including power supply, I/Os in the FPGA
Mezzanine Card (FMC) standard, possibilities for Internet connections etc. Also
available is a Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) port with which the FPGAs can be
configured. One evaluation board, the Xilinx SP605, is used as both sender and
receiver in a first test and later exclusively as sender. It uses a Spartan 6 FPGA.
The receiver counterpart is a Zedboard Zynq-7000 development board, which uses
a different programmable logic and an Advanced RISC Machine (ARM) micro-
processor allowing for the implementation of a system on a chip (SoC). With this,
an operating system independently of a PC could in principle be run, making the
latter unnecessary. Despite some differences, the boards are similar enough to be
described by a similar algorithm. The design of the electronic periphery is also
very similar [177]. Like this, further resources are saved up.
The FPGAs have to accomplish several tasks. First and foremost, the quantum
transmission has to be controlled as described above. Some processes involve
communication with a PC via USB. Since no direct USB connection from the
FPGA is foreseen, an external USB module is used (FTDI UM232H), which uses
the serial synchronous FIFO format, which can handle data rates up to 40MB/s.
The USB communication between FPGA and PC has to be configured. On the
side of the PC, a driver provided together with the USB module can be used.
Additionally, it has an interface for the configuration of the communication of the
module with the FPGA. The serial synchronous FIFO format used here calls for
FIFOs as communication buffers between the module and the FPGA. The FIFO
adapts the module to FPGA communication, executed at 60MHz, to the internal
FPGA frequency which is derived by integer division of its clock frequency of
64MHz. Not only the physical communication between module and FPGA has
to be configured, but also the communication between PC and FPGA on a higher
level of abstraction. All communication is supervised by the use of checksums.
14 of the FPGAs I/Os are used for this USB communication. All other I/O can
be used to connect to the experiment. A specialized shielded cable with a VHDCI
connector is used for this. As physical interface, a homemade PCB is used [177],
which fits the FPGAs I/Os format (FMC) on one side and features a double
VHDCI connector on the other side, as well as three BNC connectors and a layout
for integration of the USB module, see Figure 75. The PCB also uses level shifters
to adjust signal voltage levels of the FPGA of maximally 2.5V to the electronic
equipment of the experiment which needs 3.3V.
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Figure 75: Schematics of the printed circuit board (PCB) used for interfacing the
field programmable gate array (FPGA) with the experiment via very-high-density cable
interconnect (VHDCI) and Bayonet NeillConcelman (BNC) connectors and the PC via
USB. The FPGA itself is connected to the board with a FPGA Mezzanine Card (FMC)
standard connection. Also shown are the level shifters from 2.5V to 3.3V. Taken from
[177]
7.1.3.2 The control software
The software used for Alice and Bob are structurally similar. Both contain a soft-
ware module for Internet communication to exchange data as well as a software
module for USB communication with the FPGA. When both programmes are star-
ted, procedures as described in the beginning of Section 7.1.3 have to be performed,
starting with the Internet connection between Alice and Bob. It is established from
Bob to Alice by using her predetermined Internet Protocol (IP) address. Random
numbers are acquired through an Internet connection to a QRNG server in the
local network. In a future implementation, the random numbers should be ac-
quired locally from two separate QRNGs for Alice and Bob in order to guarantee
the secrecy of the random numbers. The FPGAs are configured via the USB con-
nection. When all connections are established and the FPGAs are configured, the
software representing Bob, which contains the GUI for user interaction, waits for
input. In this GUI (see Figure 76), the user can enter experimental parameters in
the run tab such as the key size to be sent by Alice, the repetition frequency and
the exact timing of the laser trigger as well as the instance the APDs are read out,
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which depends on the transmission distance. In the config tab of the GUI, e.g. the
specific voltages to be applied to the modulators for the different bits and basis
choices are entered in form of a number between 0 and 1023 each, corresponding
to 10 bit. These numbers have to be determined by a pre-measurement.
Figure 76: The run tab (above) and the config tab (below) of Bob’s graphical user
interface (GUI) to control the QKD experiment. Taken from [177].
Once the configuration is terminated and all entered parameters are transmit-
ted, the transmission is initiated by both Alice and Bob downloading and saving
the appropriate size of random numbers so no bottlenecks due to a bad Internet
connection occur during transmission. When both FPGAs are synchronised, the
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quantum transmission is started. After the transmission is completed, the pro-
cessing of the raw key, which includes sifting as well as post-processing, can be
started. For this, some parameters like the security parameter s (cf. Section 5.3)
can be chosen via the GUI. After a secure key has been generated, statistics about
the process, as sifted and secure key rate, are displayed as well as a binary picture
of the secured key which should show no structure for a random key, see on top in
Figure 76.
For building the software functionalities, the C++ library Qt is used, which con-
tains ready-made modules for building GUIs as well as for Internet and USB
communication. For the post-processing, existing software (see Section 5.3 and
[175]) has been integrated.
7.1.3.3 The digital-to-analogue converters
Two DACs are used to translate the 10 bit signals of Alice’s and Bob’s FPGAs into
analogue voltage signals for the EOMs. They are integrated on a single homemade
PCB realised as part of this thesis. The complete circuit and the corresponding
board are shown in Appendix B.4. A simplified circuit with a single DAC is shown
in Figure 77. A DAC IC from Analog Devices (AD9740) puts out a current IDAC
proportional to the applied 10 bit value and a complementary current I¯DAC =
ImaxDAC − IDAC . The 10 bit in parallel (DB0-DB9) as well as a signal indicating a
new bit value at the inputs is supplied by the FPGA (clock). The maximal output
current of the DAC is 20mA. With the termination of the output with 15Ohm
to ground, the differential input of the following differential amplifier (Analog
Devices AD8129AR) is maximally 0.3V. The gain of the amplifier is set by the
feedback pin (FB). With the chosen resistances, a gain of (1 + RF/RG) = 10 is
set, resulting in a maximal/minimal output voltage of ±3V. The last stage of
amplification comes from a conventional operational amplifier (op-amp) (Linear
Technology LT1363) in an inverting configuration with a gain of RF/RG = 1.6¯.
Like this an output voltage range of ±5V is produced. Also, the maximal current
of the op-amp is large enough to directly drive the fibre-coupled EOM which is
terminated with 50Ohm. All components are high frequency components which
work in the MHz regime. For the free-space polarisation-based BB84 scheme used
here, existing high-voltage amplifiers designed in the Nano-optics research group
precede the EOMs.
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Figure 77: A simplified scheme of a single digital-to-analogue converter (DAC) used
to drive an electro-optic modulator (EOM), consisting of a DAC integrated circuit (IC)
(AD9740), a differential amplifier (AD8129AR) and an operational amplifier (op-amp)
(LT1363).
7.1.3.4 Testing of the complete control unit
In a first test implementation, the Xilinx SP605 is used successfully as control unit
for both sender and receiver. The control software for sender and receiver are run
separately on a single PC and communicate via Internet within the local network
of the research group. In a final test, the Zedboard Zynq-7000 is used as separate
receiver control unit, synchronised to the sender via electronic signals. Also in this
case, a secure quantum key has been successfully transmitted.
Only few steps are left to complete this control module: first of all, instead of an
electronic signal, the optical synchronisation scheme of Section 7.1.2 shall be used.
In addition, sender and receiver control software should operate on separate PCs
and use separate QRNGs connected locally for their random number supply.
7.2 Summary and outlook
Major components of the time-bin plug & play scheme have been realised: the in-
terferometers have been built with a compensation scheme for uncontrolled trans-
formations of the polarisation in the interferometer arms. Strategies for length
adaption of one interferometer to the other and active/passive phase stabilisation
have been integrated by use of temperature stabilisation, a mechanically adjustable
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optical delay line and a fibre-wrapped piezo ring. A first test has shown the prin-
cipal feasibility of the phase stabilisation scheme. A DAC with a higher resolution
and a feedback loop integrated in the FPGA control unit would be the next step to-
wards robust high visibility interferometers for the realisation of an autonomously
running time-bin BB84 QKD scheme.
In addition, a suitable optical synchronisation scheme between Alice and Bob with
high temporal resolution has been successfully realised. In a future scheme, the
current synchronisation laser could be replaced by a specimen with longer pulse
length and/or higher intensity to make the transmission scheme suitable for longer
distances.
An automated control unit for sender and receiver has been realised. It governs
the complete experiment including the post-processing. In the future, it should be
operated on two separate PCs and with random numbers from two local QRNGs,
one each at Alice’s and Bob’s position.
Each module needs only few steps for completion. Integrating the modules into a
complete time-bin BB84 setup will accomplish the implementation.
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8 Realization of a quantum random number
generator
Quantum randomness plays a principal role in quantum information processing
(QIP). It manifests itself in quantum key distribution (QKD) when Eve measures
in the wrong basis and cannot measure the qubit Alice sends to Bob deterministic-
ally. It also serves as a reliable and cryptographically safe source of randomness for
the bit and basis choice of Alice and Bob in this context. In addition, good sources
of randomness are indispensable for more practical or even mundane applications:
they are an essential resource for classical cryptography and for Monte-Carlo sim-
ulations. Furthermore gambling and lotteries require good random numbers. For
any of these applications, if the used random numbers are of low quality (see Sec-
tion 8.1), because they do not occupy each possible random outcome with the
same probability or because they are predictable, this can be fatal to the respect-
ive application. Thus, a generator of “good” random numbers, a random number
generator (RNG), is of wide interest. If additionally the inherent randomness
of quantum mechanics is exploited as in a quantum random number generator
(QRNG) and if this device is practical and puts out random numbers at a high
rate, then this device steps out of the niche other devices that apply quantum
information processing still occupy.
A QRNG with an extremely high output rate of random bits of 152Mbit/s has
been realised in cooperation with PicoQuant GmbH and will be described in this
chapter. PicoQuant GmbH has designed and manufactured the device while the
testing and general analysis of the device was realised within this dissertation.
This effort has led to a joint publication [172] and a public online service providing
random numbers from the QRNG [145]. The QRNG has even reached the status
of a commercial product [146].
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 8.1 introduces the general notion and
scientific interpretation of randomness, how it can be produced and quantified. In
particular randomness generated by random quantum processes is discussed.
The subsequent Section 8.2 presents the design and technical implementation of
the QRNG and the deployed methods to guarantee the randomness of the output.
Finally, Section 8.3 analyses the resulting randomness of the output before and
after post-processing. Randomness is tested by the application of an exhaustive
randomness test on a large amount of random output sequences.
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8.1 Random numbers
The need for random numbers has been motivated by a variety of straight for-
ward examples. However, the definition and recognition of true randomness is a
challenging task, as will be discussed in the following. Before regarding random
numbers from a quantum perspective, the concept of randomness is introduced. A
positive integer random number in binary format, a sequence of N random bits,
can be described as X = {x0, x1, ..., xN−1|xiϵ {0, 1}}. For a true random number,
P (xi = 0) = P (xi = 1) =
1
2
, independently of all the other bits in the sequence.
This is the same as saying that every possible X has equal probability of appear-
ance of P (X ) = 2−N or that all 2N integer numbers representable by the sequence
are equally likely. Looking at a single number generated by a RNG does not give
any information about its randomness. For this purpose, it is advantageous to
look at the binary representation of this number, in which the probability of each
bit and a possible bit interdependence might be revealed by statistical tests if the
tested sequence is long enough. But the underlying probability distribution of the
physical process used for the random number generation is not revealed by a stat-
istical test of the output. Hence, in addition to statistical testing, this distribution
should be analysed well to quantify the degree of randomness of a RNG.
Before this aspect is further formalized, different concepts of random number gen-
eration shall be introduced. First of all, an important distinction is to be made
between pseudo random number generators (PRNGs) and true random number
generators (TRNGs).
A PRNG uses a deterministic algorithm to produce a number with seemingly ran-
dom properties out of a smaller seed consisting of a number or sequence which may
be random. Beside the obvious deterministic relation between seed and output,
even the output of a PRNG is often limited in its randomness , as can be revealed
in statistical tests.
A TRNG utilizes a physical process such as thermal noise or quantum processes
(see below) that is known or believed to be random. The process should be well
understood in order to remove eventual residual deviations from an ideal random
process by an adequate post-processing algorithm.
Quantum randomness has already been described in this thesis, for example when
introducing the BB84 protocol in Section 2.2. The prototype of a random process
is the single photon impinging on a 50:50 beam splitter (BS), with two single
photon detectors, one at each output port of the BS (see Figure 78).
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Figure 78: A simple scheme of a quantum random number generator (QRNG): a
photon impinging on a beam splitter with two output ports. Each detector is associated
with a different bit value.
In an ideal implementation of this experiment, with a perfect BS and perfect (or
perfectly equal) detectors, the generated sequence of “0s” and “1s” each associated
with a click of one of the two detectors is perfectly random. In reality, the beam
splitter will most likely be imperfect, creating a little bias towards one bit value
in the random sequence. Also, single photon detectors typically have a dead time,
i.e. a time after a detection when the detector is not able to register another
photon. If the period between two single photons is shorter than the dead time,
correlated bits might be produced. In addition, with each photon only creating a
single bit per detection, the overall bit rate is limited. Nevertheless, if carefully
designed, this is a valid approach for a QRNG [147].
Alternatively, Poisson processes which have exponential waiting times like radio-
active decays or the detection of a single photon from an attenuated Poissonian
light source can be used [148, 149, 150]. The latter approach is implemented here,
cf. Figure 79. The light of a light emitting diode (LED) is attenuated to single
photon level with respect to the average period between two detection events in
a photomultiplier tube (PMT). The waiting times between two detection events
are registered by a time-to-digital converter (TDC). The particle-like nature of the
single photons leads to waiting times between two detection events with a Pois-
sonian distribution. This exponential waiting time can than be translated into a
binary sequence by simply expressing the time in binary representation. In this
manner, many bits can be created by only two successive events.
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Figure 79: A different scheme of a QRNG compared to the BS solution in Figure 78:
an attenuated light source emits single photons with a Poisson distribution. The random
arrival times of the photons are exploited to create random numbers.
Because the waiting time distribution is exponential, it is not free of bias. But
with an appropriate post-processing, this bias can be removed.
The randomness of a number can be quantified by the Shannon entropy, cf. Section
4.4.1. If some number or sequence Xk out of 2N possibilities has a probability of
appearance of p(Xk), the Shannon Entropy is
H(X ) = −
2N
k=1
p(Xk) · log2(p(Xk)) . (118)
It gives a measure of the average information contained in the number in units of
bits. If every number out of the set is equally probable, than one needs just as
many bits as necessary to represent that same number, i.e. N . If the probabilities
are not equally distributed, if there is e.g. a repetitive pattern in each binary
sequence representing a number, then the Shannon entropy results in less than N
bits. Hence it should be as close as possible to N for a random number generator.
A more rigorous way to measure the randomness of a number or bit sequence is
the min-entropy H∞,
H∞(X ) = −log2 ma
k
x p(Xk) . (119)
The min-entropy gives a measure of the largest bit sequence such that all possible
sequences have a probability of maximally 2−H∞ .
To quantify either entropy, one needs to know the underlying probability distribu-
tion. If one is just confronted with a number or sequence claimed to be random,
it is not obvious if it is really random. That is why tests for random numbers
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have been established. Tests on a binary sequence calculate the probability of the
actual test statistics of the tested characteristic under the assumption of perfect
randomness. Only if this probability is above an agreed value, the randomness
of the sequence is accepted. Since it is improbable but possible that a random
sequence takes a highly unlikely form, a single failed test is not meaningful. Only
a repetitive failure of many different sequences of a random bit string in a given
test could confirm that the string is actually not random.
8.2 Design of the quantum random number generator
The quantum random number generator (QRNG) presented here is based on atten-
uated light from a LED which is detected by a PMT. The average photon detection
rate is 40MHz based on the detector capabilities. The time period between two
detection events is recorded by ultrafast time-tagging electronics with a timing res-
olution of 1 ps [151]. With this ultra-high timing resolution, the measured waiting
times can be measured with very high precision, resulting in many bits per meas-
urement. This and the real-time post-processing provide extremely high output
random bit rates.
One could argue that the photon statistics of the thermal light source (see Sec-
tion 3.4.1) lead to correlations between successive waiting times. However, the
according bunching effects would only be observed on timescales unaccessible to
the detector due to its considerable dead time of 80 ns, hence they do not have
any impact on the observed photon distribution.
Each waiting time event is registered by a 19 bit sequence which represents the
waiting time measured in picoseconds. Taking the minimal time-bin ∆t and the
given photon rate λ, the probability mass function of a waiting time xi between
two detection events is
p(xi) = e
−λi∆t(1− e−λ∆t) ≃ λ∆t · e−λi∆t , (120)
where i denotes the i-th time-bin. This function is obtained by integrating the
exponential waiting time distribution for the given rate over the width of a single
time-bin.
With this, the Shannon entropy becomes
S =
1− ln(λ∆t)
ln(2)
, (121)
where the approximation of Equation 120 as well as an identity for the geometric
series has been used.
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The entropy is thus 16.05 bits, the min-entropy is 14.61 bits.
With the given dead time of the PMT, the effective detection rate λ′ is reduced
with respect to the raw rate to
λ′ =
λ
1 + λτ
, (122)
with τ being the dead time. This formula can be found in the literature [152] and is
obtained by calculating the expected time between two measurements supposing a
Poissonian process and a dead time which is unchanged by detection events during
the dead time. The effective rate is thus λ′ = 9.52MHz with each detection event
resulting in 19 bits.
The bias due to the exponential waiting time distribution can be removed by using
an appropriate function for post-processing. For similar QRNGs, a secure hash
algorithm (SHA)-256 function has been used for this purpose. However, there have
been successful attacks on these functions [153, 154] which raise doubts about their
usage for sensible applications. In addition, they are hard to implement efficiently.
Here, so-called (n,m, k)-resilient functions are used for the post-processing. A
(n,m, k)-resilient function is a function f: Fn2 → Fm2 , which produces a perfectly
random output bit string (as defined at the beginning of Section 8.1) of length
m for k fixed input bits and the other n − k input bits perfectly random. They
have the advantageous property that they can be used as resilient correctors [155]
and as such have a quantifiable output bias for a known input bias. The input
bias is the deviation of the probability of each bit of the input bit string from a
perfectly random probability distribution. For a (n,m, k)-resilient corrector, the
output bias is a polynomial of the input bias of minimally k+1th degree [155, 156].
In order for these resilient functions to work, it is important that the input bits
are independent [156]. This is in general the case for an exponential waiting time
distribution [157]. However, one has to take care that is is also true for the specific
experimental implementation. This will be investigated in the next section for the
QRNG realised here.
In order to produce real time random data, the post-processing is implemented
directly into the field programmable gate array (FPGA) logic (see Section 7.1.3 for
more information on FPGAs) of the timing electronics. The output is delivered
via USB 2.0.
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8.3 Results
When random data is successfully generated, it is important to know its properties
well to quantify the quality of the produced randomness. This comprises an under-
standing of the underlying physical random process and testing of the statistical
properties of the output data. That is why both a theoretical and experimental
analysis of the resulting random data from the QRNG is carried out and presen-
ted here. In order to provide high statistically accuracy, 10million photon waiting
times have been collected to analyse the randomness of the raw data before post-
processing. Also, 30 files of 1.3TB each of post processed binary random data
output from the QRNG have been tested with a statistical test tool specifically
designed to test RNGs. This tool evaluates the randomness of output data by
submitting it to different statistical tests and by comparing the distribution of the
test results to the expected distribution of results when perfectly random data is
assumed. The tested amount of data corresponds to several weeks of constantly
generated random data of the QRNG.
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Figure 80: The bit value probability P [bs] as a function of the bit index s, without
taking into account the detector’s dead time (blue curve with crosses), with dead time
theoretically (cyan curve with crosses), measured (black curve with circles) and measured
with subtracted dead time (red curve with circles).
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It was shown in [157] that sampling with n bits from an exponential distribution
like the given one (cf. Equation 120) results in independent but biased random
bits s with 0 ≤ s < n with probability
P (bs = 1) =
1
1 + e(−λ∆t2s)
, (123)
where P (bs = 1) is the probability of bit s being one. This probability is shown
in Figure 80 (blue curve with crosses). It can be seen that the first eight to nine
bits are almost free of bias. For more significant bits, thus bits representing higher
powers of 2, a significant derivation from P (bs = 1) = 0.5 can be observed.
In the case of the implemented QRNG, the dead time of the detector further
influences the individual bit probability. The dead time can be interpreted as a
temporal region with constant detection probability of zero,
f(t, λ, τ) =

0 for t ≤ τ
λ · e−(t−τ) for t > τ . (124)
With this probability distribution, Equation 123 becomes
P [bs = 1] =
 t=2n
t=0
f(t, λ, τ) · (⌊ t
2s
⌋ mod 2)dt t=2n
t=0
f(t, λ, τ)dt
, (125)
where t is in picoseconds and the probability is selectively integrated over all times
where bit s is one. This probability is also shown in Figure 80 (cyan curve with
stars), together with the measured data (black curve with circles), which shows
good agreement.
During the dead time, detection events are impossible. This constant minimal
waiting time does not have an effect on the least significant bits which are un-
biased. For the most significant bits, which are biased, this constant minimal
time is perceivable (cf. figure) and actually results in correlations between bits.
This correlation is unwanted and also prevents the resilient function to work prop-
erly. This problem is solved easily by subtracting the constant dead time from
the measured waiting times. By doing this, one recovers the original independent
distribution from the measured data (cf. Figure 80, red curve with circles). The
least significant bits could be used directly as a random output. Since this imple-
mentation targets a high random bit rate, no bits should be neglected. To make
use of the more significant but biased bits, a resilient function is used to remove
the bias of the raw bits.
(n,m, k)-resilient functions can be constructed from (n,m, k + 1) linear codes
by the following scheme [158]: Let G be a generator matrix for an
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(n,m, k + 1) linear code C. Define a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m by the rule
f(x) = xGT . Then f is an (n,m, k)-resilient function. Here, a Bose-Chaudhuri-
Hocquenghem (BCH) code [159] is used to generate the resilient function. Starting
point for the creation of the code is the generator polynomial. The polynomial
used here is actually from a (255,231)-BCH code. Such a polynomial can be
generated for example by a function integrated by default into Matlab. From
this, a shortened (152,128,7)-BCH code is generated as described in the literat-
ure [160, 161] to form a (152,128,6)-resilient function. This function is also easily
implementable in hardware [162].
An advantage of this implementation which used resilient functions for post-
processing is that the maximal output bias of the generated random numbers
can be calculated. This is done here following the example of Theorem 15 of [156].
Using the given theoretical and experimental input bias, respectively, as well as
the generator matrix used, the maximal output bias is 10−22 for the theoretical
input bias and 10−21 for the measured input bias.
In the experimental realisation, the input of the function is constructed by con-
catenating eight waiting times with 19 bits each. The number of resulting output
bits after post-processing per sampled waiting time is 16 bits, in agreement with
the Shannon entropy of the input distribution. With the given effective rate of de-
tection, the output bit rate is about 152MBit/s, which is to the knowledge of the
author the highest reported at the time of the publication. For very sensitive ap-
plications, a resilient function with a higher compression rate could be considered
to match the min-entropy of ∼14 bits per detection event. However, it should
be pointed out that the performed analysis and the very low output bias already
without further compression reduces the necessity to make use of the min-entropy.
For statistical testing, the extremely rigorous big crush test from the TestU01 Suite
[163] has been used. The results are shown in Table 7. Tests with a large amount
of input bits have been performed. 30 random data strings of 1.3TB each are used
to realise 31 different tests on each of them. Since a random sequence can consist
of an unlikely pattern with a small but finite probability, occasional failures are
within expectations. Only repetitive tests, as executed here, can give a reliable
prediction about the randomness of the input bits.
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Test Passed Test Passed
SerialOver 30/30 SumCollector 30/30
CollisionOver 28/30 MatrixRank 30/30
BirthdaySpacings 30/30 Savir2 29/30
ClosePairs 29/30 GCD 30/30
SimpPoker 29/30 RandomWalk1 29/30
CouponCollector 30/30 LinearComp 30/30
Gap 30/30 LempelZiv 30/30
Run of U01 30/30 Fourier3 30/30
Permutation 30/30 LongestHeadRun 30/30
CollisionPermut 30/30 PeriodsInStrings 30/30
MaxOft 30/30 HammingWeight2 30/30
SampleProd 30/30 HammingCorr 30/30
SampleMean 30/30 HammingIndep 30/30
SampleCorr 30/30 Run of Bits 30/30
AppearanceSpacings 30/30 AutoCorr 30/30
WeightDistrib 30/30
Table 7: Results of the 31 different tests of the big crush battery of the TestU01 Suite
[163], tested on 30 files of 1.3TB each. The occasional failures (< 0.2%) of individual
tests are within statistical expectations.
To illustrate how the randomness is actually tested, two specific tests out of the
31 tests are described qualitatively, LempelZiv and Run of Bits. LempelZiv counts
the number of distinct patternsW in the bit string as proposed in the compression
scheme by Ziv and Lempel [164]. Under the assumption of randomness and for
large bit strings of length n, W is approximately normally distributed with a mean
and a variance which are functions of n [165].
Each binary sequence consists of a run of ones followed by a run of zeroes and so
on or vice-versa. For Run of Bits, the length of the runs of ones and of zeroes is
collected until there is a number of n runs for each [165]. The number of runs of
ones and zeroes of length j each are counted for j = 1, ... k for some k. Runs of
length larger than k are grouped with the runs of length k. The expected number
of runs of length j is simply given by 2−j. A Chi-squared test is then applied on
the 2k length counts of the tested sequence.
The introduced QRNG has become a commercial product, the PQRNG 150 [146].
One device is permanently connected to a server at the Department of Physics
of the Humboldt-Universita¨t zu Berlin (HU Berlin) and offers the possibility of
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downloading unique random numbers for various applications [145] to the pub-
lic. Random numbers from this generator have also been used for some of the
performed experiments in this thesis.
After 20 months of continuous operation, the randomness of this specific QRNG
has been re-tested by the same testing procedure as discussed above. The test
results [174] show the long term stable operation of the QRNG and its uncom-
promised random output.
8.4 Summary
A practical and ready-to-use QRNG with an output rate of 152Mbit/s has been
implemented. The underlying randomness distribution has been thoroughly ana-
lysed and tested. To remove its residual bias, a resilient function is used, which
provides a bound for the output bias of the random bits given the known input
bias. The randomness of the output and the stable longterm operation of the
device has been proven by repeated rigorous testing.
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9 Summary and outlook
This thesis has given a thorough introduction to quantum key distribution (QKD),
has implemented a new protocol for QKD, and has introduced a few QKD related
aspects, such as QKD with compact mobile single photon sources (SPSs) and in
particular the generation of random numbers from a quantum random number
generator (QRNG). The first section of this chapter chronologically summarises
the theoretical and experimental results of this thesis as well as important building
blocks towards future experiments which were implemented. In the last section,
an outlook is given on future experiments which will be enabled and motivated by
the research conducted in this thesis.
9.1 Summary
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In Chapter 5, the implementation of a
testbed for BB84 QKD experiments with
single photons from single quantum emit-
ters was reported. This testbed was used
for quantum key transmission with single
photons emitted from nitrogen vacancy
(NV) and for the first time also silicon
vacancy (SiV) centres in diamond. The
transmitted key was post processed to
a secure key by a CASCADE algorithm
programmed in the framework of this thesis.
A thorough security analysis for QKD
with imperfect single photon sources (SPSs) was established and requirements
on future SPSs were discussed which are able to compete with attenuated laser
pulses using decoy states [84].
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Chapter 6 reported on a protocol re-
lying on the time-frequency uncertainty,
the frequency-time (FT) protocol, which
was implemented for the first time while
using mainly off-the-shelve telecom com-
ponents. Different parameter sets describ-
ing the time and frequency states were
used for successful QKD. Numerical sim-
ulations have shown that a secure key
can be generated using the FT protocol
supposing individual eavesdropping at-
tacks specific to the protocol.
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Chapter 7 reports on the realisation and
testing of fundamental building blocks of
a fully automated fibre-based time-bin
BB84 QKD scheme. Functional control
units consisting of field programmable gate
arrays (FPGAs) and a personal computer
(PC) for sender and receiver were estab-
lished as well as a synchronisation and
detection unit enabling the autonomy of
both. Large parts of temperature stabil-
ised unbalanced interferometers with the capacity of automatic length adaption
and phase stabilisation were implemented.
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In Chapter 8, a high bitrate QRNG was
reported. The device outputs a ready-to-
use 152MBit/s of random bits. The ran-
domness of the underlying waiting time
distribution was characterized theoretic-
ally and experimentally. Due to resilient
functions which were used for maximizing the randomness of the output, the max-
imal bias of the output bits can be quantified for the known input bias. The long
term stability after 20 months of operation of the device was shown.
9.2 Outlook
The presented QKD experiment using defect centres as single photon
source (SPS), could, by implementing a few technical improvements, reach much
higher transmission rates. The key rate was mainly limited by non-optimised single
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photon emitters and relatively slow electro-optic modulators (EOMs) drivers. Es-
pecially the SiV defect centres have not yet been used up to their full potential.
Despite the relatively low probability of single photon emission per excitation
pulse, much higher excitation rates are possible due to the short lifetime of the
SiVs centre. In the research group of Christoph Becher in Saarbru¨cken, a SiV
centre excited at 80MHz delivered a count rate of 230 kcps with a g(2)(0) < 0.1
[171], see Figure 81. Using a testbed with capabilities of faster polarisation modu-
lation, as would be achievable with more advanced amplifiers for the EOMs used,
this could be exploited to implement a high bit rate QKD experiment using single
photons.
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Figure 81: The figure shows the g(2)(τ) value for a SiV centre for pulsed excitation at a
repetition rate of 80MHz. The count rate is 230 kcps with g(2)(0) < 0.1. With courtesy
of the research group of Christoph Becher from University of Saarbru¨cken.
A key message of the theoretical investigation of the suitability of SPSs for QKD
in this thesis could be summarised as follows: for a SPS to be attractive for
quantum information processing (QIP) and especially for QKD, a short lifetime,
a quantum efficiency near unity, high coupling into a usable (preferably single)
optical mode and a strong suppression of multi-photon events are mandatory re-
quirements. Projections onto each of these requirements into the future are made
now, showing the path to such high performance SPSs. Besides the SiV centre,
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also chromium (Cr) based defect centres in nanodiamonds have shown very bright
single photon emission [114] and short lifetimes.
Unfortunately, the quantum efficiency of the SiV and other defect centres can be
quite low. However, it has been shown that the quantum efficiency may vary sig-
nificantly within different nanodiamonds and that emitters with more than 90%
efficiency can be selected [166, 167]. An approach to enhance the quantum effi-
ciency requires enhancement of the radiative rate due to the Purcell effect [168, 169]
which is technically more challenging for a room-temperature emitter [80] but has
been demonstrated recently in [170].
Photonic structures to efficiently couple single photons from point-like SPS like
defect centres in nanodiamonds to a usable output mode have been demonstrated
[83, 79, 123] and show that collection efficiencies near unity might be possible in
the near future.
To suppress multi-photon events, near resonant excitation might be useful. Also,
using narrow band emitters, like SiV and Cr based defect centres would allow for
better filtering of the emitted light to reduce background photons.
All these approaches, their advantages and drawbacks, as well as new and not
yet known defect centres or other single photon emitters might be experimentally
analysed in depth using the QKD testbed implementation with its flexible and
easy-to-use confocal microscope setup. To test the performance limits of SPSs, as
mentioned, higher repetition rates of the QKD experiment would be desirable, as
would be readily achievable by the implementation of faster EOMs drivers.
Another interesting future application of the setup, in particular considering its
robustness and practicability, is the possibility to use it as student experiment.
These are an integral part of university studies in physics to enable the students
to perform experiments that are very close to those in modern laboratories. The
first hand experience of QIP with single photons could motivate students for a
research career in the field. The use of the setup with students has already been
successfully conducted several times.
For the frequency-time (FT) protocol, several paths shall be pursued in the fu-
ture. First and foremost, the existing setup could be simplified by using a narrower
frequency separation between the two states of the frequency basis to relax the
requirements in the timing resolution of the setup and/or using superconducting
single photon detectors (SSPDs) with a high timing resolution of about 30-50 ps
for a direct measurement of the arrival times. With this method, no switching on
Bob’s side would be necessary, which would reduce the overall complexity and the
error-proneness of the measurement in the time basis. Additionally, a complete
independence of the setup on the polarisation would be achieved this way. If an
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automated long term stable setup is striven for, no feedback mechanism on the
receiver side would be required. This would be a huge experimental advantage
compared to many other schemes.
Another important capacity of the scheme is the easy expansion to a higher number
of possibles states per transmission in time and frequency, probably enhancing
the security of the scheme. If the expansion in the dimensionality of states is
accompanied by an expansion in the dimensionality of bits per transmitted state,
the transmission rate could be dramatically increased. This expansion is currently
pursued at the Heinrich Hertz Institute (HHI), cf. Figure 82.
Figure 82: Planned setup of an experiment for the frequency-time (FT) protocol with
two transmitted bits per signal. On the sender side, four instead of two frequency states
are generated by a laser for the frequency basis. Pulses at one of four different instants
in time are generated by the intensity modulator for the time basis. Correspondingly,
on the receiver side, four different time and frequency states, respectively, have to be
distinguished by appropriate filters and four different avalanche photodiodes (APDs) per
basis. If very fast single photon detectors like superconducting single photon detectors
(SSPDs) are used, a single detector suffices to implement the measurement in the time
basis. With courtesy of the Heinrich Hertz Institute (HHI).
The FT protocol is very well suited for long distance satellite transmission. To
make a step towards this long-term goal, line-of-sight automated free-space trans-
mission over 500m between Technische Universita¨t Berlin (TUB) and HHI is cur-
rently planned using the expertise of free-space optical systems group of the HHI
and their pre-installed free-space sender and receiver units, see Figure 83.
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TUB
HHI
Figure 83: Planned line-of-sight free-space transmission between Technische Uni-
versita¨t Berlin (TUB) and Heinrich Hertz Institute (HHI) using pre-installed sender
and receiver units. With courtesy of the HHI.
Finally, collaborations with renowned quantum information theorists would enable
a more thorough security analysis and could also establish a proof of unconditional
security in the future.
For the fibre-based time-bin BB84 QKD setup, the future steps are quite
clear: expanding the length adaption and phase-stabilisation capabilities of the
interferometers, integrating its control loop into the existing FPGA control unit
on the receiver side, enhancing the long distance synchronisation capabilities by
using stronger and/or longer synchronisation pulses, and combine everything in a
complete, automated setup. This setup could not only be used as a benchmark to
other protocols and implementations, it could also be used as a testbed for new
variations of the existing protocol and/or to test new eavesdropping attacks on
their effectiveness.
In the future, the experiment could also be used as a very advanced student ex-
periment representing the status quo of secure information transfer in QIP.
The quantum random number generator (QRNG) has already reached the
status of a commercial product [146] offering higher random bit rates than any
other comparable product on the market. In addition, on average 0.8Gigabyte
each day have been downloaded from the website of the Humboldt-Universita¨t zu
Berlin (HU Berlin) [145]. In the near future, quantum random numbers could also
be delivered as an exclusive licensed service to companies or research groups in need
of good and safe random numbers, possibly with extended cryptographic protection
171
when transmitted via the Internet or even with a locally installed QRNG. Also,
higher rates through parallelization of several devices can be envisaged, which
could be vital for some applications.
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A No cloning theorem
A perfect quantum cloning machine could be represented by the following mech-
anism:
Cˆ |0⟩ |Ψ⟩ = |0⟩ |0⟩ (126)
Cˆ |1⟩ |Ψ⟩ = |1⟩ |1⟩ (127)
|0⟩ and |a⟩, respectively represent the state to be copied, Cˆ the copy-operator and
|Ψ⟩ represents the blank state of the ”copy machine”. By linearity of quantum
mechanics, if Cˆ is to be applied to a superposition state, our copy machine would
produce the following:
Cˆ(α |0⟩+ β |1⟩) |Ψ⟩ = α |0⟩ |0⟩+ β |1⟩ |1⟩ (128)
This does not correspond to the desired cloned state, which is
(α |0⟩+ β |1⟩)(α |0⟩+ β |1⟩) . (129)
B Circuits and Layouts of printed circuit boards
B.1 The analogue to broadened ECL converter
The full circuit (Figure 84) as well as the layout (Figure 85) of the printed circuit
board (PCB) introduced in Section 7.1.2.3 (see especially Figure 68) is shown. It
is used for the conversion of the analogue electronic signal coming from a photo-
diode into a digital emitter coupled logic (ECL) signal, whose pulse width is then
broadened. The principal integrated circuits (ICs), shown as dark red rectangles,
triangles and octagons with dark red labels, consist of the digital-to-analogue con-
verter (DAC) (AD9740), the two fast comparators (ADCMP581 and 566), the
delay chip (SY100EP195) and the flip-flop IC (MC100EL31) as described in Sec-
tion 7.1.2.3. Additionally, a voltage-controlled oscillator (VCO) (LTC1799) and
a Schmitt-trigger (NC7SZ14) provide a clock input to the DAC of about 7MHz.
Also shown is a second delay chip (SY100EP195V) in front of the S input of
the flip-flop. This IC does not provide any noticeable delay, it is merely used to
provide an input pulse comparable to the R input of the flip-flop which is also
preceded by a delay chip. In front of the SubMiniature version A (SMA) outputs,
a line driver (MC100EP11) provides sufficiently powerful signals and protects the
sensitive circuitry from short circuits.
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Figure 84: The complete circuit of the analogue to ECL converter with pulse width
modulation (cf. Section 7.1.2.3). Shown on top is the first part of the circuit. All
components, as the principal integrated circuits (ICs) and all resistances, capacitors
etc. are dark red, the electrical wiring is green. Not shown are the ICs for power supply.
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Figure 85: Top view of the layout of the printed circuit board (PCB). Components
and wiring on top are shown in dark red, those on the bottom in blue. On the right side
one can see five SubMiniature version A (SMA) outputs and one SMA input. On the
left side an interface for controlling some of the boards functionalities.
B.2 The control board
The just presented printed circuit board (PCB) needs two adjustable parameters
as input: the reference voltage Vref (see Section 7.1.2.3) as well as the pulse width
of the output emitter coupled logic (ECL) pulse by setting ∆t delay (see Section
7.1.2.3). It therefore has an interface which is connected to another PCB with a
broadband cable. This PCB offers the possibility to set these parameters either
manually with two 10 bit DIP switches or with a connection to a field program-
mable gate array (FPGA) with a very-high-density cable interconnect (VHDCI)
connector. The circuit is shown in Figure 86. It basically consists of the two DIP
switches connected to the interface with the other PCB. The VHDCI connector for
the FPGA is also linked to this interface. To avoid interference between manually
set parameters and FPGA controlled parameters, there are two switches enabling
the one or the other mode of control. The layout of the board is shown in Figure
87.
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Figure 86: The circuit of the board used for setting the reference voltage as well as
the pulse width of the printed circuit board (PCB) from Section 7.1.2.3 and Appendix
B.1 above. Green lines represent electrical wiring, all dark red symbols represent com-
ponents. The setting of Vref and ∆t delay can be done with dual in-line package (DIP)
switches or externally via a signal coming from a field programmable gate array (FPGA).
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Figure 87: The top view of the layout of the described board is shown. All wiring and
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B.3 The board for ECL to TTL transformation and pulse-
width modulation
The circuit in Figure 88 is used for further broadening the output emitter coupled
logic (ECL) of the board presented in Section 7.1.2.3 and Appendix B.1. The
pulses are then translated to transistor-transistor logic (TTL), so they can be
used as synchronising input to Bob’s field programmable gate array (FPGA). The
incoming ECL pulse is first of all reshaped after its transmission by a driver integ-
rated circuit (IC) (MC100EL12). Afterwards, a pulse broadening scheme similar
to the one presented in Section 7.1.2.3 and Appendix B.1 is used, with two ad-
justable delay ICs (SY100EP195) and a flip-flop chip (MC100EL31). The delays
and thus the resulting pulse width are adjustable by a DIP switch in a range
between approximately 4 ns and 24 ns. The pulses are then transformed to TTL
by a translator IC (MC100ELT25).
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Figure 88: The printed circuit board (PCB) for emitter coupled logic (ECL) to
transistor-transistor logic (TTL) transformation and pulse-width modulation. All prin-
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B.4 The digital-to-analogue converter
Figure 90 shows the full circuit of the digital-to-analogue converters (DACs) presen-
ted in Section 7.1.3.3, with both DACs integrated on a single PCB. It is originally
equipped only with one VHDCI connector for use with a single FPGA for sender
and receiver (cf. figure). It has been subsequently extended to feature a second
connector, so it can be used with two separate FPGA platforms (not shown).
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Figure 90: The circuit of the double 10 bit digital-to-analogue converter (DAC) as
described in the text (shown without integrated circuits (ICs) for power supply).
The board layout is shown in Figure 91.
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Figure 91: The top view of the board layout of the digital-to-analogue converters
(DACs). Components and electric transmission lines on top are show in dark red, the
ones on the bottom in blue. On the left side on the bottom one can see the very-high-
density cable interconnect (VHDCI) input connector linked to the field programmable
gate array (FPGA). The small red lines connected to it are the transmission lines for
the two times 10 bit transmitted in parallel. On top of the VHDCI connector, the two
SubMiniature version A (SMA) outputs of the analogue signal are shown.
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